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Introduction
Conventional economic reasoning suggests that increasing a country’s stock of assets provides
greater opportunities for economic development. Somewhat paradoxically, a substantial and
growing body of empirical evidence suggests that natural resources tend to hinder, rather than
promote economic growth. The seminal studies of Sachs and Warner [1997] and Sachs and
Warner [2001] show that, after controlling for a wide variety of variables, an increase of one
standard deviation in ’natural resource abundance’ reduces economic growth by about one
percent per year. A puzzling result. In a similar vein, albeit possibly less paradoxical, it has
been suggested that resource-rich countries tend to suffer more from violent conﬂict than their
resource-poor counterparts. Work by Collier and Hoefﬂer [1998], Ross [2004b] and others
develops a compelling claim that certain resources might trigger civil wars and support rebel
groups in their efforts to ﬁght the government. For these reasons, natural resource abundance
has been called a ’curse’ for development rather than a blessing.
In general, conﬂict has become a pressing theme over the past years, which calls for solu-
tions. It has been and will most likely continue to be (as an example take the heavily discussed
terrorist threat) on the research agendas in many ﬁelds, such as political science, sociology,
biology, psychology and anthropology. The general discussion could often be enriched with
a more economic perspective, since so far, one of the advantages of economics - theoretical
modeling - has been neglected.
Of course, the obvious questions are how to alleviate the threat of conﬂicts and how to
manage them once they arise. To be able to come up with remedies, one ﬁrst has to understand
the causes. This is where economics can step in. Theoretical modeling provides a systematic
framework for studying the interplay of causes and effects, incentives and drivers of certain
12
phenomena, such as conﬂicts.
In the ﬁeld of conﬂicts over natural resources much work has been done to establish empir-
ical facts and ﬁnd regularities about such events. Research into the proximate causes of such
conﬂicts has been rather speculative though. It is the contention of this thesis that formalizing
these processes with the help of theoretical models is essential to a deeper understanding of
the issues. Thus the largest part of the present thesis is devoted to gaining insights on the issue
of conﬂict over natural resources in a formal, rational choice model of strategic interaction.
In particular, chapter 3 and 4 model conﬂict situations between two parties that ﬁght over
the distribution of resource rents. Chapter 3 investigates the issue of the geographical con-
centration of a resource and its effect on conﬂict intensity. Chapter 4 considers the effect of
the amount of resource rents on the intensity of conﬂict. In both cases there exists a consid-
erable amount of empirical literature on the topic, but the two works are ﬁrst in providing a
theoretical underpinning of the empirical results.
A government that wishes to avoid internal conﬂict over natural resources has two ways to
achieve this. The ﬁrst is military oppression of the people, achieved simply by building a large
military apparatus such that the population does not dare to uprise. A second possible strategy
is to try to ”buy the peace” by increasing people’s productivity in the non-resource sector. A
straightforward way to do this is by supplying productivity enhancing goods, such as good
health care, infrastructure, education, etc.. In this way the opportunity cost of ﬁghting for the
population increases and thus people are lured away from ﬁghting, and towards productive
activities.
Two chapters of the present thesis explicitly deal with these two distinct strategies of a
government. The aim of chapter 4 is to understand conﬂict intensity, and thus the focus lies
on the repressing strategy of a ruling elite. Chapter 5 on the other hand concentrates on the
choice of public good provision. Thus here the focus shifts towards the policy of “buying the
peace”.
Finally, chapter 6 has a singular standing within the thesis. Methodologically, it is the
only chapter that does not rely on game-theoretical tools, but it is exclusively conducted as an
empirical exercise. Conceptually it is dedicated to the other facet of the curse: the association
of natural resources and bad economic performance.
The remainder of this introduction is devoted to a brief presentation previewing the re-
search questions as well as main ﬁndings and conclusions of each of the chapters in turn.
Chapter 2 provides a thorough literature review, covering most of the ideas put forth in
relation to the resource curse. In particular this chapter also puts the remaining chapters of the
thesis in perspective, and positions them within the ﬁeld.CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
In Chapter 3, we develop a static, theoretical conﬂict model in which there is conﬂict over
the distribution of resource rents. One dimension along which resources can be classiﬁed is
their geographical concentration. One distinguishes pointy resources that are geographically
clustered (like for example oil ﬁelds or diamond mines) from diffuse resources, which are
spread out in space such as agricultural land or forests. In this chapter, we look at the effect of
the geographical concentration of the resource on the conﬂict intensity in the economy.
Our model is in the tradition of Hirshleifer [1995], but takes conﬂict technology as exoge-
nous. We interpret Hirschleifer’s “decisiveness parameter” as a proxy for resource pointiness
- more pointy resources more closely resemble a “winner takes all” context. 1 In the model,
the people are potential rebels and they allocate their time endowment to either production
or ’rebelling’ - contesting resource rents. Larger resource stocks, and more pointy resources,
may trigger more conﬂict and lower economic output as effort is diverted away from produc-
tive uses. However, when the presence of conﬂict lowers the productivity of effort allocated
to manufacturing (for instance, because of lack of trust or other spill-over effects etc.), then
resource contests through war can be less damaging to the economy as a whole than con-
testing resources through peaceful rent seeking. This is due to the fact that larger factions in
the economy have a strong incentive to forego conﬂict when it adversely affects their other
options.
Chapter 4 considers the relationship between the amount of resource rents and conﬂict
intensity, and the effect of resource rents on GDP growth. The ﬁndings suggest that resources
mayinducenegativegrowthratesinaneconomywithconﬂict, thuslinkingthetwodimensions
of the resource curse (conﬂict and low growth).
Empirical literature has established the stylized fact of a non-monotonous, hump-shaped
relationship between conﬂict intensity and the amount of resource. Conﬂict intensity peaks
at intermediate values of resource rents in the economy. Chapter 4 provides a theoretical
foundation of this empirical result.
To this end, we present a Stackelberg model of conﬂict, in which contestants have limited
endowments to be directed towards two separate sectors, thus incorporating salient features of
many conﬂicts. We model a game between two parties, the people of a country and the ruler.
The ruler is the owner of the resource but the people can contest that ownership and try to
steal part of the resource rent from him. In this case conﬂict arises. Each of the two parties
has a certain endowment that can be allocated either to productive activity or to appropriative
1When two parties ﬁght over a prize, the share grabbed by party 1 (or the probability with which the party






2 ) where ei is the conﬂict effort employed by party i (and where
p2 = 1 − p1). The parameter m in this formulation is the decisiveness parameter, determining how ’skewed’ the
distribution of outcomes will be in response to small changes in conﬂict effort.4
actions. As mentioned, the theoretical outcome of the model is consistent with several em-
pirical observations: we ﬁnd a hump-shaped relationship between resource rents and conﬂict
intensity, and that resources may induce negative growth rates.
In chapter 5, we consider explicitly the policy (in particular public good) choice of a ruler
in a resource rich country. The diverging experiences among resource rich countries show
that resource wealth may not always be a curse for a country, but can in some cases consti-
tute a blessing. Malaysia serves as a prime example of a country well endowed with natural
resources, that enjoys high economic growth. On the other hand, Nigeria, an oil rich country,
has been struggling with poverty and starvation for many years.
The opposing experiences come in several forms, one of them being the (under) provision
of public goods. We argue that the threat of conﬂict - as was pointed out inherent when a
country possesses resources - impacts upon the policy choice of a leader. In particular, we
model the policy choice of a ruler in a resource rich country who can, given the looming
threat of conﬂict over the distribution of the resource, either invest in military repression or in
productive public goods, such as physical and social infrastructure. Whereas both policies aim
at keeping the population from ﬁghting over the resource, we ﬁnd which of the two is chosen
depends on the relative strengths of the ruler and the population in contesting. Depending on
these parameters, different policy choices are made, which explains the differing experiences
of resource rich countries. In this chapter, we also test the hypotheses put forth by the model
on data from 67 countries over 25 years. The empirical ﬁndings corroborate our theoretical
predictions.
Finally, the sixth chapter provides a critical view on preceding resource curse results and
is in line with a recent discussion in the literature that attempts to upturn the conventional
wisdom of the past 15 years. We argue that the empirical literature up until now has ignored
serious endogeneity concerns, and thus empirical results are biased in most cases. Almost
all works use an endogenous measure for resource abundance of a country, namely resource
exports over total exports or GDP. Obviously, when investigating the effect of resources on
economic performance or growth this measure is endogenous. Recently available data on
natural resource stocks allows us to tackle this unresolved problem. Using the, for our pur-
pose exogenous, resource stocks allows us to examine the effect of (1) properly instrumented
resource dependence, as well as (2) properly measured resource abundance on economic per-
formance. Surprisingly, our results seriously challenge the hypothesis of a curse of natural
resources. This ﬁnding and related works are discussed thoroughly in the upcoming literature
review.
In addition, we also contribute to the literature of Development Accounting, a ﬁeld con-CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
cerned with identifying cross-country productivity differences. Up until now the only input
factors taken into account were human and physical capital. The remaining - unexplained
- part of output was attributed to productivity. In this chapter, we argue that natural capital
should also be considered, as it constitutes an important productive input in many countries
- our work ﬁlls this gap in the literature. The results obtained when accounting for natural
capital as an additional factor, suggest that productivity differences across countries are even
larger than assumed until now.
Concluding, the main contributions of this work lie in identifying several features that cru-
cially determine the degree of conﬂict in the presence of natural resources. We ﬁnd that certain
characteristics of resources (in particular their geographical concentration) matter, along with
the amount of resource rents that are open for grabbing. Also, we show formally how the rel-
ative strength of the two contestants (usually the government and the people) plays a critical
role in determining conﬂict and policy outcomes.
At the time this work was begun, the curse of natural resources could have virtually been
regarded as common knowledge, in particular among academics and many policymakers. In
the last years the ﬁeld evolved and broadened. One particularly interesting avenue of recent
research challenges at least one aspect of the resource curse hypothesis, namely the negative
association between resources and economic performance. The ﬁnal chapter of this thesis,
which is also the most recent, contributes to the incipient strand of empirical research that
questions some of the standing results in the ﬁeld, and as such invites future research to inves-
tigate this matter further.CHAPTER2
The Literature on the Natural Resource Curse: An Overview
In this chapter, we review the emerging literature on the resource curse and evaluate the main
explanations for this phenomenon. We will cover a wide range of explanations, starting from
structuralist theories from the 1950’s, to the famous Dutch Disease hypothesis and ending with
so-called “indirect explanations”, honing in on the adverse effects of resources on institutions
and governance quality. Much of this discussion has found its way into policy debates and
has resulted in policy recommendations as well as concrete initiatives, some of which will
be covered in detail. We then turn to a very recent development challenging traditional re-
source curse results. Finally we focus on a speciﬁc facet of the curse, the link between natural
resources and conﬂict, and thereby lead over to the rest of this thesis.
2.1 The Puzzle
2.1.1 The Origins Of The Curse
Sachs and Warner [1997] are among the empirical pioneers of the resource curse (others are
Gelb [1988] and Auty [1990]). They used multivariate regression analysis - Barro and Sala-i-
Martin style - to explain average economic growth over the period 1970-1990 in a systematic




= α0 + α1lnY0 + α2SXP + α3Z + ǫ (2.1)
where Yt is income at time t (so Y0 is initial income), SXP is the ratio of primary exports
to GDP in 1970 (or the resource abundance measure employed by Sachs and Warner), and Z
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is a vector of the usual control variables in cross country growth regressions (e.g. openness
of the economy, investment proxies, bureaucratic quality). Upon estimating (2.1), or a variant
thereof, Sachs and Warner found that their measure of resource abundance was negatively and
signiﬁcantly associated with economic growth. Ceteris paribus, they state that if country 1
is 12% more resource rich than country 2, the annual growth rate of country 1 will be 0.4%
lower. Over a 20-year time span this implies that the GDP of country 1 will around 8% lower
than that of country 2. This effect is also found when removing outliers, correcting for scale
effects, or working with different measures of resource abundance. The paradox was born.
2.1.2 Supporters
Although Sachs and Warner [1997] provided the seminal paper on the issue, they were not
alone in noticing the negative effect of resources on economic growth. Noticeable support-
ing work was done by for example Gylfason et al. [1999], Gylfason and Zoega [2001], Auty
[2001b] and Isham et al. [2005] who all ﬁnd evidence of a resource curse. Also several case
studies support the view of resources as a hindrance to development. For example, Ross
[2001b], trying to understand the destructive effect of timber booms in Southeast Asia, ana-
lyzes the deteriorating impact of timber booms on the quality of the institutions that are sup-
posed to manage timber harvesting. Karl [1997] observes that a large ﬂow of “petrodollars”
may weaken the state and undermine the government’s ability to manage the economy, which
consequentlyleadstopooreconomicperformancebytheaffectedcountries. Gelb[1988]takes
a close look at the experience of several oil exporting countries after the oil price booms in the
1970s and concludes that all of them would economically have been better off if no boom had
occurred, i.e. also in these cases resources were not the expected blessing.
Since the resource curse is a phenomenon aiming to understand the success of resource
rich countries, one might question the suitability of GDP growth as a measure thereof (Davis
[1995]). The wealth of resource abundant countries might only be a consequence of extracting
resources and converting them into cash ﬂow. But mere exhaustion of resources does naturally
not guarantee the sustainability of such a living standard (an argument consistent with the
discussion on genuine savings by Atkinson and Hamilton [2003] that is discussed later in this
chapter). An alternative is to investigate the effects of resources on developmental indicators.
Bulte et al. [2005] estimate a basic “development equation”, which is the equivalent of
the usual growth expression. The aim is to explain several development proxies (Human
Development Indicator, the share of the population that is undernourished, the share of the
population that lacks access to safe water, and life expectancy) by in particular the export
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“Point” resources are referred to as resources that are extracted from a geographically
narrow base. Resources such as oil and minerals fall into this category. “Diffuse” resources
on the other hand are thinly spread out in space as for example agricultural land.
The results of Bulte and co-authors are generally consistent with the ﬁndings of the growth
literature - there is a negative association between point resources and development indicators
(and no signiﬁcant association for diffuse resources). A detailed discussion about the distinct
effect of point and diffuse resources on economic growth follows shortly.
2.2 Suggestions For Causal Links: Theory And Empirics
A plethora of possible explanations has seen the light since the mid 1990s. In this section we
will present and where possible evaluate the explanatory power of these competing theories.
Pre-dating the current curse discussions, in the 1950s several “structuralist explanations”
weredevelopedthattriedtolinkunderdevelopmenttoexportsofprimaryproducts. Theyfocus
on declining terms of trade for primary commodities (e.g. Prebisch [1950]), ﬂuctuations in the
prices of such commodities, or lack of linkages between resource extraction enclaves and the
rest of the economy (Hirschman [1958]). None of these explanations have stood the test of
closerempiricalscrutiny(Ross[1999])-whileundoubtedlyrelevantforcertainresourcesthere
are exceptions to the structuralist’s dismal predictions (Tan [1983], Moran [1983], Behrman
[1987], Cuddington [1992], Lutz [1994], Dawe [1996], Fosu [1996]).
Manzano and Rigobon [2001] consider the impact of debt overhang. They argue that
resource abundant countries, using their stocks as collateral, incurred large debts in the 1970s
(when resource prices were high), and that this has adversely affected their growth potential
in the 1980s (when resource prices were low).
A similar idea was put forth by Davis [1983]. He shows that in a number of coffee-
exporting countries imports rose just as much as exports in times of windfall gains (the mid
1970s). Countries wanted to use their sudden wealth to promote development, and as a result
spending increased by much more than they could sustainably afford. After the boom of
primaryproducts, contractionarymeasures, withdetrimentaleffectsongrowth, hadtobetaken
in order to keep the current account balanced.
Manzano and Rigobon present some empirical evidence for their claim. Introducing credit
constraints (the value of a country’s debt over its GDP) into the regression leaves the coef-
ﬁcient on the resource abundance measure insigniﬁcant. This suggests that resource curse
results were caused by credit constraints facing resource rich countries after the commodity
booms of the 1970s.10 2.2. SUGGESTIONS FOR CAUSAL LINKS: THEORY AND EMPIRICS
One interesting question that arises is why resource abundant countries accumulated larger
debts than they could reasonably service, and why they failed to invest their loans in sufﬁ-
ciently productive projects. Consistent with earlier suggestions by Auty [1990], these ques-
tions point to some form of policy failure - perhaps akin to institutional failure - and we return
to this below.
Another class of explanations is made up by so-called Dutch Disease theories. The name
“Dutch Disease” was introduced by The Economist [1977] referring to the Dutch experience
of a declining manufacturing sector following the discovery of natural gas. Nowadays the
term refers to a general phenomenon: Resources may drive out certain sectors (such as the
manufacturing sector) and activities (such as human capital accumulation) that are conducive
for growth. Both of these issues are discussed below.
Models concentrating on the manufacturing sector suggest that resource booms undermine
a country’s competitiveness in activities that are conducive to long run growth. During a
resource boom capital and labour are drawn away from the manufacturing sector that provides
(endogenous) growth opportunities through learning by doing effects and forward as well as
backward linkages to the rest of the economy.
Matsuyama [1992] for example suggests that a large natural resource endowment results
in labour being drawn away from the manufacturing sector (as the natural resource sector and
the manufacturing sector feed on the same labour base), leading to a necessary contraction of
activities in the growth-inducing sector. This channel is reasonable where a labour intensive
natural resource such as land is abundant. In countries endowed with other (capital intensive)
resources such as oil this mechanism is less likely to play an important role.
Krugman [1987] and Van Wijnbergen [1984] argue that a resource boom leads (through
a demand increase) to a rise of the domestic price level - a real appreciation of the currency
occurs (see also Gylfason et al. [1999]). As a result manufacturing goods are harder to be
sold on world markets, thereby decreasing learning by doing impulses exerted by this sector.
Also, the increased domestic price level makes investment goods more expensive, depressing
investment rates and thereby growth (Sachs and Warner [1997], Sachs and Warner [2001]).
Empirically, Dutch Disease models have a somehow blunt prediction: all resource rich
countries should suffer from the curse. However, a satisfying theory should be able to explain
both though: resource successes such as Norway as well as resource failures such as Nigeria.
Matsen and Torvik [2005] criticize that in traditional Dutch Disease models there is no role
for public savings. Resource proceedings are consumed at once, although (public) saving
decisions undoubtedly play an important role in resource rich states (just think of Norway).
The authors develop a model in which public saving is allowed for and determine its optimalCHAPTER 2. THE LITERATURE ON THE NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE: AN
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level. As we argue above, in resource rich countries consuming one more unit today not
only has the negative effect of lessening future consumption, but also of decreasing future
productivity growth (due to Dutch Disease effects). Thus, optimal consumption growth in
these countries is higher than in resource poor ones (that is, more should be saved today). One
way to explain diverging experiences of resource rich countries is therefore by considering
the countries’ (in)ability to act (i.e. to save) optimally. Some countries save too little of
their resource money, thereby triggering strong Dutch Disease effects and falling prey to the
resource curse. Others such as Norway and Thailand act more wisely: they save large parts of
the resource proceedings, and are therefore not cursed by their resources.
The Dutch disease may appear in different forms and disguises, and is therefore not easy to
evaluate. However, existing work that focused on one speciﬁc channel - exchange rate appre-
ciations - suggests that it plays a minor role in explaining the curse (see Leite and Weidmann
[2002], Sala-i Martin and Subramanian [2003]).
In a resource rich country the primary sector is - by deﬁnition - very large, which has sev-
eral counteracting effects on the (incentives for) human capital accumulation in the economy.
First of all, the large low-skill primary sector draws away labour from high-skilled sectors
such as the manufacturing sector (De Gregorio and Bravo-Ortega [2005]). In addition, Dutch
disease effects discussed above (such as a real exchange rate appreciation following a resource
boom) hamper the development of human capital intensive sectors (Gylfason et al. [1999]).
Consequently, there is little demand for high skilled labour and thus no incentive to invest in
human capital. This is true for individual workers whose motivation to invest in education is
very low, since for work in the high rent primary sector it is not needed (i.e. private returns to
education in resource rich economies are rather low). Also, governments do not see the imme-
diate need for a highly educated workforce due to the resource wealth of the country (Gylfason
and Zoega [2001]). Empirically it has been found that resource abundance is negatively cor-
related with school enrolment rates and public expenditure on education (Bulte et al. [2005],
Gylfason and Zoega [2001], Papyrakis and Gerlagh [2004]), thus providing some support for
the above theories.
2.3 Institutions
2.3.1 Are Institutions The Key?
The above theories aim to explain the average performance of resource rich countries, i.e. why
do resources on average have a negative effect on the growth rate? The high variation in the12 2.3. INSTITUTIONS
experiences of resource rich countries - note the contrast between countries like Nigeria and
Congo as opposed to Norway and Botswana - are disregarded. Most recent approaches to
explaining the puzzle try to account for this. Also the present thesis contributes by providing
a conditional theory of the resource curse. In chapter 5 a theoretical model is presented which
is able to account for both, resource failures as well as successes.
The most intuitive expectation is that resources have a direct positive effect on a country’s
income and growth rate (Robinson et al. [2006]). If a country is endowed with resources, it
can sell these on world markets, and/or can use them in the production process. As it seems,
this is not the end of the story though. At least in some cases, there are other (indirect) effects,
which impact negatively on the performance of resource-rich economies.
As a next step, scholars started to consider institutions as intermediaries between natural
resources and growth or income. Institutional Quality 1 differs among countries and thus
can potentially explain different experiences of economies (in particular with respect to the
natural resource endowment). In the recent past many researchers have followed this path,
despite early dismissals of this hypothesis. The pioneers of the ﬁeld Sachs and Warner were
skeptical of this approach - in their seminal paper they discuss empirical evidence that natural
resources do not affect a bureaucratic index, measuring the degree of corruption, red tape and
judicial independence in a country.
Mehlum et al. [2006] have developed a model where institutions matter (but are exoge-
nously deﬁned). In “grabber friendly” economies resource booms are bad, but in economies
with proper institutions (awarding production, not rent seeking) the reverse will happen (a
result also supported by a recent contribution of Robinson et al. [2006]). Interestingly, as
mentioned above and explored further below, there is evidence that the institutional context
itself is not invariant with respect to resource abundance. From that perspective the argument
by Mehlum and co-workers is a compelling one, but perhaps only part of the story.
2.3.2 Endogenizing Institutions
In addition to the explanations outlined above, an attractive alternative hypothesis was devel-
oped a few years ago: countries well endowed with certain types of resources tend to suffer
1Examples of institutional quality variables are the World Bank’s rule of law indicator (RL), a measure of
Voice and Accountability (VA), and Government Effectiveness (GE). RL is an index that measures the extent to
which agents abide by the rules of society. It includes indicators for the protection of property rights and the
predictability of the judiciary. GE measures the capacity of the government to formulate and enforce policies. It
includes measures of the quality of the civil service and bureaucratic efﬁciency, and focuses on measuring inputs
necessary for the efﬁcient provision of public services. VA includes various indices that capture the extent to
which citizens participate in the selection of governments and the freedom of the press. For more information,
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from worse institutions than comparable countries without access to such resources. The par-
ticular type of resources considered contentious are point resources - natural resources that
are clustered in space (oil, mineral stocks) and that can possibly be appropriated and defended
against challengers with relative ease. In contrast diffuse resources (such as arable land) are
geographically spread out and for that reason less easy to control.
Leite and Weidmann [2002] were, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst to show that abundant point
resources are a major factor shaping institutions. They demonstrated that abundant point re-
sources tend to stimulate corruption, and that corruption, in turn, retards economic growth.
After controlling for the level of corruption, Leite and Weidmann ﬁnd that resource abun-
dance is not signiﬁcant in growth regressions. This suggests that the main effect of resources
on economic performance is indirect - through the level of corruption. Isham et al. [2005] and
Sala-i Martin and Subramanian [2003] have conﬁrmed these ﬁndings and placed them in a
more general context. They analyse the association between (point) resources and a broader
set of governance indicators, and examine direct and indirect causal links. They also ﬁnd
that, given a certain level of institutional quality, natural resources have no separate effect
on growth. However, point resources tend to result in worse institutions (whereas diffuse re-
sources do not). Evidence therefore suggests that at least one salient feature of the curse is
that institutions are endogenous and co-determined by resource abundance.
Three relevant observations may be made at this point. First, political scientists like Ross
have noted that oil abundance also adversely affects the degree of democracy in countries.
The concept of “institutional quality” is thus broader than the several proxies employed by the
World Bank. Also Aslaksen and Torvik [2008] ﬁnd that resource wealth puts democratic insti-
tutions to a test. The higher the resource wealth of a country, the less probable that democracy
survives - countries are prone to fall into the conﬂict trap. Second, point resources have also
been implicated in the resource-conﬂict literature. (Civil) wars start over clustered resources,
not over ones that are spread out. We will return to this topic in more detail shortly. Murshed
[2003] explicitly links point resources to bad institutions, and then links bad institutions to
bad policies - impeding economic performance.
2.3.3 Linking Institutions To Economic Growth
What is the link between institutions and growth? Various hypotheses have been formulated in
the economic literature, and space does not permit an extensive treatment of the issue here. In-
stead, we mention one approach that appears apt in the context of resource-exporting countries
- countries notoriously exposed to periodic price booms and busts. While most commodity de-
pendent countries experienced satisfactory growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s, this changed14 2.3. INSTITUTIONS
after the oil price shocks in the 1970s. Some countries were able to react quickly and in an
appropriate manner, but many suffered the consequences of the shocks and were not able to
recover. Institutions mattered here.
Various features of institutional quality determine a country’s ability to react to external
shocks. As Rodrik [1998] writes: “When social divisions run deep and the institutions of con-
ﬂict management are weak, the economic costs of exogenous shocks - such as deteriorations
in the terms of trade - are magniﬁed by the distributional conﬂicts triggered.” Dealing with
shocks may require unpopular and painful measures to be borne by (parts of) the population,
and if civil peace is unstable due to smouldering conﬂicts between factions in the country,
implementing appropriate policies may be quite a challenge.
Point resources are associated with both social divisions and weak institutions of conﬂict
management. Social divisions can run along various lines - wealth, ethnic identity, or geog-
raphy - and may be caused by unequal access to the riches of point resources. Similarly, as
mentioned above, point resources tend to be associated with corruption, undemocratic regime
type, and unaccountable governments. In such a setting, it is perhaps not surprising that the
ability of governments to react in an appropriate manner to external shocks is compromised,
with adverse consequences for growth. Naturally, the next step is to unravel the determinants
of institutional quality - what is the causal mechanism linking resource abundance to institu-
tions? Next, we turn to this question.
2.3.4 Resources, Policies And Institutions
The idea that institutions are not exogenous and ﬁxed, but endogenous entities shaped by the
environment is not new. In recent years, important work by Acemoglu et al. [2001], Engerman
and Sokoloff [2000] and others conveyed this message too. Acemoglu and co-workers argue
that economic development trajectories and current institutional quality in former colonies
depend on the prevalence of diseases back in the days when these were colonized. If mortality
rates among early settlers were high, the new powers had incentives to extract resources from
the new colonies, but not to settle and introduce their home institutions. 2
Also emphasizing the historical perspective, Sokoloff and Engerman ﬁnd that extractive
colonies based on plantation crops (sugar, coffee) were established in places where physical
conditions were suitable for plantation agriculture (beneﬁting from returns to scale) and where
cheap labour was locally available or could be imported. Once in place, institutions based on
unequal distribution of power and income are beneﬁcial for (domestic) elites, and therefore
2Compare the different development trajectories of the USA and Australia versus those of Central Africa.CHAPTER 2. THE LITERATURE ON THE NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE: AN
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perpetuated and reproduced over time.
In contrast, development in North America was based on different factor endowments,
favouring household farms and triggering a rather equal distribution of wealth and power.
These egalitarian beginnings affected the way American society is currently organized. The
main hypothesis is that colonies with diffuse resources (arable land) developed favourable
institutions, conducive to long-term growth, whereas colonies endowed with pointy resources
or conditions enabling plantation agriculture moved in other directions.
In addition to this very “long-term” view on institutions, we may focus on the shorter
term, where the distinction between “institutions” and “policies” becomes somewhat blurry.
For example, the institutional measures ’rule of law’ and ’government effectiveness’ employed
aboveareperhapsasmuchaboutcurrentpolicychoices(e.g. investmentsinthejudicialsystem
or incentive systems for bureaucrats) as they are about the historical context. Next we focus
on other approaches linking resources to institutions and policymaking.
One alternative explanation for the curse, possibly related to the Dutch disease idea, con-
cerns the detrimental effects of rent seeking. Resource rents accrue to resource owners, so in
practice they often fall in the hands of the government who can then allocate them to certain
uses. It has been argued that such rents are easily appropriable by elites, leading to bribes
and distortions in public policies (Karl [1997], Tornell and Lane [1999], Torvik [2002]). Rent
seeking may also upset economic production in the formal economy through crowding out of
talent and entrepreneurial activity from manufacturing to the resource sector - one link with
the Dutch disease above. Also Atkinson and Hamilton [2003] capture the adverse effects of
rent seeking on an economy with the concept of the genuine savings rate. The term refers
to the net national savings adjusted for natural resource depletion (i.e. extracting a resource
is equivalent to de-saving). In an empirical analysis they ﬁnd that it is those resource rich
countries with low or even negative genuine saving rates (i.e. that use resource money for
government consumption) that fall prey to the resource curse.
Rent seeking opportunities also increase the level of corruption in an economy. According
to Leite and Weidmann, this is the main reason for resource curse experiences. Corruption
lowerstheincentivetoinvestandinnovate, asittendstoraiseuncertaintyanddecreasesreturns
(by effectively imposing an investment tax). The effect of resources on the level of corruption
crucially depends on how much rent is produced. Natural resources such as agricultural land
are rather labour intensive, and thus offer less easily appropriable rents. They thereby affect
the level of corruption differently than relatively capital intensive resources, such as fuels and
ores. Again the classiﬁcation of resources into pointy and diffuse proves useful.
In resource rich countries patronage and policies aimed at satisfying certain interest groups16 2.3. INSTITUTIONS
often play an important role. To keep themselves in power, leaders in resource rich countries
often choose for policies that favor certain interest groups, and that are not necessarily growth-
enhancing (Robinson et al. [2006], Ross [2001a]). It has been shown that the incentive to stay
in ofﬁce, and thereby the incentive to inﬂuence the re-election probability by undertaking loss
making projects, increases in the amount of natural wealth, as this in turn increases the value
of being in power (Robinson et al. [2006]).
Data shows that resource rich countries often take on important investment tasks. Davis
[1983] for example reports many resource rich countries reacted to price booms in the mid
1970s by undertaking an immense amount of investment projects. This was reﬂected by a
sharp increase in the import of capital goods. Often the implementation of these development
plans could not be continued after the time of the windfall gains. Also, the quality of invest-
ments in resource rich countries has been questioned by Davis and theoretically explored by
Robinson and Torvik [2005].
Many times an incumbent politician tries to maximize his re-election probability by pro-
viding jobs to his supporters and tying their employment to his own political success. This is
done by undertaking loss-making projects, so-called ’white elephants’, whose sole purpose is
to provide jobs for political supporters (rather than beneﬁting the economy). Such projects are
preferable to simple money transfers because in this way a political incumbent makes himself
indispensable for future periods. A new leader may not be willing to continue the unproﬁtable
project, and thus jobs would be lost. Also, public sector employment offers a committed way
to transfer rents to political supporters. Again a simple promise of money transfers to a group
of supporters could be withdrawn after the election. Public sector employment on the other
hand acts as a strong commitment device, which is due to ﬁring costs that would have to be
incurred if the government wanted to lay off people. Thus political supporters are assured that
there will be no reneging from the part of the political leader (Robinson and Torvik [2006]).
Resource wealth thus many times leads to loss-making projects being undertaken - a re-
source curse. There are many examples of such white elephants. Sala-i Martin and Subrama-
nian [2003] consider the case of Nigeria, where capital investment rates were very high during
the oil booms. This is at odds with low capacity utilization and poor productivity throughout
the economy. Nigeria seems to have invested much of the oil revenues, but in the end there
was nothing to show for it.
Some scholars suggest that a resource boom leads policy makers to act myopically, a
so-called “get-rich-quick” mentality materializes (Ross [1999]). Governmental leaders use
resource wealth to become rich, and do not see the need for economic diversiﬁcation or ﬁscal
discipline. Rodriguez and Sachs [1999] also suggest that many of the problematic resourceCHAPTER 2. THE LITERATURE ON THE NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE: AN
OVERVIEW 17
based experiences were due to a consumption boom triggered by a resource boom - countries
were living beyond their means. Had the money been invested abroad many of the problems
of an over-heated economy could have been avoided.
According to some analysts countries grow soft and spoiled because of their resource
wealth (Gylfason and Zoega [2001]). This sugar uncle theory suggests that countries receiving
large ﬂows of money tend to be overconﬁdent, and often underrate the importance of sound
policy choices. Since there is no urgent need to develop a manufacturing sector, less emphasis
might be placed on the provision of growth enhancing public goods, such as infrastructure,
education, etc. Resource poor countries are less likely to make such mistakes as there is no
“sugar uncle” to bail them out.
The “policies for sale” approach, pioneered by Bernheim and Whinston [1986] and Gross-
man [1994], provides one logical avenue to link resource abundance to policy making. Ac-
cording to this model politicians trade with interest groups (industries), exchanging policies
forsupport(bribes). Inequilibrium, bribingistruthful-ﬁrmspaymoremoneywhenexpecting
greater beneﬁts from the policies.
Bulte and Damania [2008] have developed a simple general equilibrium model where the
manufacturing sector (characterized by increasing returns to scale at the sector level) and the
resource sector purchase “supporting policies” from a selﬁsh government (such as investments
in education for the manufacturing sector, and physical infrastructure for the resource sector).
In this model, resource booms and discoveries tilt the balance in the favour of the resource
sector - a re-orientation of support to this sector. As policy support for manufacturing falls
entrepreneurs exit from that sector. In spite of the windfall gain, it can be shown that aggre-
gate income in the economy falls. There exist, however, conditions under which the dismal
outcome above need not materialize. When there is a political challenger waiting in the wings
to oust the incumbent government, the story changes. In particular; the threat of a political
transition “disciplines” the incumbent, so that he is forced to care about aggregate income as
well as about the bribes he can pocket himself. Empirical work (along the lines set out by
Sachs and Warner, but including an interaction term for political competition multiplied by
resource abundance) supports the central idea that abundant point resources can lead to bad
policies and bad economic performance, but only in the absence of political competition.
Also Hodler [2006] presents a model in which a certain dimension of institutional quality,
namely property rights, are endogenously determined. According to his model a resource
boom triggers an increase in ﬁghting activities in an economy (a topic we return to soon). The
increase in appropriating activities leads to a worsening of the property rights in the economy.
In political science the concept of “rentier states” is well known and often used to explain18 2.3. INSTITUTIONS
why resource-rich countries may suffer from bad institutions and policies (e.g. Ross [1999],
Karl [1997]). It identiﬁes a “disconnection” between the state and its citizens as one of the
main causes for weak institutional capacity. As Moore [2001] points out, when the state can
control resource rents associated with extraction, then it does not rely on taxation of citizens
for revenues. Several things happen when the state does not have to “earn its income” but lives
off rents.
First, citizens might care less about how the government spends its income (as they do not
have to pay for it directly), and are less inclined to scrutinize public expenditures and hold
the government accountable - possibly giving rise to exorbitant private consumption of the
government or hopelessly inefﬁcient bureaucracies.
Second, since the government does not need to generate its income from the people, the
interests of the state and the people do not necessarily run parallel. The state has a weaker
incentive to provide the public goods needed by the people to enhance production (like for
example the rule of law).Furthermore the state may possibly have less knowledge about what
it is that the people desire.
Third, the state has ample means to quell potential opposition - either by wasteful public
spending programs and patronage, or by investments in repression. Investments in repression
may also be induced by the fact that resource wealth often triggers ethnic or regional conﬂict.
One response would be to invest in a larger military apparatus, so as to “keep peace” in the
region. This means that income from resource rents might support authoritarian, rather than
democratic, regimes. 3
Another difference between rentier states and states relying on taxing citizens is that the
former are more attractive to take over by force. While tax revenues only ﬂow if the whole
complex revenue mechanism is kept going, the immediate rewards for obtaining access to
point resources are far greater. In rentier states, therefore, the danger of violent strife is greater
- a prediction consistent with stylized facts. We return to the issue of conﬂict and resources
below.
Note that a focus on institutions logically connects many of the issues above. It is easy to
imagine that undemocratic and unaccountable leaders may accumulate excessive debts, under-
invest in public goods, indulge in consumption and support a rent seeking elite.
3Empirical evidence supports these claims. Oil and minerals are associated with authoritarian leadership
(Ross [2001a]). However, this effect seems to be nonlinear, and becomes weaker if the state becomes richer.
This is consistent with evidence that poorer countries do experience the curse, whereas others, such as Norway
and the US, do not.CHAPTER 2. THE LITERATURE ON THE NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE: AN
OVERVIEW 19
2.4 Are There Solutions To The Curse ?
Some of the poorest countries in the world, in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, are suffering
fromphenomenaakintothenaturalresourcecurse. Abetterunderstandingofthephenomenon
enablesformulationofappropriatepolicyrecommendations, andthishasbecomeatoppriority
for both the academic and policy-making world in recent years.
For example, Sala-i Martin and Subramanian [2003], considering the example of Nigeria,
suggest distributing rents to the people as a means around the rentier state problem. Distribut-
ing resource rents to the population in a lump-sum fashion, and subsequently requiring the
government to tax part of it back to ﬁnance any state activity would re-introduce a stronger
linkage between the state and its people. In this way there is hope that the government would
be held more accountable for the way the money is spent. Sandbu [2006] argues that such a
strategy would trigger two effects, each one helping to alleviate resource curse type of prob-
lems. First an “endowment effect” would be created - people care more about the usage of
money, which they have formerly possessed and had to give up through taxation, than about
the spending of resource rents they never owned in the ﬁrst place. Second, due to an “infor-
mation effect” citizens of countries where the government relies on taxation are more aware
about the amount of money the government has at its disposal.
A global initiative that resulted from the ongoing debate and research ﬁndings on the re-
source curse is the so-called Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI is
supported by many institutions, among them the World Bank, the IMF, the African Develop-
ment Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as many
Non-Governmental Organizations. The aim of the initiative is to strengthen and improve gov-
ernance in resource rich countries, so that many of the problems discussed above (resulting
from bad institutional quality) can be avoided. This will be achieved by improving trans-
parency and accountability in relation to natural resources. As discussed, one of the major
problems identiﬁed is that the population does not have detailed information about the amount
of money the government disposes of, and thus cannot hold the government accountable for
how resource revenues are spent. In particular, the initiative aims at publicizing company
payments in exchange for usage of natural resources and aims to give full accounts of govern-
ment revenue. So far, 21 countries have joined the initiative, among them Congo, Nigeria and
Peru. All of the countries are still in the preparation phase, thus at this moment the potential
success of the project is yet unclear. Already now several problems have been encountered.
For example, governments fail to recognize the important role of civil society organizations in
the process, and there is marginalization and intimidation of civil society activists. Also there20 2.5. THE PUZZLE REVISITED
is a large discrepancy between rhetorical commitments and concrete actions of government
leaders. Additional problems stem from weak political leadership and subsequent difﬁculties
in realizing necessary steps.
2.5 The Puzzle Revisited
Ever since Sachs and Warner published their seminal work, there has been much discussion
on the validity of the results, and some works may be interpreted as particularly challenging
to the curse hypothesis.
Some researchers suggest that resource abundance may negatively affect average growth
rates, but also has a positive and persistent income level effect (Rodriguez and Sachs [1999],
De Gregorio and Bravo-Ortega [2005]). From this perspective resource abundance is hardly a
“curse” for resource-rich countries.
Rodriguez and Sachs [1999] postulate that negative growth rates are nothing more than the
consequence of the output level overshooting during resource booms. Since in the steady state
resource extraction tends to zero (due to the characteristic of exhaustibility), many resource
rich countries converge to their steady state income levels from above. This effect could
be circumvented if a country were to invest its resource revenues abroad, so as to avoid an
investment and consumption boom at home, which increases domestic output to unsustainably
high levels.
De Gregorio and Bravo-Ortega [2005] argue that a resource boom draws away human
capital from growth inducing sectors (a Dutch Disease type of effect). Although in this case
natural resource wealth increases income levels, it also decreases growth rates.
Manzano and Rigobon [2001]) do not only use cross-section analysis (as is commonly
done in the resource curse literature), but estimate the growth model using panel data (con-
trolling for ﬁxed effects). They ﬁnd that the negative effect of resource abundance disappears
in this set-up. The authors thus infer that the resource curse result - found in a cross section
analysis - is due to an omitted variable bias. They suggest that the omitted variable is “credit
constraints”. Once one introduces a measure for credit constraints into the (cross-country)
regression, the negative effect of resources disappears.
Next, measurement issues have played a particularly important role in scrutinizing tradi-
tional curse results.
Stijns [2002] does not use the share of primary exports in income (or total exports) to
proxy for resource abundance, but instead chooses a physical measure of energy and mining
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DingandField[2004]explicitlyacknowledgethedifferencebetweenmeasuresofresource
dependence and resource abundance. Whereas the measure used in virtually all the resource
curse literature discussed above (the ratio of resource exports to GDP or total exports respec-
tively) is a measure for resource dependence, resource abundance is best captured by measures
of the stock of natural capital. Ding and Field include a resource abundance as well as a re-
source dependence variable in their growth regressions. As Stijns above, also Ding and Field
ﬁnd a positive effect of resource abundance on economic growth.
Taken together these results might seem to seal the fate of the resource curse - while a lot
of intellectual “buzz” surrounded the topic shortly after the results of Sachs and Warner hit the
newsstand, it appears as if the profession has been beating a dead horse. But such a conclu-
sion would be premature. For example, Norman [2005] does ﬁnd evidence of a resource curse
when using physical reserves as opposed to export intensity as the key explanatory variable.
Atkinson and Hamilton [2003] also employ another proxy for resource abundance than Sachs
and Warner and ﬁnd that the curse emerges for a subset of countries. Also, De Gregorio and
Bravo-Ortega [2005] report speciﬁcations where the resource curse “survives” ﬁxed effects
panel estimates. In addition, as discussed in detail above, corroborating the ﬁndings of politi-
cal scientists like Michael Ross and Terry Lynn Karl there is mounting evidence that resource
richness may harm the economy through indirect channels - which are possibly ’picked up’
by ﬁxed effects in panel approaches (but are endogenous nonetheless).
The discussion on the existence of a curse remains an open and much debated topic. Most
recently the challengers have again found some support.
Brunnschweiler and Bulte [2008a] argue that causality as it has been assumed in most of
the resource curse literature, has to be reversed. They claim it is not resource dependence
that has a detrimental effect on institutional quality, but rather causality runs the other way -
countries with bad institutions are highly dependent on their resources. In addition they ﬁnd,
similar to Stijns and Ding and Field, that resource abundance affects growth positively.
Chapter 6 of the present thesis contributes to the heated discussion. Within the frame-
work of Development Accounting, our ﬁndings in this work disprove earlier research: neither
(properlyinstrumented)resourcedependencenor(properlymeasured)resourceabundancehas
a destructive effect on (the income of) economies.
The topic remains controversial, and certainly offers scope for future research - to ﬁnally
settle the issue of the existence of a resource curse.22 2.6. ANOTHER FACET OF THE CURSE: RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
2.6 Another facet of the curse: Resources and Conﬂict
Most of the present thesis deals with this facet of the resource curse - the positive association
between resources and conﬂicts.
Collier and Hoefﬂer [1998] and Collier and Hoefﬂer [2004] established an empirical styl-
ized fact in this literature. Considering the relationship between conﬂicts and resource de-
pendence (measured by the ratio of resource exports over GDP), they ﬁnd that “the effect of
primary commodity dependence is non-linear, peaking with exports at around 30% of GDP”.
In particular, in a probit regression taking the occurrence of conﬂict as the dependent variable
they ﬁnd a positive (and signiﬁcant) coefﬁcient on the explanatory variable primary goods
exports, whereas the coefﬁcient on the squared term of primary exports is negative (and sig-
niﬁcant). This indicates a non-monotonous, concave relationship. A similar result is found
when running a tobit regression on the duration of conﬂicts. In chapter 4 of the present thesis,
I present a theoretical underpinning of this empirical result.
Empirically however, it seems at this moment that the debate has not been settled. Partic-
ularly, Brunnschweiler and Bulte [2008b] propose to reverse causality as opposed to the way
it was assumed to run until now. They suggest that conﬂict leads to a high dependence on
natural resources (and not the other way around).
The literature identiﬁes two main motivations for conﬂicts in countries well endowed with
natural resources (see for example Fors and Olsson [2004]). First, a grievance motive is trig-
gered by grievances over economic and political inequality (Deininger [2003]). Second, and
more importantly according to Collier and Hoefﬂer [2004], a greed motive may exist. This
captures competition between groups for the control over valuable resources. As discussed
in the introduction, a government wishing to avoid conﬂict can choose between two distinct
strategies. On the one hand, it can militarily suppress the people, on the other hand lure them
into production by providing productivity enhancing public goods. Chapters 4 and 5 explore
these two options of a ruling elite.
Ross [2004b] points out that the relationship between natural resource wealth and violent
conﬂict, stated in this very general form, does not withstand closer empirical inspection. It ap-
pears that both, the type of resource as well as the type of conﬂict is important. Three regulari-
ties are robust. First, oil and other non-fuel minerals are associated with the onset of civil war,
especially secessionist conﬂicts (see also Ross [2006], Lujala et al. [2005], Fearon [2005]).
Resource rich regions might want to separate from the rest of the economy to control the re-
source rents and enjoy the beneﬁts of foreign investment. With respect to non-secessionist
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of the riches, but also enables the government to defend itself against any insurgences - scaring
off potential rebels (De Soysa and Neumayer [2007]). The second regularity is that so-called
“lootable” resources as gemstones, drugs and timber, lengthen the duration of conﬂict. Nat-
ural resources allow the weaker party to raise funds so that they are able to withstand defeat
longer, prolonging the duration of war (De Soysa and Neumayer [2007]). Third, agricultural
goods and other “diffuse resources” are associated with neither the onset nor the duration of
violent conﬂict. In chapter 3, we develop a static conﬂict model that captures many of these
facts in a stylized fashion.CHAPTER3
Contesting Resources: Rent Seeking, Conﬂict and the
Natural Resource Curse
3.1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom suggests that having access to greater quantities of inputs should lead
to higher growth rates and subsequently higher levels of output. This expectation has been
challenged for natural resource endowments. Recent empirical work suggests that resource
rich countries tend to grow slower than their resource poor counterparts (Sachs and Warner
[1997], Sachs and Warner [2001]), and are more prone to suffer from civil strife (Collier and
Bannon [2003]) and rent seeking (Leite and Weidmann [2002], Auty [2001a], Torvik [2002]).
For these reasons natural resource abundance has been coined a curse for development rather
than a blessing.
There exist competing explanations for the mechanism linking resources to conﬂict and
impeded growth. One prominent hypothesis that is gaining momentum highlights the adverse
implications of resource richness on institutional quality (Isham et al. [2005]). In particular,
empirical work suggests an inverse relation between so-called “point resources” and institu-
tions or governance proxies (Leite and Weidmann [2002], Isham et al. [2005], Bulte et al.
[2005]). Not surprisingly, therefore, it appears that economies that are abundantly endowed
with diffuse resources (resources spread thinly across space), typically grow faster than coun-
tries with resources that are geographically clustered (or “pointy”). Similarly, Ross [2004b]
shows that pointy resources trigger and prolong conﬂicts whereas diffuse resources do not.
Pointiness therefore appears to matter, and arguably deserves a more prominent place in eco-
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nomic theory than it currently occupies.
In light of the empirics two important questions emerge. First, what is the causal mech-
anism linking natural resource abundance to economic performance, rent seeking and con-
ﬂict, and why do point resources have a more pronounced and negative impact on the fate of
economies than diffuse resources? Second, how do resources and their geographical distribu-
tion impact on income distribution and thus, indirectly, on institutional quality? To address
these issues we develop simple rent seeking and conﬂict models, and explore how resource
abundance and pointiness affect the incentives of agents to divert resources away from pro-
duction and toward contesting activities. Such activities are not productive, but merely intend
to redistribute the surplus. We do not model institutional quality directly, but note that this
is likely associated with income distribution (e.g. due to envy, social tension and the ensuing
division of power – see also Engerman and Sokoloff [2000], Bourguignon and Verdier [2000]).
There are two relevant but rather separate streams of literature that feed into the problem
we analyze. One literature examines the inverse relation between resources, rent seeking and
growth. This literature started out as mainly empirical in nature, but recent years have also
seen theoretical explorations into the nature of the resource curse. 1 The second literature
focuses on the relation between resources and conﬂict.2 We pull together elements of these
different literatures, and analyze the effects of resource abundance and pointiness on contest
intensity, income distribution and aggregate output. We therefore identify both direct and indi-
rect channels through which resources and the implied incentives for conﬂict affect economic
outcomes.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, and not surprisingly, we demonstrate that resource
abundance induces a re-allocation of effort from production toward rent seeking or conﬂict.
However, the effects of increased pointiness are less straightforward, and we show that more
pointy resources may be more or less heavily contested. Second, we show that resource abun-
dance and pointiness could promote an unequal distribution of income between groups in
society, regardless of whether resources are contested through rent seeking or conﬂict. And
third, unlike earlier work (as discussed by, say, Neary [1997]), we ﬁnd that contesting re-
sources through conﬂict may yield more favorable outcomes for the economy as a whole than
contesting resources through rent seeking. This result follows from our speciﬁcation of con-
1Important contributions, highlighting various dimensions of the causal link, include Sachs and Warner
[1997], Auty [2001b], Auty [2001a], Gylfason and Zoega [2001], Acemoglu et al. [2001], Sachs and Warner
[2001], Torvik [2002], Isham et al. [2005]and Mehlum et al. [2006].
2The conﬂict literature was established by theoretical contributions by Hirshleifer [1991a], Hirshleifer
[1991b], Skaperdas [1992], Grossman [1994], Grossman and Kim [1995], Hirshleifer [1995], and others. Collier
and Hoefﬂer [1998], Baker [2003], Fors and Olsson [2004] and Ross [2004b] explicitly consider the link between
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ﬂict in the context of ﬁghting over resource rents (which differs from the standard speciﬁcation
of conﬂict models).
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the basic features of the model,
including our interpretation of “resource pointiness”, and presents the “contest game” in a
general form (encompassing the rent seeking and conﬂict model as two special cases). Section
3.3 considers the rent seeking model. A crucial assumption is that contesting resources does
not affect production possibilities elsewhere in the economy. We demonstrate that the degree
of resource pointiness determines which kind of equilibrium will arise. In section 3.4 we allow
for the possibility that a contest for resources does adversely affect production. Production
possibilities may be curtailed, for example, because of factors like reduced trust and safety, or
adeteriorationofthephysicalinfrastructureorsocialcapital. Sincethesefactorsareassociated
with violence we interpret the model in section 3.4 as a conﬂict model. Section 3.5 concludes,
and we contrast our model outcomes to stylized facts about resource abundance, pointiness
and economic performance.
3.2 The basic setup
There are different approaches to modeling “contests”. Economic literature distinguishes be-
tween rent seeking models and conﬂict models. A common element is that agents have to
decide about the optimal allocation of their endowment between two activities: redistribution
(contesting a certain prize) and production. Rent seeking models, typically, are of a partial
equilibrium nature – both the size of the prize that is contested and the opportunity costs of ef-
fort devoted to redistribution (or the foregone returns to production) are ﬁxed and independent
of rent seeking decisions. Conﬂict models, in contrast, capture general equilibrium effects.
They differ from rent seeking models because both the contested prize and the opportunity
cost of effort are endogenously determined. The prize is typically a measure of aggregate pro-
duction in the economy – people contest the surplus that they create themselves. This implies
that the net beneﬁts from production (the share of own production that agents are able to re-
tain for themselves, or the private opportunity cost of redistribution) are affected by aggregate
decisions with respect to the allocation of the endowment.3
The differences between the modeling approaches of rent seeking and conﬂict have several
implications (see Neary [1997] for an overview). One important consequence is that rent
seeking generally results in more favorable outcomes for the economy than conﬂict. Ceteris
3If other agents allocate a larger share of their endowment to contesting the prize, or if new agents enter the
game, the share appropriated by the individual agent goes down and, hence, the opportunity cost of contesting
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paribus, the aggregate value of endowments wasted in conﬂicts exceeds that wasted during
seeking rents. However, it is important to realize that this outcome is an artifact of the way
economists model conﬂicts. In the context of conﬂicts over access to resource rents in the “real
world”, moreover, it is not at all obvious that the standard conﬂict model provides a suitable
speciﬁcation. After all, the purpose of the contest is to gain access to resources and not to gain
access to each other’s output. This has as an important consequence that agents can opt out of
the conﬂict game – leaving the resources to the rival fraction. 4
In this chapter, therefore, we have chosen to approach “conﬂict” rather differently. First,
we recognize that agents may dispute a given resource base. This implies a feature shared
with the standard rent seeking models where a given prize is contested. But, second, we also
recognize that violent conﬂict may affect production possibilities elsewhere in the economy
through potentially adverse effects on social and physical infrastructure, limited opportunities
for trading and communication, etcetera. In other words, we assume that the opportunity
cost of conﬂict is endogenous – labor allocated to production is more productive in times of
“peace” than in times of “war”. This feature, obviously, is unlike the standard rent seeking
model, but it is consistent with intuition and supported by observations about the deteriorating
impact of violent conﬂict on production possibilities in real life (Collier and Bannon [2003]).
Westartbydevelopingageneralcontestmodel.5 Consideraneconomy thatconsistsoftwo
(risk neutral) groups or tribes, each consisting of a number of members or agents, Ei, i = 1,2.
One agent is the tribe leader, akin to a social planner, who decides on the allocation of tribe
labor between production or redistribution. Redistribution implies engaging in the contest for
controlling the natural resource. Deﬁne the number of people allocated to production as Wi,
and the number engaged in the contest as Fi, where Wi + Fi = Ei. The payoff from working
is given by a production function, exhibiting constant returns to scale.6 To keep the model
as simple as possible, labor is the only production factor and we assume it is a homogeneous
input (i.e. we do not account for skill differences and entrepreneurial talent, but see Sachs
and Warner [2001] and Torvik [2002] for rent seeking models with heterogeneous agents).
4Note that opting out of a normal conﬂict model is not feasible – there is no way for individual agents to
prevent their own output from being taken by others.
5The model is general in the sense that it nests a rent seeking and a conﬂict model. Grossman [2003] has a
more general approach that complements ours, where he allows agents to choose the sort of game that they play
(in his case: invest in fortiﬁcations – perhaps akin to rent seeking in our model –, conﬂict or do nothing). In
our model the nature of the game that is played is exogenously determined – agents cannot choose between rent
seeking or conﬂict.
6An alternative speciﬁcation could have decreasing returns to scale in manufacturing (e.g. Hotte et al. [2000]).
This could reverse some of the effects in our model – the assumption of decreasing returns to scale (DRS)
introduces an offsetting force because labor ﬂows from production to conﬂict could raise – rather than lower –
the marginal and average productivity of labor in production. The assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS),
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Denoting the production function by f(Wi), we write:
ΠiW = f(Wi) = Aj · Wi i = 1,2 j = C,P 0 < A < ∞, (3.1)
where ΠiW is tribe i’s payoff from working and Aj is a parameter, the magnitude of which may
depend on whether the contest is characterized by violent conﬂict. The subscripts C and P
indicate whether the tribe is engaged in the contest or not (C is short for contest and P is short
for peace). For the rent seeking model in section 3.3 we assume AC = AP, so the opportunity
costs of the contest are ﬁxed – the rent seeking activity does not disrupt production elsewhere
in the economy. For the conﬂict model (section 3.4), instead, we assume that AC < AP to
reﬂect the disruptive effects of war. We also assume that the production function is the same
for both tribes, and that production industries are disconnected (no overlap in the production
sectors of the two tribes).
The expected payoff from contesting is given by:
ΠiF = pi(Fi,Fj) · R, (3.2)
where ΠiF is tribe i’s expected payoff from contesting and R is the total value of the natural
resource in the common pool. The speciﬁcation in equation 3.2 is a common approach in
the contest literature. The term pi(Fi,Fj) is a so-called contest success function (CSF in
what follows). The CSF determines the share of the resource that tribe i will obtain, given
it allocates Fi people to the contest and the other tribe allocates Fj members to the contest.
Different suggestions for functional forms of the CSF have been advanced. In this chapter, we
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and p2 = (1 − p1).
One of the innovations of this chapter is our interpretation of the parameter m.7 We argue
that m > 0 may be treated as a proxy for pointiness of the contested resource – the larger this
parameter, the “pointier” the resource. To get some intuition, consider Figure 3.1, which plots
7Hirshleifer [1995] calls m the “decisiveness parameter” which, in his interpretation, is a measure for conﬂict
technology rather than the characteristics of the prize that is contested. For example, in World War I mainly men
and simple (machine) guns were used in combat. Attacks usually did not achieve more than small changes to the
front line – decisiveness was very low. On the other hand, in World War II, conﬂict technology was much more
advanced, intensifying the effect of force superiority (think of Hiroshima). This corresponds to a situation with
high m.30 3.2. THE BASIC SETUP
expected beneﬁts from contest of tribe 1 for a range of different contest levels (i.e. varying F1
for given F2) and different values of the parameter m.8


















Figure 3.1: Contest Success Function for F2 = 5
Figure 3.1 has two limiting cases. As m approaches zero, the function becomes a ﬂat
line and, regardless of contest effort, the success probability of tribe 1 is always 1/2. As m
grows larger, the function changes such that a given difference in contest effort has greater
inﬂuence on the success probability of the tribes. In the extreme, as m approaches inﬁnity, the
CSF approaches a step function: a marginally higher value of F1 compared to F2 implies that
the entire resource is allocated to tribe 1 – and vice versa for F1 < F2. The case of m = 1
represents a natural benchmark in the sense that the share of the resource that is controlled
is proportional to contest effort. We explore what happens when m increases so that the
distribution becomes increasingly skewed toward the more powerful tribe.
We postulate that pointiness affects economic outcomes because different degrees of ge-
ographical clustering reﬂect different costs of controlling the resource. When resources are
clustered they are easier to grab and control, or easier to defend against rivals – defensive ac-
tivities need not be spread out across space. More pointy resources therefore are more likely
to be controlled by certain groups in society, excluding others (Ross [1999], Engerman and
8Note that - although it might appear that way - the graphs in Figure 3.1 are not symmetric around 5. To see








m. In the ﬁgure we chose m = 1 for the “m low” graph,
which (as can readily be seen from the second derivative) corresponds to a function that is always concave. For
the “m high” graph we chose m = 5, which corresponds to a function ﬁrst being convex and then concave. As
the resource’s pointiness increases (i.e. as m goes up), the gradient of the contest success function at the point
F1 = F2 increases. For sufﬁciently high m, an inﬂection point emerges, and the CSF becomes convex-concave.CHAPTER 3. CONTESTING RESOURCES: RENT SEEKING, CONFLICT AND THE
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Sokoloff [2000], Isham et al. [2005], Ross [2004b]). Similarly, pointiness likely matters when
agents are rent seeking. Extremely clustered resources are more likely to end up under the
control of a small group of agents than resources that are spread across space, if only for
administrative reasons. This is consistent with the picture that emerges from Figure 3.1. As
pointiness increases, the resource contest more closely resembles a winner-takes-all contest.
In contrast, for low m values the resource is diffuse. A small difference in contest effort, then,
has little impact on the allocation of the resource.
We approach the resource contest as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage the tribe leader
decides to enter the contest or not. Based on these choices, he acts accordingly in stage 2 and
optimally chooses contest effort and production effort. Note that we assume that a tribe leader
needs to put forth some minimal, positive level of ﬁghting effort ¯ F in stage 2, once he decided
to enter the contest.9 If the tribe leader chooses not to enter the contest, instead, he devotes all
effort to peaceful production. The game is solved by backwards induction, i.e. we ﬁrst solve
the tribe leader’s problem in stage 2 and with this knowledge go back to solve for optimal
behavior in stage 1.
3.2.1 The second stage
If a tribe leader decides not to enter the contest, aggregate tribe income is Ei · AP, where AP
denotes the constant returns in peaceful production.10 If, in contrast, a leader opts for contest,
aggregate tribe income is the sum of income from production and contesting. Contest income
is determined by taking into account the opposing tribe’s actions. If one tribe enters and the
other tribe does not, it is optimal for the ﬁrst tribe to allocate as little effort as possible to
the contest and by this secure the full resource.11 Aggregate income in this case is simply
R + (Ei − Fi)AP, with Fi = ¯ Fi.
If, in contrast, both tribes enter the contest, the payoffs are determined by a Cournot game.
To ﬁnd the Cournot equilibrium we ﬁrst establish optimal responses of tribe leaders to each
9For mathematical reasons we deﬁne the minimal level of ﬁghting implicitely by the following equation:
πi(F∗
j ,F∗
i ) = πi(F∗
j , ¯ Fi) + ǫ (3.5)
where F∗ is as deﬁned in equation (3.9)
10In section 3.4 where we model violent conﬂict we adopt the reasonable assumption that the return to produc-
tion is only AF when both tribes chooses to enter the conﬂict. There can be no violent conﬂict unless two tribes
allocate some effort to conﬂict. Note that the payoff structure may be different when there are more than 2 tribes
– it would be possible to adversely affect the returns to productive labor of a peaceful tribe when two or more
other tribes wage a war. This is ignored in what follows, but the analysis can be extended in a straightforward
fashion to capture this possibility.
11For Fj = 0 it follows from (3.4) that pi = 1, unless m = 0 in which case F = 0 is always optimal.32 3.2. THE BASIC SETUP
others’ actions. We consider each tribe’s optimal decision in turn. Tribe leaders maximize
expected payoffs:
Πi = ΠiW + ΠiF = f(Wi) + pi(Fi,Fj) · R (3.6)
by optimally choosing Wi and Fi, respecting the endowment constraint. Solving this problem








Given CRS technology, the ﬁrst-order condition for tribe leader i, given the action of tribe














From 3.9 follows that optimal contest intensity is independent of the tribe’s endowment
(assuming the tribes are sufﬁciently large for an interior solution to occur, i.e. Ei ≥ mR
4AC for
all i). In other words: contest intensity is independent of the relative size of tribes. Both tribes




Note also that contest intensity is increasing in the pointiness of the resource contested. If the
parameter m is large, the marginal return from using more resources in the contest (for any
given effort by the other tribe) is higher, thus attracting more resources into the contest from
both groups and in turn increasing social waste.
3.2.2 The ﬁrst stage
After deriving expected payoffs for all potential situations, we now return to the decision of a
tribe leader in the ﬁrst stage. The decision problem can be depicted in a 2x2 matrix.
In Table 3.1 we assume that resources that are not contested will not be used by either tribe.
However, the main results that follow are robust with respect to the main alternative spec-
iﬁcation that resources are equally shared when uncontested – a result akin to a cooperative
outcome.12 This game gives several possible equilibria13. Note that R+EiAP > EiAP, hence
12The only change of assuming a split down the middle instead of an unused resource base is as follows: if the
parameters are such that a mixed strategy equilibrium emerges, then the probabilities with which the different
strategies are played will be different. This does not affect the main results.
13For a formal treatment consult the Appendix.CHAPTER 3. CONTESTING RESOURCES: RENT SEEKING, CONFLICT AND THE
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Tribe 2
Acquiesce Contest
Acquiesce E1 · AP E1 · AP
Tribe 1 E2 · AP R + E2 · AP
Contest R+E1·AP
1
2R + (E1 − F1)AC
E2 · AP
1
2R + (E2 − F2)AC
Table 3.1: The Game Matrix
(acquiesce, acquiesce) cannot be a Nash equilibrium. The nature of the equilibrium depends
on whether the following holds:
Ei · AP >
1
2
R + (Ei − Fi) · AC for all i. (3.10)
If this condition holds, a coordination game arises. Tribes prefer “acquiesce” or “contest” de-
pending on what the other tribe does. Three equilibria arise in this game: two in pure and one
in mixed strategies. The coordinated outcomes (contest, acquiesce) and (acquiesce, contest)
are the two equilibria in pure strategies. In the mixed strategy equilibrium tribes sometimes
play F = 0 and sometimes they play F = F ∗.14 Each one of the possible ﬁnal outcomes - (ac-
quiesce, contest), (contest, acquiesce), (acquiesce, acquiesce) and (contest, contest) - emerges
with a certain probability. The probability distribution associated with the mixed strategy is
determined by the payoffs in Table 3.1, and thus depends on parameters. The (contest, contest)
outcome will be termed a “contest trap” in what follows. Properties of the equilibria will be
analyzed in the next section.
Another outcome is characterized by the following condition:
Ei · AP <
1
2
R + (Ei − Fi) · AC for all i. (3.11)
If (3.11) holds a game arises in which “contest” is the dominant strategy for both tribes.
Theuniqueequilibriumoutcomethenis(contest, contest). Notethatcondition(3.11)isalways
satisﬁed if the value of the resource is large enough, i.e. R >
4Ei(AP−AC)
2−m for all i. However,
to focus on the crucial role of resource pointiness (parameter m) we exclude this trivial case
in what follows. Also the case where (3.11) holds for one of the tribes but not for the other
one might arise. This possibility is relevant in section 3.4.
14Note that condition (3.5) ensures that the outcome (F∗
1 ,F∗
2 ) (which in the case of m > 2 constitutes only a
local but not a global maximum) prevails. We thank Reyer Gerlagh for his comments that encouraged us to look
deeper into this issue.34 3.3. THE RENT SEEKING MODEL
3.3 The rent seeking model
In this section we analyse the case where contest does not affect production possibilities,
AP = AC = A, which we term the rent seeking model. Depending on the magnitude of
parameter m (greater than 2 or not) either a coordination game or a game with contest as a
dominant strategy emerges. If the resource is sufﬁciently pointy (if m > 2, i.e. if condition
(3.10) is fulﬁlled) a coordination game arises. If, instead, m < 2 (i.e. (3.11) is fulﬁlled), then
a game with rent seeking as a dominant strategy arises. We refer to m = 2 as the critical m
for the rent seeking model, or ¯ mR, in what follows.15
We now consider the properties of the equilibria arising in the different cases. In what
follows we assume that tribe 1 is the bigger tribe, i.e. E1 > E2. When analyzing the properties
of the equilibria we are interested in two issues. First, we are interested in the contest intensity
in economies, i.e. F1 + F2. This is a proxy of resources “wasted” in the contest process –
resources diverted away from production. Second, we are interested in the income distribution
that eventuates. We aim to establish which tribe beneﬁts most from the resource.16
3.3.1 The case of m < 2: Contest as a dominant strategy
If the economy is endowed with a rather diffuse resource (m < 2), tribes maximize their per
capita incomes by choosing some rent seeking. The reason is that contest intensity will be
rather low in equilibrium (as m is rather low, see (3.9)), so losses from rent seeking in terms
of production foregone are modest. Contest intensity in the economy is simply:




which is increasing in m. Income maximizing tribes will sacriﬁce some production to obtain
a share of the resource. And, consistent with intuition and empirical observations, the amount
of endowment wasted in rent seeking (i.e. the departure from the aggregate optimum) is larger














15The case of m = 2 is not interesting as such but merely constitutes a threshold level. Were pointiness exactly
such that m = 2, either one of the three equilibria in pure strategies (contest, contest), (contest, acquiesce) and
(acquiesce, contest) might arise.
16We compare the evolving income distribution to an initial situation of full equality. This starting point is
justiﬁed by considering a situation in which both tribes employ all their members in constant returns to scale
production, whereby the income per capita would be the same in both tribes.CHAPTER 3. CONTESTING RESOURCES: RENT SEEKING, CONFLICT AND THE
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This result suggests that the smaller tribe is better off. The reason is that for m < 2 the tribal
beneﬁts from rent seeking outweigh the costs, but the revenues are the same for both tribes
(R
2), regardless of their size. Since the extra beneﬁts are shared with fewer tribe members in
tribe 2, they are better off than members in the large tribe. However, as the resource becomes
more pointy (increasing m), the distribution becomes more equal. The reason is simply that
the costs of obtaining the resource share go up, but these costs are borne by a larger number
of tribe members in tribe 1.
3.3.2 The case of m > 2: A Coordination Game
Thecaseofm > 2isslightlymorecomplexbecausedifferentoutcomesmayemerge. Ifm > 2
neither of the two pure strategies is dominant. There are three possible Nash equilibria, two
of which are in pure and one in mixed strategies.
One tribe grabs all The two equilibria in pure strategies can be termed “coordinated out-
comes”. Equilibrium strategies in this case are (contest, acquiesce) and (acquiesce, contest).
In both of the outcomes induced by those strategies only one tribe grabs the whole resource.
Here we consider for expositional purposes the former equilibrium outcome. In this case rent
seeking intensity will be very low.
F1 + F2 = ¯ F1 + 0. (3.14)
Aggregate output in this case is
Y = R + ((E1 − ¯ F1) + E2) · A, (3.15)
which is the maximum possible, as there are very little resources wasted in rent seeking. The










Since ¯ F1 is very small, the tribe that engages in rent seeking is better off as it receives all the
resource rents. Note that this outcome yields a very unequal income distribution, as it is only
one of the two tribes that grabs all the resource.
There is also an equilibrium in mixed strategies. Each tribe leader decides for each of the






iA) and where σ∗
iC (σ∗
iA) denotes the probability with which tribe i plays
strategy contest (acquiesce). Speciﬁcally, equilibrium strategies are σ∗
1 = σ∗
2 = ( 4
m+2, m−2
m+2).36 3.3. THE RENT SEEKING MODEL
This strategy pair induces a probability distribution over ﬁnal outcomes. Each one of the
four ﬁnal outcomes may emerge. This is to say, that in addition to the already discussed
“coordinated outcomes” also the outcomes (acquiesce, acquiesce) and (contest, contest) may
materialize. Each one of the four outcomes emerges with a certain probability, which in this
case depends solely on the size of the parameter m.
The uncontested resource One possible outcome is that both tribes choose “acquiesce”. Of
course this is an inefﬁcient outcome as resource (rents) go unused. In a real setting, therefore,
such an outcome would not be stable as tribes have a strong incentive to restart the game.
The probability of this outcome happening, if a mixed strategy is played, increases with the
parameter m. If the resource is pointier, tribe leaders playing a mixed strategy choose more
often for the peaceful outcome, because outcomes where both parties enter the contest are
costly for both participants (i.e. are characterized by intense competition). As mentioned
above, these qualitative results are the same when we assume that the uncontested resource is
split down the middle and used by both tribes.
The “contest trap” An interesting possible case emerges when resources are sufﬁciently
pointy (m > 2). Given an equilibrium in mixed strategies emerges, there is a positive prob-
ability that tribes ﬁnd themselves in a “contest trap”. Since the optimal rent seeking level is
linearly increasing in pointiness, contest intensity will be high. For m > 2 the value of the re-
sources wasted due to rent seeking exceeds the (tribe’s share of the) value of the resource, and
both tribes are worse off than they would have been had they opted for “acquiesce” instead.
Rent seeking intensity is:




Consistent with the case of m < 2 above we see that the contest becomes more intense (i.e.















If tribes ﬁnd themselves in a contest trap, the bigger tribe is not as bad off as the smaller tribe.
The reason is that it can spread the costs of inefﬁcient rent seeking over a larger number of
tribe members. Inequality becomes more pronounced as m increases.CHAPTER 3. CONTESTING RESOURCES: RENT SEEKING, CONFLICT AND THE
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3.3.3 Summary
The simple rent seeking model developed conﬁrms a number of expectations and is consistent
with several stylized facts. For moderately pointy resources (m < ¯ mR) we ﬁnd that increasing
pointiness tends to lower aggregate production. And further, increasing m such that m > ¯ mR
holds, may make economies with easy access to resources even worse off than they would
have been without access to resources (that is: if a wasteful contest trap eventuates). Further-
more, increasing m will enhance inequality between tribes and thereby potentially contribute
to social unrest. However, increasing pointiness is not always bad. Upon comparing outcomes
where m < ¯ mR with those where m > ¯ mR we note that increased pointiness may also imply
a reduction in rent seeking effort. For m < ¯ mR rent seeking is a dominant strategy but this is
no longer true for m > ¯ mR.
Note the resemblance of our ﬁndings to standard rent seeking models. Most of the lit-
erature on rent seeking is concerned with “rent dissipation”. This term captures the ratio of
resources devoted to (unproductive) rent seeking to the total rent available. It is a well known
standard result in this literature that rent dissipation D equals
m(N−1)
N , where N is the number
of parties (tribes) engaging in rent seeking (Nitzan [1994], Tullock [1980]). D in our model is
equal to 2m
4 , where 2
4 coincides with the term N−1
N , because N = 2 in our model.
There are two main differences between our approach and standard rent seeking models.17
One is that in the rent seeking literature it is widely established that rent dissipation can never
exceed one, so there will never be over dissipation of rents (for a discussion see Baye et al.
[1993]). However, our model allows for a “contest trap”, where the value of resources wasted
in rent seeking exceeds the value of the price.
The second main difference in this chapter, compared with the standard rent seeking ap-
proach, is dealt with in the next section. We remove the usual assumption of a constant and
exogenous cost of contesting (rent seeking). In the conﬂict model below we explore what
happens if conﬂict is costly in terms of reduced production opportunities in the rest of the
economy. We will show that under certain conditions this might actually produce more favor-
able overall economic outcomes.
3.4 The conﬂict model
In this section we will depart from the assumption that production possibilities are unaffected
by contest and turn to the scenario we refer to as “conﬂict”. Speciﬁcally, we consider the
17We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.38 3.4. THE CONFLICT MODEL
case where conﬂict has a deteriorating effect on production: AC < AP. Interestingly, this
deteriorating effect need not imply that the economy as a whole is worse off.
First we consider how AC < AP affects the “critical m”, or the necessary degree of
pointiness where the tribe is indifferent between going to war and acquiesce if it expects that
the rival tribe goes to war. This “critical m”, (or ¯ mC) is found by solving:
Ei · AP =
1
2
R + (Ei − Fi) · AC ↔ m = 2 −
4Ei · (AP − AC)
R
= ¯ mC. (3.19)
From this equation follow two results. First, since AC < AP it follows directly that ¯ mC < ¯ mR
= 2. In other words, the range of values for which the resource is always contested (i.e.
m < ¯ mC) becomes smaller, compared to a rent seeking model. Second, ¯ mC is not independent
of tribe size, Ei. Speciﬁcally, for E1 > E2 we know that ¯ m1
C < ¯ m2
C (i.e. ∂ ¯ m
∂Ei < 0). The larger
tribe will “switch” from conﬂict as a dominant strategy to playing a mixed strategy at a lower
degree of pointiness. This is natural, as the larger tribe has a larger production sector, and
therefore stands more to lose from conﬂict than the small tribe.
The latter result has an interesting implication. Since tribe size matters in our conﬂict
model we ﬁnd that there is a smaller range of m values for which “contest” is a dominant
strategy for both tribes – the degrees of pointiness where a contest equilibrium is inevitable.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.2 where for m < ¯ m1 conﬂict is the dominant strategy for both
tribe leaders. For m ∈ (¯ m1, ¯ m2) the resource is uncontested and goes to the smaller tribe.
Fighting does not pay for the large tribe but it still does for the small tribe, hence the latter can
credibly commit to a conﬂict strategy. Note that this range gets wider if E1 and E2 are further
apart: the more unequal tribe size, the more likely is this outcome. If m > ¯ m2 a coordination
game emerges, with the possible equilibrium outcomes already discussed in section 3.3.
Upon comparing the outcomes of the rent seeking and the conﬂict model it is evident that
they cannot be unambiguously ranked in terms of welfare losses for the economy. Whether
conﬂict or rent seeking models of contest are to be preferred depends on the degree of resource
pointiness. On the one hand, as mentioned above, a wasteful contest equilibrium will not ma-
terialize in the conﬂict model for a range of m values.18 On the other hand, and opposing the
ﬁrst effect, contest intensity will be greater in case a conﬂict equilibrium does emerge. For
m < ¯ m1 both tribes will opt for conﬂict (and they may both do this for m > ¯ m2), lowering
18Note that in the “conﬂict model”, conﬂict actually arises in fewer cases than in the rent seeking model.
Still we believe the wording here is valid, because the effects captured by this model are mainly relevant for the
case of violent conﬂict. In times of violence, productivity is reduced due to the destructive effect of conﬂict on
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productivity. This reduction in the opportunity costs of conﬂict implies that optimal contest
effort will be higher in a war equilibrium.
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Figure 3.2: Comparing outcomes for the conﬂict and the rent seeking model
3.5 Discussion
Empirical work suggests that resource abundance and pointiness are signiﬁcant determinants
of economic performance and (civil) war. Using a simple framework we have tried to explore
an underlying mechanism that could give rise to both of these phenomena. Our general con-
test model may be speciﬁed as either a rent seeking or a conﬂict (war) model, and for both
speciﬁcations we examine how resources impact on the incentives of agents to divert their en-
dowment (effort) away from production and toward redistribution. The results are richer and
more subtle than perhaps expected a-priori.
Nevertheless, our main theoretical predictions match well with stylized facts. For a range
of parameter values we ﬁnd that increasing pointiness provides an incentive to allocate effort
toward contesting. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the economy as a whole can be made worse off follow-
ing the discovery of a new resource stock if that resource is sufﬁciently “pointy” – the potential
“conﬂict trap” equilibrium. However, we also note that the link between resources and con-
ﬂict intensity is not unambiguous; there are circumstances where more pointy resources may
be less heavily contested. This is consistent with ﬁndings by Ross [2004a], who notes that
“resources do not necessarily make conﬂicts longer or more severe - at times they appeared to
shorten conﬂicts and promote cooperation among opposing sides.”
We also ﬁnd that the impact of pointiness on distribution is not straightforward. According
to our speciﬁcation the effect of increased resource pointiness is that the contest more closely
resembles a winner-takes-all event. Very pointy resources, therefore, appear to contribute40 3.6. APPENDIX
to inequality as they end up being controlled by one tribe.19 But there is also a range of
intermediate parameter values where the resource is contested and where increased pointiness
implies a more equal distribution. Per capita income in the disadvantaged (larger) tribe creeps
closer to incomes in the privileged (smaller) tribe.
One further result of the model is that contesting resources through the mode of violent
conﬂict (as opposed to rent seeking) may yield superior outcomes for the economy as a whole.
Conﬂict equilibria are less likely to emerge – the fact that the opportunity cost is endogenous
facilitates coordination on no-contest outcomes. When conﬂict arises this is destructive as the
productivity in the rest of the economy decreases, thus making this strategy more costly to
initiate. Therefore, the economy may end up with one (the smallest) of the tribes grabbing the
resource rents without the other entering into the conﬂict. As a consequence an unproductive
“arms race” is not initiated, and little resources are wasted in the conﬂict. On the other hand
if conﬂict does occur it is more ﬁerce than in the rent seeking case. The presence of conﬂict
lowers the opportunity cost of contest effort and thus intensiﬁes the conﬂict. The net effect in
terms of labor wasted is ambiguous and depends on the degree of resource pointiness.
Finally, the model could be extended in at least two different directions. First, it would be
interesting to place the framework in a dynamic setting to enable a ﬁrmer link between the the-
ory and the empirical literature on the resource curse (which focuses on average growth rates
and not production levels). Second, the model could be enriched by introducing decreasing or
increasing returns to scale in the production sector (see, for example, Matsuyama [1992] for a
model with IRS and Hotte et al. [2000] for a model with DRS in manufacturing). Similar as in
the conﬂict model explored above we would ﬁnd that the returns to labor in production are af-
fected by the allocation of labor. But unlike the conﬂict speciﬁcation above the returns would
be affected in a smooth and continuous manner, and moving labor from production to con-
testing could raise (rather than depress) the marginal return to labor in production. Exploring
these issues in detail, however, is left for future work.
3.6 Appendix
To ﬁnd the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the described game, we calculate the best-
answer correspondences of the two tribes. We ﬁnd:
19That is: unless tribes end up in a conﬂict trap and share the rents equally. As mentioned above, however, this
would imply that both are worse off than they would have been had they specialized in production instead.CHAPTER 3. CONTESTING RESOURCES: RENT SEEKING, CONFLICT AND THE





Contest if σ2A > σ∗
2A
(Contest,Acquiesce) if σ2A = σ∗
2A







2R + E1(AP − AC) + mR
4
1
2R + E1(AP − AC) + mR
4
σ∗
2A denotes the probability with which tribe 2 plays strategy (Acquiesce). Note that σ∗
2A < 1,
i.e. (Acquiesce) is never dominant for tribe 1. Similarly, the best-answer correspondence of





Contest if σ1A > σ∗
1A
(Contest,Acquiesce) if σ1A = σ∗
1A







2R + E2(AP − AC) + mR
4
1
2R + E2(AP − AC) + mR
4
Again we see, that the pure strategy (Acquiesce) is never dominant for tribe 2. Note the intu-
ition behind the best-answer correspondences: Tribe i only chooses (Contest) if the probability
withwhichtheothertribechooses(Contest)issufﬁcientlysmall(i.e. ifσjA issufﬁcientlyhigh.
Furthermore we ﬁnd that
σ
∗
iA > 0 ↔ Ej · AP >
1
2
R + (Ej − Fj) · AC
Therefore the classiﬁcation in section 3.2.2. If
Ej · AP <
1
2
R + (Ej − Fj) · AC
for j=1,2 (i.e. if condition (3.11) is fulﬁlled), then
σ
∗
iA < 0 for all i
i.e. the pure strategy (Contest) is dominant for each tribe.
Since we assume E1 > E2 it could be the case that
E2 · AP <
1
2
R + (E2 − F2) · AC42 3.6. APPENDIX
but
E1 · AP >
1
2




2A > 0 and σ
∗
1A < 0.
In this case the pure strategy (Contest) is dominant for tribe 2, but not for tribe 1.
If, on the other hand,
Ej · AP >
1
2
R + (Ej − Fj) · AC
for j=1,2 (i.e. if condition (3.10) is fulﬁlled), then
σ
∗
iA > 0 for all i.
By referring to the best-answer correspondences above, we ﬁnd that there are now three equi-
libria, two in pure and one in mixed strategies. The two equilibria in pure strategies are:





2A)). Note that in this general case σ∗
iA depends on all the param-
eters in the model, in particular on Ei. The mixed strategy equilibrium induces a probability
distribution over possible outcomes of the game. The probability for each of the outcomes are
shown in the following table:
Outcome Probability
(Contest, Contest) (1 − σ∗























































bers of a family or village, or violent conﬂicts on a large scale, such as civil wars and disputes
between states, conﬂict adversely affects the economic, physical and emotional well-being of
many people. It is therefore unsurprising that research into the ultimate and proximate causes
of such events has become a lively ﬁeld in economics. Following signiﬁcant theoretical ad-
vances in the early 1990s on the “economics of conﬂict” in general (e.g. Hirshleifer [1991a],
Hirshleifer [1991b], Hirshleifer [1995], Grossman [1994], Grossman and Kim [1995]), the
ﬁeld has developed and now encompasses thorough econometric work and more focused the-
oretical analyses.
The structure of conﬂict games is always similar in essence. Two agents have the choice
between productive or contesting (unproductive) activity. Their objective is to maximize their
utility. Utility is derived from two sources: (1) A share of total production, aided by the
productive inputs of both agents, goes to each of the agents. (2) The allocation of the contested
prize1 depends on the relative contesting efforts supplied by each agent. An increase in the
prize makes contesting activity more attractive to both contenders. That is, productive activity
aids both agents, whereas the payoff of (unproductive) contest activity only accrues to the
1In many conﬂict models the contested prize is total production in the economy - an assumption different to
what I consider in this chapter as I explain below.
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agent undertaking it.
So far the literature has neglected some salient features of contests. Most conﬂict models
consider a situation of conﬂict in a Cournot setting (simultaneous choice) (see for example
Garﬁnkel [1990], Skaperdas [1992], Grossman and Kim [1995]) over an endogenous prize
(usually production output) (see for example Garﬁnkel [1990], Hirshleifer [1991b], Grossman
[1991], Skaperdas [1992], Grossman [1994]). In this chapter, I consider a situation in which
(1) the two contenders are not of equal standing, but one has a ﬁrst mover advantage (i.e. a
Stackelberg game), and (2) competitors ﬁght over an exogenous prize (i.e. not created by the
participants in the contest).2 Endowments are limited and can be allocated either to produc-
tive (benevolent) or contesting (malevolent) activity. Due to limited resources, an agent that
decides to be productive, has less endowment to engage in contesting activity and vice versa. I
am not aware of work that captures a combination of a Stackelberg game with conﬂict over an
exogenous prize. Yet, there are many real-life situations to which a model with these features
is applicable.
In particular the model readily applies to situations of conﬂict between, for example, the
ruler and the people of a country.3 They compete for control over a ﬂow of rents, that stems
from development aid or natural resource rents. But conﬂict is not inevitable – rebelion may be
deterred by the threat of force, or the people may be paciﬁed by public investments. Following
important work by Azam [1995], Azam [2001] and also Azam and Mesnard [2003], I assume
that the ruler may invest in defense to quell opposition, or that he may “buy the peace” by
providing a productivity-enhancing public good (also see Grossman [1994], and, for empirical
evidence, Azam et al. [1996]). On the other hand the people spend their effort either on
productive working or on stealing rents. Many resource rich countries witness the latter type
of behaviour. For instance in Nigeria rebels continuously try to divert pumped-up oil and trade
it.
Such a situation is best modeled using a Stackelberg approach with the ruler as a ﬁrst
mover (as was also recognized by for example Azam [1995], Azam [2001], Grossman [1991],
Grossman [1994]).
2That is, I consider a situation of an economy with two separate sectors, a no-conﬂict and a conﬂict sector.
3Also one could think of other real life situations where such a model framework is applicable. For one, think
of a situation in which co-workers compete for a certain position in an organization. The utility of each agent is
given by the status of the position he is holding and his income. The contested prize is the status and prestige
connected with the position. The Stackelberg leader is the incumbent, i.e. the person holding the position at the
present moment. He has a ﬁrst-mover advantage, for example due to better access to information. The follower
is the person that longs for the position. Both have the choice to allocate their total available effort (which is
their working time, i.e. 8 hours a day) to either contributing to the organization’s output (and thus increasing
their salary, whereby the organization’s output is allocated among the agents in the form of salaries) or engage in
unproductive “mobbing” of the other person in order to acquire the position.CHAPTER 4. CONFLICT AND PRODUCTION: AN APPLICATION TO NATURAL
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First, a government’s actions are readily observable for all parties involved. The govern-
ment has the intent and arguably the essential function of guiding people via its policies. This
quality suggests that the government is well described as a leader in a Stackelberg game.
Another reason why, within the Stackelberg setup, it is natural to consider the ruler as the
leader is that the contesting efforts of the ruler and the people respectively are of an inherently
different kind. The committed party is the one assumed to be the leader in a Stackelberg
game. A ruler’s contesting takes a much more organized and institutional form than the one
of the people. To fulﬁl his defensive goals, the ruler needs to create an army (institutionalized
infrastructure), which implies concertive administrative efforts. The bureaucracy involved
bars him from changing his behaviour very quickly. As a result, a ruler is slow to respond,
whereas rebels are rather “quick on their feet”. The people can, sloppily said, simply “grab a
gun” and ﬁght as rebels. They tend to be more ﬂexible in their contesting decisions. Thus a
ruler is more committed to its actions than the people, which makes him the natural leader in
a Stackelberg game.
The contribution of the chapter is three-fold. First, I present a general conﬂict model that
incorporates salient features of many conﬂict situations. That is, I model a Stackelberg game
in which both contenders have limited endowments to put into contesting an exogenous prize
or productive activities. In this chapter, I focus on the example given above, in particular I
consider a situation of conﬂict among a ruler and the people over natural resource rents. The
second contribution of the chapter is thus to examine the relationship between the amount of
resource rents and conﬂict activities. I ﬁnd that it is characterised by a hump-shape relation.
Conﬂict intensity is low at very low and very high levels of resource wealth. It peaks at
intermediate levels. Third, I trace out the effect of resources on economic performance. I ﬁnd
that resource wealth may induce a “convergence from above”. That is, resource rich countries
may overshoot at times, converging back to their “normal” income level as resource rents dry
up.
The model outcomes are consistent with empirical evidence. Recent work by Collier and
Hoefﬂer [2004] suggests that opportunities for rebelion (sometimes referred to as the “greed
motive”) are an important driver of conﬂict. This corroborates analyses implicating natural re-
sources as a cause of civil war (e.g. Collier and Bannon [2003], Ross [2004a], Ross [2004b]).
A robust empirical ﬁnding is a non-monotonous relationship between the amount of resources
and the extent of conﬂict activity in an economy (Collier and Hoefﬂer [1998]). Conﬂict inten-
sity does not, as one might expect at ﬁrst sight, increase linearly with the amount of resource
rents, but peaks at intermediate values. I reproduce this ﬁnding in my model, and thereby
provide a theoretical underpinning of the empirical result.46 4.1. INTRODUCTION
In addition, empirical work also associates natural resources with low or even negative
economic growth rates (see for example Sachs and Warner [1997]). The link between re-
sources and conﬂict possibly represents another manifestation of what has become known as
the “curse of natural resources”.4 There is empirical evidence that the resource curse is due to
some “convergence from above” of countries. Overshooting at some point, resource rich coun-
tries converge back to adequate income levels as time passes (Rodriguez and Sachs [1999]). I
ﬁnd a similar result in my theoretical model, whereas the causal mechanism is different from
the one in Sachs and Rodriguez.5
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, I present the general conﬂict model
using the interpretation of conﬂict over resource rents. I explicitly examine the role of resource
rents in a Stackelberg model of conﬂict, recognizing the inherent difference of the ruler and
the people respectively. This is an important point of difference between this work and other
recent theoretical contributions on conﬂicts and natural resources. Hodler [2006] develops a
model in which institutional quality is endogenously determined. Natural resources decrease
productive activity via two channels; they increase the incentive to ﬁght, and decrease the
incentive to work because conﬂict erodes institutions (i.e. weakens property rights). Wick
and Bulte [2006] trace out the effects of the resource’s pointiness on appropriative actions
in the economy. Both of these works consider contenders to be of equal standing, which
may be inappropriate in the context of conﬂict between unequals, such as a ruler and the
people. In Section 4.3, I propose a concrete speciﬁcation and am thereby able to trace out the
optimal appropriative effort decisions of both agents as a function of resource rents in Section
4.4. In the following sections, I turn to applications of this result. Section 4.5 considers
the relationship between conﬂict intensity and resource wealth. This is done by considering
the comparative static properties of the results of Section 4.4 with respect to the amount of
resource rents. In Section 4.6, I argue that resource rents may well vary over time, thus the
results of Section 4.4 lend themselves to a dynamic interpretation (as in Caselli and Coleman
[2006]). While assuming that resource earnings fall over time, I trace out the effect on income
levels and growth. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes.
4The term “resource curse” refers to the empirical fact that resource poor countries have, on average, worse
growth experiences than their resource rich counterparts. Recently it has been found that the curse extends to
other dimensions as well, that is resource rich countries fare worse in terms of institutional quality (Isham et al.
[2005]) and many developmental indicators, such as life expectancy (Bulte et al. [2005]). For evidence on the
resource curse see for example Sachs and Warner [1997], Sachs and Warner [2001], Isham et al. [2005] and
Michaels [2006].
5Sachs and Rodriguez argue that if resource money is invested domestically rather than abroad, this leads
to investment and consumption booms at home, which in turn increase domestic output. Thus, resource rich
countries live beyond their means for a while, before falling back to “normal” income levels.CHAPTER 4. CONFLICT AND PRODUCTION: AN APPLICATION TO NATURAL
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4.2 The general model
The two agents in the model are the ruler and a rebel leader who represents the people or the
population of a country. Resource rents are fueled into the economy, and thus provide the
incentive to engage in contesting activity. Think for example of a situation where the govern-
ment receives resource rents as a sort of usage fee paid by an (international) ﬁrm extracting
the resource. Then there are different approaches to capture the notion that the people may
wrestle those rents from the government. First, following Tornell and Lane [1999], one may
view the public budget as a common pool from which various groups try to secure a share.
Second, one can develop a model where rebels ﬁght to control part of the resource stock, so
that they themselves become the residual claimant of some of the resource rents generated
by the international ﬁrm. Third, and closest to the speciﬁcation that I have in mind, one can
think of a model where rebels steal part of the output generated by the ﬁrm, and sell it else-
where. The example of Nigeria, where there is widespread diversion of pumped-up oil that is
subsequently traded, serves me as a practical motivation to my choice. The degree to which
such theft is possible is, of course, determined by enforcement and hence is subject to choices
made by the government. It does not matter whether the rebels take the physical output (oil,
diamonds, or another commodity) or money - one can easily be converted into the other.
There are two separate sectors in the economy, a manufacturing and a resource sector.
Both groups in society have a certain “budget” they can allocate to two possible activities,
production and contesting the resource rent. The rebel leader allocates the people’s effort
to stealing and production, so they potentially turn into a rebel force if contesting the rent is
proﬁtable. The ruler has a budget which he can use to provide a productivity-enhancing public
good or he can allocate to the contest. Moreover, the ruler taxes the people’s production (or
otherwise beneﬁts from it). Following Azam, I assume the ruler and people play a Stackelberg
game, with the government as the Stackelberg leader. But my speciﬁcation of the contest
process is different from Azam: the ruler can, as a ﬁrst mover, at some cost choose how much
of the rent he wants to fully secure. The rest is open for contesting, and may be grabbed by
the people. This means the government controls the size of the contested prize.
4.2.1 The Setup
Production in the manufacturing sector is given by a general production function F(φ,W)
with ∂F
∂φ > 0, ∂F
∂W > 0, ∂2F
∂φ2 ≤ 0, ∂2F
∂W2 ≤ 0, where φ denotes a productivity enhancing public
good and W is the working effort provided by the people. That is, I assume non-increasing
positive marginal returns to productive activities. Production beneﬁts both the people and48 4.2. THE GENERAL MODEL
the ruler who either taxes production (in case of a formal sector) or beneﬁts from bribes and
kickbacks (in case of an informal sector). To hone in on the key tradeoff between production
and ﬁghting I treat the tax (or bribe) rate τ as constant and exogenous.
The proceedings of the resource sector are also split between the two parties. The split is
determined by the respective contesting efforts. I call G(D,E) the “grabbing function”, where
D is the governmental defense effort and E is the people’s stealing effort. The amount of rent
grabbed by the people is given by R · G(D,E), where R denotes the ﬂow of resource rent
poured into the economy.6 Accordingly the government receives share (1 − G(D,E)) of the
rent R. That is, I assume that grabbing is - independent of the size of R - determined by the
relative contesting effort levels. I assume positive, decreasing marginal returns to contesting
activities, that is ∂G
∂D < 0, ∂G
∂E > 0, ∂2G
∂D2 > 0, ∂2G
∂E2 < 0.
Also I assume ∂2G
∂E∂D < 0, i.e. the marginal return of people’s stealing decreases in the
governmental defense effort. Finally, I assume ∂2F
∂W∂φ > 0, which means that the marginal
return to people’s working effort increases in the public good provided.
The rebel leader allocates effort across the two possible activities, so that for the people
the following effort constraint is relevant: W + E ≤ N, where N is total effort available.
Similarly, the ruler has total effort Q that he divides between the contest and public good
provision: D + φ ≤ Q.
4.2.2 Contesting efforts as strategic substitutes or complements?
Since the people are the follower in the Stackelberg game, I consider, by backwards induction,




P = (1 − τ)F(φ,W) + G(D,E)R (4.1)
s.t. W + E ≤ N = 1 (4.2)
E ≥ 0 (4.3)
W ≥ 0 (4.4)
Note that I normalize the people’s endowment, N, to 1. Budget constraint (2) will always be
fulﬁlled with equality (since πP is strictly increasing in both arguments, E and W), so that
“wasting” any effort is never optimal.7 The optimal stealing effort of the people, E∗, is deﬁned
6Just like most literature on the topic (see for example Collier and Hoefﬂer [1998]), I use a ﬂow variable to
measure resource wealth of a country. This is in line with the extensive literature on the resource curse, where
it has been found that it is usually resource ﬂows (most commonly used in the literature is the share of primary
goods exports in total exports) and not resource stocks that inhibit a country’s development (Ding and Field
[2004], Stijns [2002]).
7Note that this implies that ∂F
∂E = − ∂F





∂E       
MB
= −(1 − τ)
∂F(φ,1 − E∗)
∂E       
MC
. (4.5)
The LHS denotes the marginal beneﬁt of an increase in E, the RHS the marginal cost. If
rebels devote more effort to stealing, they can secure more of the resource (MB). On the
other hand, it implies less time for working, so that income from production decreases (MC).
How does rebel stealing effort, E, respond to an increase in defense, D? To examine whether
contest activities are strategic substitutes or complements, I investigate how the MB and the
MC change with an increase in D.
Increasing defense effort D has two counteracting effects on optimal stealing effort. First,
there is a direct negative effect because there is less to steal for the people (the unsecured rent,
i.e. the potential prize for the rebels, becomes smaller). But there is an indirect effect as well.
If the government increases defense effort, less resources are left to be invested in the public
good. This implies that the productivity of effort in production falls, so that the opportunity
cost of stealing decreases. This effect works to increase the optimal stealing effort of the
people. Hence, both the marginal cost and the marginal beneﬁt of E decrease, as D goes up.
Which of the two decreases more determines the sign of ∂E
∂D. If the marginal beneﬁt decreases
more than the marginal cost (the case that will be discussed later) then ∂E
∂D < 0, and (E,D) are
strategic substitutes. For other functional forms it could be the case that ∂E
∂D > 0, i.e. (E,D)
are strategic complements.8
Note that if either the production function or the grabbing function were additive in their
inputs, this would have straightforward effects on the results. In particular:
• If the production function is additive in its inputs, then ∂2F
∂W∂φ = 0. Note that this implies
that there is no possibility for the ruler to lure the people into production, i.e. “buying
the peace” is not possible. In this case (E,D) are strategic substitutes.
• If the grabbing function is additive in its inputs, then ∂2G
∂E∂D = 0. Here the strategy
of “sheer force” does not work. People are not “scared away” by high governmental
defense effort. Thus (E,D) are strategic complements.
The respective contesting efforts (E,D) might be complements or substitutes, depending on
the functional forms chosen. That is, high governmental defense effort can either drive people
away from stealing natural resources and push them into the manufacturing sector, or it can
8For a more formal treatment consult Appendix 2.50 4.3. AN EXAMPLE OF A SPECIFIED MODEL
lead to the opposite, since high government expenditure on defense means very little invest-
ment in productivity enhancing public goods (because the government has limitations on how
much it can spend). This in turn lowers the opportunity cost for stealing of the people, i.e. they
tend to steal more. To go one step further, I next turn to a concrete speciﬁcation of the model.
The robustness of the results with respect to other functional speciﬁcations is discussed as I
go along.
4.3 An example of a speciﬁed model
In this section I discuss the results of the model given speciﬁc functional forms. In particular I
assume manufacturing output to be given by F(φ,W) = (1+φ)(1+W).9 The grabbing func-
tion (denoting the share of the resource grabbed by the people, as a function of the respective
contesting efforts) is assumed to be G(D,E) = (1 − Dγ)Eα. One can interpret R · (1 − Dγ)
as the undefended rent or potential prize for the rebels. Given their stealing effort E, rebels
win the amount R(1 − Dγ)Eα of the resource. The amount of rent grabbed is increasing in
the contest effort of the population and decreasing in the contest effort of the ruler. I assume
α = 1
2 and γ = 1.10,11
4.3.1 The People’s problem
The people are the follower in the Stackelberg game. Given policy choices by the government
(D,φ) and using the speciﬁcation introduced above, I can solve for their reaction function by





2(1 − τ)(1 + φ)
 2
. (4.6)
9I assume a production function linear in its inputs for mathematical ease. The results typically carry over to
nonlinear speciﬁcations. To see this consult Appendix 2.
10Numerical simulations show that the presented results do not change qualitatively for other values of α and
γ (both ≤ 1 of course). That is, the assumption of α = 1
2 and γ = 1 is only for mathematical ease, and does not
drive the results.
11As a referee correctly pointed out setting α = γ would be more intuitive since then the grabbing function
would be equally sensitive on the margin to the effort of the ruler and the people. Unfortunately such a speciﬁ-
cation in general does not allow for an analytical solution. The only tractable such case is given by α = γ = 1.
Then optimality for the people dictates a corner solution, which makes this case not all that interesting. For an
interior solution diminishing marginal returns to contesting for the people are needed.CHAPTER 4. CONFLICT AND PRODUCTION: AN APPLICATION TO NATURAL
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4.3.2 The Government’s problem
The government, assumed to be dictatorial, is a selﬁsh ruler that, like the people, is only
interested in its own income. The government receives income via resource rents and taxation
of production. It can implement policies that raise productivity in manufacturing or allocate
effort to defense to secure part of the rent ﬂow. The former policy raises the tax base, which
is a direct effect. In addition, it increases the opportunity cost of stealing effort for the rebels.
This is an indirect beneﬁt, because it raises the share of uncontested resource rents falling back
into the hands of the ruler, as demonstrated below.






∗(D,φ)) + R − G(D,E
∗(D,φ))R (4.7)
= τ(1 + φ)(1 + W












∗ = N − E
∗. (4.9)
s.t. D + φ ≤ Q, (4.10)
Q ≥ 1, (4.11)
0 ≤ D ≤ 1, (4.12)
φ ≥ 0. (4.13)
Note that (4.10) is always fulﬁlled with equality, as wasting any effort is never optimal for the
government (the objective function is increasing in both φ and D).
With respect to (4.11), I assume Q ≥ 1. Thus, in principle it is possible for the government
to defend all of the resource. Otherwise, if I allowed for Q < 1, the ruler could not, even if
he devoted all his resources to defense, secure all the resource. I do not want to impose this
exogenously. Nevertheless, this arises as an endogenous result as I go on.
Consistent with the speciﬁcation for the rebels, I assume a multiplicative function for
securing resource rents: R · D. Depending on the choice of D, a fraction of the rent is
potentially available for the rebels: R − R · D = R(1 − D). The rebels grab a fraction
R(1 − D)E
1
2, leaving the remainder for the ruler (because it is too expensive to steal). Note
that for an interior solution D∗ < 1 must hold. Below I show that this condition is always
satisﬁed. That is, it is never optimal for the government to defend all of the resource.52 4.4. RESULTS
4.3.3 Strategic interaction
Since the government is the Stackelberg leader it faces the people’s response as an additional
constraint. Upon substituting (4.10) in (4.6), the people’s reaction function with respect to





2(1 − τ)(1 + Q − D)
 2
. (4.14)
It is readily veriﬁed that the government’s and rebel force’s contest effort levels are strategic
substitutes.12 Raising D both lowers the prize available for the people (discouraging stealing)








(1 − τ)(1 + Q − D)2
 
< 0. (4.15)
The conﬂict literature ﬁnds that conﬂict levels may be both strategic substitutes or comple-
ments, i.e. the sign of ∂E∗
∂D is generally ambiguous (see for example Addison et al. [2002] or
Azam [1995]). In section 4.2, I showed that both cases are possible in the presented model
setup, (E,D) may be strategic substitutes as well as strategic complements. With the chosen
speciﬁcation, I can unambiguously sign the impact of the ruler’s on the people’s choice. Here,
the government is able to “scare away” the people.
4.4 Results
In this section I characterize optimal choices of the Stackelberg leader and follower as a func-
tion of the amount of rents R in the economy.
4.4.1 Optimal defense effort of the government - Characterizing D∗
I ﬁrst trace out the behavior of D∗. Note that since the effort constraint (4.10) of the gov-
ernment is always fulﬁlled with equality an optimum is fully characterized by D∗, as φ∗ =















∂D       
C
= 0. (4.16)
12This unambiguity is, as discussed before, a result of the functional forms assumed.
13An increase in D comes at the cost of a decrease in φ, because the ruler has a limited endowment. Once he
puts more of his effort in defense, less is left for the public good. As a result productivity in the manufacturing
sector is lower, and thus the opportunity cost of stealing decreases.
14To arrive at this result I employ the envelope theorem - Appendix 2 shows the derivations.CHAPTER 4. CONFLICT AND PRODUCTION: AN APPLICATION TO NATURAL
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An increase in defense effort has three effects on the proﬁts of the government. First, it
changes the rebels’ optimal stealing effort (and hence production effort)(A). Second, it leaves
the economy with a lower level of the public good, decreasing manufacturing output (B).








R2(1 − D)(1 + 2Q − D)




∂D = 0 gives an intractable quadratic equation in D. For a clean representation of
the results, I trace out the qualitative behaviour of D∗ via an indirect way. In Appendix 1 it is
shown that the objective function of the government is always concave in D. Therefore there
are only two qualitatively different forms of the objective function that may emerge.
Evaluated at D = 0 it could be the case that ∂πG
∂D D=0 < 0 with the objective function
monotonically decreasing in D. Obviously this translates into an optimal D of 0; D∗ = 0
always. Alternatively, it could be that ∂πG
∂D D=0 > 0 (with the slope decreasing thereafter). This
translates into an optimal D greater than 0, D∗ > 0. Formally, the slope of πG in the point











The second term on the RHS of (4.18) is increasing in R. So for sufﬁciently large values of R,
I ﬁnd that ∂πG
∂D D=0 > 0 and D∗ > 0. But as R decreases, defense effort is no longer worthwhile
for the ruler. Denote R as the threshold value for the rent ﬂow that warrants defensive effort
(i.e. for R ≤ R, D∗ = 0). This threshold value is given by:
R = 2(1 − τ)(1 + Q)
 
2τ
(2 − τ)(1 + 2Q)
. (4.19)
Summarizing, for R > R, D∗ > 0, and for R ≤ R it is the case that D∗ = 0. This suggests
that D∗ decreases as R goes down. Indeed, by differentiating the FOC (implicitly deﬁning the




(1 − D)(1 + Q − D)(1 + 2Q − D)
RQ2 > 0. (4.20)
15Intuitively, one might argue that I have “forgotten” one effect. Since the optimal stealing effort of the people
changes as a response to an increase in defense, this also has an effect on the resource income of the ruler. This
effect can be neglected though (as a result of the envelope theorem)
16Note that when τ = 0 (the case of a purely informal economy, as for example considered in Marcouiller and
Young [1995]) there is no negative effect of an increase in D (given (E,D) are strategic substitutes as is the case
in my speciﬁed model). In this case the ruler does not provide any public good φ∗ = 0.54 4.4. RESULTS
Equation (4.20) implies that optimal defense effort of the government declines as R falls.
Above various costs and beneﬁts associated with raising D have been identiﬁed, and (4.20)
illustrates that the net marginal beneﬁts of increasing defense effort are falling as the ﬂow
of rents dries up. This makes intuitive sense. Moreover this result is robust to the choice of
functional forms. That is, given the assumptions of section 4.2, optimal D always increases in
R.17 In Appendix 1two further resultsabout theoptimal allocation ofeffort bythegovernment
are derived: (i) the function relating resource rents to conﬂict effort is concave, and (ii) the
ruler will never defend all the resource (i.e. D∗ < 1). This latter result implies also that it is
never optimal for the government to allocate its entire endowment to conﬂict (D∗ < Q).18
4.4.2 Optimal stealing effort of the rebels - Characterizing E∗
Having characterized the path of optimal behaviour of the ruler I now proceed by solving for





2(1 − τ)(1 + Q − D)
 2
. (4.21)
The effect of increasing the inﬂow of rents on the allocation of effort is a priori unclear because













1 + Q − D
. (4.23)
17To see this intuitively, note what happens to the marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs of governmental
defense D, when R increases.
First note that the marginal cost of D (as given by B in equation (4.16)) decreases in R. If R is high, people
devote more effort to stealing, i.e. work less. Thus the public good is less effective, which translates into a
decrease in the marginal cost of D.
Second, let us look at the marginal beneﬁts. They are made up of two components. An increase in governmental
defense effort affects the ruler’s payoff positively through two different channels: (1) An increase in defense
secures the ruler more of the resource (C in equation (4.16)). Governmental defense is more effective if R is
high. (2) An increase in defense induces people to work more. This effect of broadening the tax base is more
pronounced if R is high.
That is, the marginal beneﬁt of D increases with R and the marginal cost decreases, so that ∂D
∗
∂R > 0 always.
Consult Appendix 2 for a more formal treatment of this discussion.
18One could think that Q should, instead of being exogenous, depend on the amount of resource rent secured
by the government plus its manufacturing income (i.e. the total income of the government). As was pointed out
by a referee, this value can only be determined in equilibrium. As the analysis turns out to be extremely difﬁcult
and cumbersome, a fully ﬂedged investigation of this problem is beyond the scope of this chapter and has to be
left for future research. Other people have recognized this difﬁculty too, and to circumvent this problem have
worked with an exogenous effort constraint in similar models (see for example Hirshleifer [1991b] or Skaperdas
[1992]). In effect this assumption may not be all that unrealistic if, for instance, one thinks of the effort constraint
in terms of time.CHAPTER 4. CONFLICT AND PRODUCTION: AN APPLICATION TO NATURAL
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The sign of ∂E∗






(1 + Q − D)2[(1 − D)(1 + Q − D)
      
A
−R(1 + Q − D)
∂D∗
∂R       
B       
Bounty Effect
+ R(1 − D)
∂D∗
∂R       
C       
Public Good Effect
]. (4.24)
The term in brackets is made up of a “bounty effect” and a “public good effect”. The ﬁrst part
reﬂects that increasing R raises the stakes in conﬂict – there is more to ﬁght over (effect A).
However, an increase in R also triggers an increase in D (for R > R), which in turn lowers
the bounty accessible for the people (effect B). The bounty effect appears a priori ambiguous,
but in Appendix 1 it is shown that it is always negative (i.e. works to decrease E). In addition,
the increase in D leads to a reduction in the public good, so that the public good effect in the
expression above is always positive: it works to increase E (effect C). The next question,
then, is whether the bounty or public good effect dominates, and governs the path of E. For
the presented model, one can show that ∂E∗
∂R < 0 holds, or that the bounty effect dominates
(see Appendix 1).19
Here a decrease in R induces a sufﬁciently large decrease in D to imply a rise in R(1−D)
(i.e. in the bounty). This effect is strong enough to offset the counteracting public good effect,
and thus people increase their stealing effort as R decreases.
Note that two of the described effects (effects B and C) drop out when ∂D∗
∂R = 0. Therefore















(1−τ)(1+Q−D) > 0 : R ≤ R
(4.25)
In Appendix 1 I show that E∗(R) is convex in the range where R > R and concave where
R ≤ R.
Since the people only have one unit of effort available, I cannot a priori rule out corner
solutions. Formally, a more complete description of E is as follows:
E
∗ < 1 ⇔ R − 2(1 − τ)(1 + Q) < D(R − 2(1 − τ)), (4.26)
19For a more general discussion on the path of E∗ consult Appendix 2. There I show that both ∂E
∗
∂R < 0 and
∂E
∗
∂R > 0 are generally possible.56 4.4. RESULTS
and
E
∗ = 1 ⇔ R − 2(1 − τ)(1 + Q) ≥ D(R − 2(1 − τ)). (4.27)
So that I ﬁnd
If R > 2(1 − τ), then E
∗ < 1 ⇔ D > T(R), and (4.28)
if R < 2(1 − τ), then E
∗ < 1 ⇔ D < T(R), (4.29)
where T(R) =
R−2(1−τ)(1+Q)
R−2(1−τ) . The function T(R) provides the threshold level of defense.
Note that
If R > 2(1 − τ), then
lim
R−→∞




If R < 2(1 − τ),then
lim
R−→0




Corner solutions for E∗ can be ruled out by assuming D∗(Rmax) > T(Rmax), where Rmax
is the highest level of R considered.20 Corner solutions are evidently less insightful, thus we
assume the above throughout the chapter.21
4.4.3 Summary: The paths of D∗ and E∗
In the preceding section I have found the paths of D∗ and E∗ as a function of R. These
trajectories, for sufﬁciently large resource ﬂows (R > R), are illustrated in the following
ﬁgure22:
20For R < 2(1 − τ), I know that T(R) > (1 + Q). Furthermore I know that 2(1 − τ) < R, as deﬁned by
equation (4.19), and that for R < R, D∗ = 0. That is, condition (4.29) is always fulﬁlled.
If R > 2(1 − τ) then T(R) < 0 for R < ˇ R = 2(1 − τ)(1 + Q). Also I know that R < ˇ R. And ﬁnally it is true
that
∂T(R)
∂R > 0. All of this together means that the assumption D∗(Rmax) > T(Rmax) is sufﬁcient to rule out
corners.
21What would happen if the above condition were not satisﬁed, and thus a corner solution would eventuate?
E∗ could hit a corner for high values of R, if at some point D∗(R) < T(R). Then the ruler realizes in this range
of R values the people do not react to his defense, but just choose E∗ = 1. In this case his optimization problem
is maxD τ(1+Q)+D(R−τ). This makes perfect sense when one acknowledges the fact that now the ruler only
has to take into account the direct effects of his increase in defense (so he can disregard any effects his choice
has on the working/stealing effort of the people). An increase in D will on the one hand secure the ruler more of
the resource, but on the other hand decrease the public good, lowering his income from the manufacturing sector.
If R > τ (i.e. the positive effect of D on resource income dominates the induced reduction of manufacturing
output), the ruler will set D as high as possible, D∗ = D∗(R), as characterized by the FOC (4.16). Otherwise,
if R < τ (i.e. the negative effect of D overweighs), he will choose D∗ as low as possible, which here means
D∗ = 0.
22A sufﬁcient, though not necessary, condition for the two curves to cross is given by Rmax >   R, where   R is
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Figure 4.1: Conﬂict effort of the ruler (D, solid line) and the people (E, dashed line) as a
function of the ﬂow of rents (R)
Note that this ﬁgure is drawn for decreasing R. At the farthest point to the left R = Rmax,
and at the farthest point to the right R = 0.23
At this point one might wonder how results would change if the taxation rate τ, taken as
an exogenous parameter in the model, were to increase.24 I ﬁnd that the overall effect on con-
ﬂict intensity is ambiguous. Increasing the tax rate implies the government gets to keep more
of the beneﬁts from manufacturing, providing an incentive to invest more in the productivity-
enhancing public good. But there is also an indirect effect, triggered by the changed incentives
that the people now face. For high values of τ, the people ﬁght more and work less (decreas-
ing the incentive of the government to invest in φ). Changing τ therefore not only affects the
distribution of income, but it also affects the creation of wealth. A detailed formal discussion
can be found in Appendix 1.
One could also think of a situation where τ is not exogenous, but endogenous. It can be endo-
genized in two ways. First, τ could be another choice variable in the government’s problem.25
In this case the model is not solvable analytically anymore. Numerical solutions show that the
qualitative behaviour of the paths of E∗ and D∗ remain unchanged though (see Appendix 3).
Second, the people and the government could contest over the amount of taxes that has
23With respect to section 4.6 this means that one can picture time t on the x-axis (see Section 4.6).
24I would like to thank an anonymous referee whose comment encouraged me to look into this important
question.
25I thank Thierry Verdier for this comment which directed me towards investigating this matter further.58 4.5. A HUMP-SHAPE OF CONFLICT INTENSITY
to be paid.26 In this case the government (the people) exerts some effort in order to collect
(refuse to pay) taxes. Thus there is conﬂict over the distribution of production output. In
such a model an exogenous (resource rents) and an endogenous (production income) prize
is contested. Whereas many other conﬂict models consider the situation of contest over an
endogenous prize (see for example Grossman [1991], Hirshleifer [1991b]), the present chapter
focuses explicitly on a situation of contest over an exogenous prize. Since in endogenous prize
models the agents’ conﬂict decisions determine the contested prize, different incentives27 are
at work. In the current chapter, I thus abstract from this issue to focus clearly on a different
mechanism.
Next I apply the above results28 about the paths of conﬂict efforts to two particularly in-
teresting questions concerning the role of natural resources. I ﬁrst look at the relationship
between resource rents and conﬂict intensity. Second, I consider the effect of a change in
resource rents, and the implied change in contesting efforts, on income of the economy.
4.5 A hump-shape of conﬂict intensity
In this section, I look at a cross-section of countries all endowed with a different degree of
resource wealth, and investigate the differing conﬂict experiences the model suggests. I then
relate the theoretical results to empirical evidence by Collier and Hoefﬂer [1998].
4.5.1 Conﬂict Intensity
From Figure 4.1, note that when resource rents are large (Section I in the graph), the ruler and
the people ﬁght over control of the rents. The ruler has a ﬁrst-mover advantage, and secures
a large share of the rent (crowding out the rebels). If the ﬂow of rents is smaller, incentives
for the ruler are different. He provides less conﬂict effort, and more productivity-enhancing
public goods instead. Since D is lower, the rebels respond with a higher contest effort. If
rental payments are below the threshold value R (Section II), the rents are too small to warrant
government defense. The ruler provides no defense at all, and the optimal allocation of effort
by the rebels is exclusively governed by the amount of rents fueled in the economy. At R = R,
26This insightful comment was given by two anonymous referees.
27A more formal and detailed discussion on how and why incentives differ can be found in Appendix 3.
28Note that in a simultaneous move game, in which defense D and stealing E is chosen at the same time, the
effect of a decrease in R on the optimal stealing effort E∗ is unchanged to the presented model. The effect on
D∗ is ambiguous. That is, qualitatively similar results could eventuate in a Cournot setup (as opposed to the
Stackelberg one considered). Detailed information can be found in Appendix 3. I thank two anonymous referees
whose comments encouraged me to look into this important question.CHAPTER 4. CONFLICT AND PRODUCTION: AN APPLICATION TO NATURAL
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the comparative statics result of rebel conﬂict effort with respect to the size of the resource
ﬂow switches sign, and rebels’ stealing effort is now decreasing when R becomes smaller.
When there is no resource, i.e. R = 0 (Section III), both groups concentrate their effort on
manufacturing, that is the government sets φ = Q and the rebels provide W = N.
This gives all the ingredients necessary to characterize conﬂict intensity as a function of
rents R. Just like there are different ways to measure the intensity of conﬂict in reality, there
are also different ways to capture conﬂict intensity in stylized models. One convenient and




This representation captures the fact that it takes two to wage a war. Even if one party puts in a
lot of effort, and the other does not, then no conﬂict arises. It postulates that relatively “even”
conﬂicts are more intense than uneven ones (holding aggregate conﬂict effort constant), and
captures that intensity increases if both parties allocate more effort to conﬂict. These are all
desirable features.
From Figure 4.1 it is evident that the relation between conﬂict intensity and resource abun-
dance is non-monotonous for the speciﬁed model.29 In particular, the relation between inten-
sity and abundance is characterized by an inverted U shaped relationship. To verify this, move
from “left” to “right” in Section I in Figure 4.1, keeping track of min(D∗,E∗). At high R,
D∗ > E∗, but after the curves cross the reverse holds. The ﬁnding of an inverted U shaped
relation between resources and conﬂict intensity is consistent with empirical work by Collier
and Hoefﬂer [1998] and Collier and Hoefﬂer [2004].
In particular, Collier and Hoefﬂer ﬁnd in their papers a non-monotonous relationship be-
tween resources (measured as primary good exports) and civil war occurrence. They deﬁne
civil wars as events that cost more than 1000 deaths per year. Note the good ﬁt between their
deﬁnition of civil war and my measure of conﬂict intensity. At high levels of R, my measure of
intensity is low as D is small and the threshold (of civil war occurrence) may not be reached.
No civil war occurs. At intermediate levels of R, my measure of intensity is higher. If it
crosses the threshold, my model predicts the occurrence of a civil war. Finally, at low levels
of R, the measure for intensity falls below the threshold, so my model again predicts no civil
war. That is, the presented model predicts a civil war only at intermediate values, and none at
very low or very high levels of resource wealth. Therefore there is a strong match between the
implications of the model presented and the empirical ﬁndings of Collier and Hoefﬂer.
29As I discussed in section 4.4.2, it could also be the case that optimal stealing effort of the people is decreasing
in R. Then conﬂict intensity is decreasing in the amount of rents.60 4.5. A HUMP-SHAPE OF CONFLICT INTENSITY
They propose the following underlying mechanism: Resource wealth has two counter-
acting effects on the probability of civil war so that the overall effect is ambiguous, and the
hump-shape evolves. That is, for low values of R one effect overweighs, whereas for high
levels the other effect is stronger. The two effects are the following. First, more resources
allow the government to increase their military expenditure. Thus the government can sup-
press potential opposition and the probability of a civil war decreases. Second, more resources
increase the potential prize for rebel groups if they manage to capture the state, thereby in-
creasing the risk of conﬂict. The set-up explored in this work, with a given span of control,
allows for a different explanation. That is, accounting for alternative occupations and invest-
ment opportunities for the ruler also yields the inverted U.
A way to empirically tell apart the two theories is to look at the allocation of resource
rents between the ruler and the people.30 Collier and Hoefﬂer propose that the second effect
explained above overweighs for low values of R, whereas the ﬁrst effect overweighs for high
values (thus the hump-shape of conﬂict intensity evolves). This in turn means that for very low
R, Collier and Hoefﬂer’s theory proposes that people are not very aggressive, conﬂict intensity
is low. As R increases people get more aggressive and conﬂict intensity rises, since the second
effect overweighs in this range of R values. Thus, for low R the government grabs most of
the resource. In the presented model on the other hand, at low R the ruler provides very little
defensive effort, whereas the people put forth much stealing effort. That is, the presented
model predicts that people receive a large share of the resource rent, if R is relatively low.
4.5.2 An alternative conﬂict measure – the economic costs of conﬂict
To gain further insight on the results I next employ an alternative measure of conﬂict. An





C = R + F(Q)
      
GDPN
−R − F(Q,D,E)
      
−GDPC
, (4.33)
where the superscript E stands for economic, N for no conﬂict, and C for conﬂict. GDP is
given by the income from the resource, R, plus income from the manufacturing sector F(·).
By assumption, in a “no-conﬂict economy” the population puts all its effort into working. In
a “conﬂict economy” on the other hand, income from production depends on the contesting
decisions of the agents. I refer to CE as the economic costs of conﬂict in what follows.
30I thank an anonymous referee who encouraged me to investigate this interesting question.CHAPTER 4. CONFLICT AND PRODUCTION: AN APPLICATION TO NATURAL
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Using the speciﬁc functional forms, the economic costs of conﬂict are given by the fol-
lowing expression:
C
E = R + 2(1 + Q) − R − (1 + Q − D)(2 − E) = 2D + E(1 + Q − D). (4.34)
Note that if R ≤ R (since then D∗ = 0), the economic costs of conﬂict are given by
C
E = E(1 + Q). (4.35)





















which is, using the functional speciﬁcations,
∂CE
∂R
= (2 − E)
∂D∗
∂R       
A
+(1 + Q − D)
∂E∗
∂R       
B
. (4.37)
If R > R the effect of an increase in R is ambiguous. If R is high, the government puts forth
more defense effort, i.e. provides less of the public good, decreasing manufacturing output.
This increases the economic costs of conﬂict (effect A in equation (4.37)). On the other
hand, people steal less when R is high, providing more working effort and thereby increasing
manufacturing output. This decreases the economic costs of conﬂict (effect B in equation
(4.37)). Increases in R may thus increase or decrease the economic costs of conﬂict. Note
that for R ≤ R, I ﬁnd that ∂CE
∂R > 0. That is, for R ≤ R, the economic costs of conﬂict are
decreasing, as R goes down. Thus, whenever ∂CE
∂R |Rmax < 0, I ﬁnd a hump-shape also of this
- economic - conﬂict measure.
4.6 Convergence from Above - Resource Rents and Income
In this section I employ the results of section 4.4 to investigate how income of an economy
varies with resource rents. To put the results in the context of the literature on the natural
resource curse, I follow Caselli and Coleman [2006] in arguing that resource rents fall over
time. This assumption has many justiﬁcations. In particular this time path is the result of
an intertemporally optimizing ﬁrm, that has some market power, extracting a ﬁnite and non-
replenishable resource stock.31
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Thus I can readily interpret the comparative static results of section 4.4 and 4.5 in a dynamic
context, following the fate of a single economy over time, as its resource rents fall.
Income in the economy is deﬁned as the sum of rental payments and the value of manu-
facturing. In light of the recent controversy about the relation between income (growth) and
resource abundance – the so-called “resource curse” – it is instructive to consider the trajectory
of income over the three sections, detailed in section 4.5. Section III, where the resource is de-
pleted, is trivial in this respect: aggregate income is simply given by GDPIII = 2(1+Q) and
it is constant over time (∂GDP
∂t = 0). But dealing with the other sections is more challenging.
For example, in section II GDP is given by
GDPII = R + 2(1 + Q) −
R2
4(1 − τ)2(1 + Q)
. (4.38)
This is a quadratic function in R that reaches its maximum at some level of R, that I denote as
R∗. A change in R has two counteracting effects in section II, which together yield this form
of GDPII. When rental payments go down, there is a direct and negative effect on aggregate
income. However, lower rents induce a decrease in E, so working effort of the people goes
up which works to raise GDP. For higher R values, the working effort effect dominates and
GDP goes up when R falls. In contrast, for lower levels of R, the direct resource effect
dominates and GDP decreases when R falls.
How does the presence of a ﬂow of resource rents affect an economy’s income? The effect
is typically ambiguous. Denote income in a non-resource economy as GDP N. For sufﬁciently
low values of R, R <   R, resource ﬂows provide an impetus for income: GDPII > GDP N.
But I also ﬁnd that income growth rates are adversely affected by rental payments. A complete
characterization depends on the value of the tax rate τ. Three possible cases can emerge. (1)
For “low (1−τ)” I ﬁnd R∗ <   R < R. This implies GDPII will initially be below GDP N, but
as extraction proceeds income will increase and eventually GDPII > GDP N (when R <   R).
Income further increases, but then starts to fall. In ﬁnal stages the resource economy will
experience a negative growth rate, until R = 0 is reached. The resource economy’s income
approaches the non-resource economy’s income from above. (2) For “intermediate levels” of
(1 − τ) I ﬁnd that R∗ < R <   R, and GDPII > GDP N throughout. Depending on R, the
resource economy experiences positive or negative growth and eventually, as above, GDPII
approaches GDP N from above. (3) For “high levels” of (1 − τ) I ﬁnd R < R∗ <   R, so that
GDPII > GDP N, as above. But, unlike the case above, it is always the case that income
in the resource economy is decreasing over time. For a formal treatment and a graphical
representation of the above results, consult Appendix 1.
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values is the same (notably, this holds when R is not too great – which is the situation that
will eventually emerge in all societies after extraction has proceeded sufﬁciently long). Rental
payments will (i) increase income levels, but (ii) result in negative growth rates. This is in line
withempiricalevidence. RodriguezandSachs[1999]promotetheideaofincomeconvergence
from above, and empirical work by De Gregorio and Bravo-Ortega [2005] validates this result.
Note that this result is obtained without resorting to Matsuyama-style positive externalities in
manufacturing (Matsuyama [1992]).
The dynamics in section I are too complex to solve analytically, but yield ambiguous
results both with respect to income levels and growth rates. This is easily demonstrated for
the simplest case where the tax rate τ approaches zero – the case where the informal economy
is thriving and the ruler has virtually no possibility to claim part of the value added generated.
For τ → 0, it is evident from (4.17) that then ∂πG
∂D > 0, so that the ruler should (given my
speciﬁcation) optimally set D = 1 (and, hence, φ = Q − 1). All of the resource is defended
in this case, and thus E∗ = 0, so that aggregate income is simply GDP = R + 2Q. Upon
comparing this to the income level in the absence of resource extraction (i.e. GDP N =
2(1 + Q)), it is evident that resources raise income levels in the economy as long as R > 2
holds. Income will be lower if the reverse condition holds. The result for the growth rate is
simpler, ∂GDP
∂t = ∂R
∂t , so that income is falling over time.
4.7 Conclusions
Two recently emerged branches of literature hold abundance of natural resources responsible
for both civil unrest and slow economic growth. I argue that these two phenomena are not
independent, and propose a uniﬁed model that links resource rents to the allocation of effort
between production and conﬂict.
The model provides insights into the different conﬂict experiences of resource rich coun-
tries (depending on their degree of resource wealth). In addition, I investigate the effect of
resource wealth on a country’s income. Recognizing that resource rents fall over time, I am
able to follow a single economy over time and trace out its growth experience.
My main analytical results are consistent with empirical evidence: (1) in line with ﬁndings
of Collier and Hoefﬂer [1998] and Collier and Hoefﬂer [2004], I unearth a non-monotonous
relation between resources and conﬂict intensity, and (2) following work of Sachs and Warner
[1997] and others I ﬁnd that resource wealth tends to slow down growth (but may raise in-
come levels). Note that the model can also be used to make predictions on how new resource
discoveries might affect the (economic) fate of a country.64 4.7. CONCLUSIONS
Since analytical results are sometimes hard to obtain in conﬂict models, I had to invoke
a number of simplifying assumptions to maintain tractability. The main ones, arguably, are
(i) the exogenous budgets of the ruler and the people, Q and N, and (ii) the simpliﬁed model
set-up where I treat the tax rate as a parameter (rather than a choice variable). Relaxing these
assumptions involves searching for numerical solutions. For a model with an endogenous tax
rate32, numerical solutions show that the qualitative behaviour of the optimal contesting efforts
of the two agents is unchanged. The optimal tax rate in this case increases as resource rents
go down, emphasizing the intuitive result of the chapter that the ruler concentrates his effort
on the manufacturing sector as rents dry up.
In the present chapter I focus on the role of resources in conﬂict. That is not to deny that
there are other factors that may trigger violent clashes, such as ethnic hostilities. However, the
main argument of this chapter is that resource rents may be one of the factors fueling conﬂict.
The exact way in which they do is the object of investigation.
Policy wise the model gives some hints on what to consider when the goal is minimizing
conﬂict activities. Following the model there are essentially two ways to achieve minimum
conﬂict, either take out the resource all at once, while at the same time repressing rebels
harshly, or extracting very little at a time, so as not to trigger too much greed among the
population.
Thus the model presented in this chapter contributes not only towards understanding con-
ﬂict phenomena that undermine many societies, but provides also a formal foundation for
policy driven solutions.
32I thank Thierry Verdier whose comment encouraged me to investigate this question.CHAPTER 4. CONFLICT AND PRODUCTION: AN APPLICATION TO NATURAL
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4.8 Appendix 1
4.8.1 Proofs regarding the path of D
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Therefore I know that
∂2πG
∂D2 < 0 ⇔ 0 < Q
2 (A-6)
which is always the case, so that I can conclude that the objective function is concave in D.
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Therefore I know that D∗(R) is concave in R.






R2(1 − 1)(1 + 2Q − 1)
(1 + Q − 1)2 ] − 2τ = −2τ < 0 (A-11)
So it is never optimal for the government to secure all of the resource (to choose D∗ = 1),
i.e there is always something left for the rebels to grab. This result also implies that the
government will never ﬁnd it optimal to spend all of its endowment on defending (as I assumed
that Q ≥ 1), so D∗ < Q.
4.8.2 Proofs regarding the path of E
Derivation of ∂E∗
∂R (for R > R):
• The bounty effect is always negative:
sgn Bounty Effect =
= sgn
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The last inequality follows from D < 1 + Q. Thus, one can conclude that the negative
prize effect always overweighs the positive public good effect and E∗ is decreasing in
R, i.e. ∂E∗
∂R < 0 for R > R.
The sign of ∂2E∗
∂R2 : For ∂D∗
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For ∂D∗
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4.8.3 Proofs regarding the paths of D∗ and E∗
A sufﬁcient (though not necessary) condition for the two effort paths, D∗ and E∗, to cross is
that R is such that
∂πG
∂D
|D=Emax > 0. (A-25)





(2 − τ)(1 + 2Q)
(A-26)
If condition (A-25) is fulﬁlled, then D∗ is at some point (at least) as high as Emax. Knowing
that D∗ = 0 and E = Emax at R = R, the two curves must then cross at some R > R. A
hump-shaped conﬂict path emerges.
Calculations yield that the value of R where (A-25) holds is given by






(1 + Q)(2 − τ)(1 + 2Q) − 2τ
[(2 − τ)(1 + 2Q) − 2τ]1/2[(2 − τ)(1 + 2Q)2 − 2τ]1/2 (A-27)
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4.8.4 Proofs regarding the effect of an increase in τ
Starting from equation (4.16) and implicitly differentiating it with respect to τ I can derive the
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The signs of the other partial derivatives are discussed in Appendix 2. From expression (A-28)
it is obvious that the effect of an increase in τ is ambiguous. The intuition for the effects is the
following:
Effect A and B both show that the marginal beneﬁts of D increase, if τ is high. Knowing
that ∂MB
∂D < 0 from the denominator of expression (A-28), these effects thus work to increase
D∗. Letuslookatthetwoeffectsseparately. EffectA: IncreasingD letspeoplegrabless. This
effect is stronger if τ is high. When τ increases, people work less, i.e. ﬁght more, since they
get to keep less of the manufacturing output. A higher E makes, by assumption, governmental
defense more effective. Thus this effect works to increase D∗. Effect B: Increasing D induces
people to work more, broadening the tax base. This effect is stronger if τ is high, thus also
increasing D∗.
On the marginal cost side the two effects, X and Y , are counteracting. Thus it is not
clear what happens to the marginal costs of D, if τ increases. Effect X: If the tax rate is
high, people ﬁght more. Thus it is not so bad for the ruler to provide little public good (i.e. to
defend a lot), since the public good is not put to much use anyway. This effect thus works to
decrease the marginal cost of D. Since I know from the denominator of the above expression
that ∂MC
∂D > 0, this effect works to increase D∗. Effect Y : If τ is high the ruler gets to keep
more of the manufacturing output, thus his incentive to invest in the manufacturing sector
increases. This effect therefore works to increase the MC of D, and thus to decrease D∗.70 4.9. APPENDIX 2: A GENERAL MODEL
4.8.5 Proofs regarding the trajectory of income
Proofs regarding Stage II:
I know
GDPII = R + 2(1 + Q) −
R2
4(1 − τ)2(1 + Q)
(A-29)




4(1 − τ)2(1 + Q)
< 0 (A-30)
The maximum of this function is reached at R∗:
∂GDPII
∂R
= 0 ⇔ 1 −
2R∗




∗ = 2(1 − τ)
2(1 + Q). (A-32)
Income in the resource rich country is higher than income in the resource poor country (which
I call GDP N here) when R <   R. That is,
GDPII > GDP
N ⇔
⇔ R + 2(1 + Q) −
R2
4(1 − τ)2(1 + Q)
> 2(1 + Q) (A-33)
⇔ R < 4(1 − τ)
2(1 + Q) =   R (A-34)
Note that R∗ <   R. Plotting the three relevant levels of R as a function of (1 − τ) one gets the
following picture (for a given level of Q33 ):
There are three cases to be distinguished: For low levels of (1 − τ) (i.e. high τ) I can see
from the picture that R∗ <   R < R. 34 For intermediate levels of (1−τ) (i.e. intermediate τ),
it is the case that R∗ < R <   R. Finally for high values of (1 − τ) (i.e. low τ), R < R∗ <   R.
Thedifferentcasesaretreatedverballyinthemaintext. Belowseethegraphicalrepresentation
of all three scenarios:
4.9 Appendix 2: A General Model
The general setup is the same as in the model of the main text. There are two agents in the
economy, the government and the people, that can put their endowment into two different,
33Note that I assume here that Q is such that the graph looks as in Figure 4.2, i.e. Q is not too large. If Q were
“too large”, not all of the ranges deﬁned by Figure 4.2 exist.
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Figure 4.2: The three relevant levels of R plotted as a function of (1 − τ)






Figure 4.3: The trajectory of income for low (1 − τ)
separate sectors (a production and a resource (conﬂict) sector). As in the main text the two
budget constraints hold with equality, i.e. φ = Q − D and W = 1 − E.
Production in the production sector is given by F(φ,W), and grabbing is given by R ·
G(E,D), that is - independent of the size of R - grabbing is always determined by relative
contesting effort levels. (1 − G)R is then the part of the resource rent left for the ruler.
Some assumption on the derivatives of the primitives are imposed. In particular I assume
for the production function ∂F
∂D < 0, ∂F
∂E < 0, ∂2F
∂D2 ≤ 0, ∂2F
∂E2 ≤ 0. The assumptions on the
grabbing function are ∂G
∂D < 0, ∂G
∂E > 0, ∂2G
∂D2 > 0, ∂2G
∂E2 < 0. Thus I assume non-increasing72 4.9. APPENDIX 2: A GENERAL MODEL
 














Figure 4.5: The trajectory of income for high (1 − τ)
marginal returns to activities.35 Additionally I assume ∂2G
∂E∂D < 0. It means that the marginal
return of grabbing of the people is decreasing in the governmental defense effort. Also I
assume ∂2F
∂E∂D > 0. It means that the opportunity cost of ﬁghting for the people is increasing in
the level of public good provided. Equivalently, people’s working effort yields higher returns
if the level of the public good is high.








−1. Thus, the assumption ∂F
∂φ > 0 (φ is the productive input), implies ∂F









∂φ2 . Thus ∂
2F
∂φ2 ≤ 0 (i.e. non-increasing marginal returns as is standard to assume) implies
∂
2F
∂D2 ≤ 0. A similar reasoning can be applied to see why ∂
2F
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4.9.1 The problem of the people: are contesting efforts strategic substi-
tutes or complements?




P = (1 − τ)F(φ,W) + G(D,E)R (AA-1)
s.t. W + E ≤ N = 1 (AA-2)
E ≥ 0 (AA-3)
W ≥ 0 (AA-4)
Assuming interior solutions throughout, the FOC of the people is given by
R
∂G
∂E       
MB
= −(1 − τ)
∂F
∂E       
MC
. (AA-5)
The LHS denotes the marginal beneﬁt of an increase in E, the RHS the marginal cost. If rebels
devote more effort to stealing, they can secure more of the resource (MB). On the other hand,
if people steal more, they have less time left to devote to working. Therefore people’s income
from the manufacturing sector decreases (MC).
Next I want to ﬁnd out whether rebels’ stealing effort E and governmental defense D are
strategic substitutes or complements. For this let us examine how the MB and the MC of E
































then(E,D) are strategic complements.










then(E,D) are strategic substitutes
With the speciﬁcation considered in the chapter condition (AA-8) holds for any R, i.e. (E,D)
are strategic substitutes. In what follows I assume that condition (AA-8) holds (to make the74 4.9. APPENDIX 2: A GENERAL MODEL
general analysis comparable to the main text). Also I assume that ∂2E
∂D2 > 0, that is the effect
of D on E gets weaker the higher the level of D. 36
Investigating the numerator in expression (AA-6) tells us how the MC and MB of E change
if D increases.
First if the government increases its defense effort, less resources are left to be invested
in the public good. This implies that the productivity of effort in production falls, so that
the opportunity cost of stealing decreases. This means that the MC of E decreases at any
given level of E (compared to a situation with low D). Inspecting the denominator of (AA-6)
one ﬁnds ∂MC
∂E > 0. Thus this effect works to increase E (since for an (interior) optimum
MB = MC is needed).
Second, if D increases there is less to steal for the people (the unsecured rent, i.e. the
potential prize for the rebels, becomes smaller). This is to say that the MB of E decreases at
any given level of E (compared to a situation with low D). Again from the denominator of
(AA-6) one knows ∂MB
∂E < 0. Thus, this effect works to decrease E.
The two effects are counteracting and thus the ambiguous result derived above.
From above I can also derive ∂2E
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Next note that I assume ∂
3G
∂E∂D2 > 0, which implies that for a higher level D the effect of D on ∂G
∂E is less
negative. This captures something like decreasing returns of the effect of governmental defense on E. Second,
I assume ∂
3F
∂E∂D2 > 0 which means that for a lower level of φ (i.e. a higher level of D) the effect of φ on ∂F
∂W
is stronger. Again this captures something like decreasing returns of the effect of public good provision on ∂F
∂W .
Third, I assume ∂
3F
∂E2∂D < 0. At a low level of φ the marginal returns to W are decreasing faster. Fourth and last,
I assume ∂
3G
∂E2∂D < 0, which means that for high levels of D the marginal returns to E in grabbing are decreasing
faster.
Given the above - all reasonable - assumptions, one arrives at ∂
2E
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Since given the assumptions the LHS is smaller than 0 and the RHS is bigger than 0, this




with the potential prize, i.e. ∂E











which is greater than zero given the assumptions on the primitives.
4.9.2 The problem of the government: the path of D∗




G = τF(φ,W(D)) + R − G(D,E(D))R (AA-14)
where E(D) is deﬁned by (AA-5),
and W = N − E. (AA-15)
s.t. D + φ ≤ Q, (AA-16)
Q ≥ 1, (AA-17)
0 ≤ D ≤ 1, (AA-18)
φ ≥ 0. (AA-19)




G = F(φ,E(D)) + R − π
P = (AA-20)
= F(φ,E(D)) + R − [(1 − τ)F(φ,E(D)) + RG(E(D),D)].
This re-formulation of the problem is needed in order to be able to apply the envelope theorem.















The last part can be found by using the envelope theorem (because D is just a parameter in the
people’s optimization problem):
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From the FOC of the people (∂ΠP
∂E = 0) we know that the latter part is 0, i.e. only the direct
effect is relevant, so that
∂πP(R,D,E∗(D))
∂D






































Note that equation (AA-25) corresponds to equations (16) and (17) in the main text.




















      
MC
. (AA-26)
The LHS denotes the MB of D, the RHS the MC. A higher D lets the people grab less (so
more of R is left for the ruler, MB1) and induces people to work more (broadening the tax
base and thereby also increasing the income of the ruler, MB2). These effects make up the
marginal beneﬁts of D. There is also a marginal cost of D (MC). Less of the public good is
provided and therefore manufacturing income is lower.
From here, we can ﬁnd a general expression for ∂D∗




































































∂R > 0. That is, given (E,D) are strategic substitutes and the assumptions
imposed on the primitives in the beginning we ﬁnd that ∂D∗
∂R > 0, i.e. the ruler’s defense effort
increases in the prize R.
The intuition for the above result is the following: Investigating the numerator in expres-
sion (AA-27) tells us how the marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs of D change with an
increase in R. First, one ﬁnds that ∂MB1
∂R > 0. Governmental defense effort is more effective
if the prize R is high. Second, one ﬁnds ∂MB2
∂R > 0. The broadening of the tax base followingCHAPTER 4. CONFLICT AND PRODUCTION: AN APPLICATION TO NATURAL
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an increase in D is more pronounced for high R. Finally I am interested in ∂MC
∂R . How is
the marginal product of φ is affected by an increase in R? R does not enter the production
function, so there is no direct effect. There is an indirect effect though, since E is affected by
R, and the marginal product of φ is affected by the working effort of the people. I know that
people steal more if there is more to win (i.e. if R increases) and therefore spend less effort
on working. This in turn implies that the public good is less effective, so that a decrease in
the level of the public good is “less bad” for the ruler’s payoff from the manufacturing sector.
That is ∂MC
∂R < 0. Thus, at a given level of D, an increase in the parameter R results in higher
MB and lower MC of D. How does D have to change to re-instate optimality? For this one
has to look at the denominator in expression (AA-27). From there one ﬁnds that ∂MB
∂D < 0 and
∂MC
∂D > 0, so that at a higher D optimality is re-achieved (since for an (interior) optimum we
need MB = MC). Thus ∂D∗
∂R > 0.
4.9.3 The problem of the people revisited: the path of E∗
Next, I consider ∂E∗
∂R , so the effect of an increase in R on the equilibrium E. That is here I take
into account the reaction of the ruler to an increase in R.
















<0,since (E,D) are strategic substitutes




















∂R < 0 if ∂G
∂E is not “too positive” (as is the case in the main text).
Note that, as explained in the main text, there are three effects on the marginal beneﬁts and
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There is a bounty effect, which is made up of two separate effects, effects A and B. The
direct bounty effect, that is an increase in R increases the bounty (A). Effect A thus works
to increase the MB of E. In addition there is an indirect bounty effect, that is an increase in
R triggers an increase in D, which in turn lowers the bounty (B). That is effect B decreases
the MB of E. Also, there is a public good effect (an increase in R triggers an increase in D,
which in turn lowers the public good offered (C)). This means that the MC of E is reduced.
Note the resemblance of this to the analysis done before, when I investigated the effect of
an increase in D on E. There I found the effect of a marginal increase in D on E. This is
quite similar to the problem here, where two of the three effects (effect B and C) I consider
are driven by an increase in D. There is an additional effect here, that is the direct effect of R
on the marginal beneﬁt of E (effect A).
Considering the denominator in equation (AA-30) I know that ∂MB
∂E < 0 and ∂MC
∂E > 0, so
that effect A works to increase optimal E, effect B works to decrease optimal E and effect C
works to increase optimal E. Thus the ambiguity observed in the formal derivation above.
4.10 Appendix 3: Additional Proofs
4.10.1 Endogenous τ
To address the concern of an endogenous τ, let me consider a model in which the government
has (essentially) two choice variables, D and φ as in the chapter (where φ = Q − D from
the effort constraint of the government), as well as τ. In particular, I look at the following





∗) + R − G(D,E
∗)R (AAA-1)
= τ(1 + φ)(1 + W












∗ = N − E
∗. (AAA-3)
s.t. D + φ ≤ Q (AAA-4)
Q ≥ 1, (AAA-5)
0 ≤ D ≤ 1, (AAA-6)
φ ≥ 0, (AAA-7)
0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. (AAA-8)
In the above equation the government can set the tax rate at cost c.CHAPTER 4. CONFLICT AND PRODUCTION: AN APPLICATION TO NATURAL
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Since the endowment constraint of the government (AAA-4) is always fulﬁlled with equal-
ity a solution to the above optimization problem is characterized by the pair (D∗,τ∗). For



















R2(1 − D)(1 + 2Q − D)
(1 + Q − D)2
 
− 2τ = 0 (AAA-10)
∂πG
∂τ
= (1 + Q − D)
 











= 2(1 + Q − D) −
R2(1 − D)2
4(1 + Q − D)(1 − τ)2
−
τR(1 − D)
(1 − τ)2 −
R3(1 − D)3
2(1 − τ)3(1 + Q − D)2 − c = 0 (AAA-12)
Equations (AAA-9) and (AAA-10) are taken from the main text. In equation (AAA-11) one
can identify the different effects of an increase in τ on the government’s payoff. On the one
hand, a higher τ implies that the government receives more from the production sector in
form of taxes, i.e. this effect impacts positively on the government’s payoff. On the other
hand there are also negative effects. An increase in τ decreases the people’s working effort
(and thus increases their ﬁghting effort), since they now get to keep less of what they produce
in the production sector. Last, there are also costs incurred by the government to set a higher
tax rate.
Unfortunately such a model is not analytically solvable. I therefore search for a numerical
solution of this new optimization problem. I ﬁnd that the qualitative behaviour of the model
outcomesisthesameasinthechapterwithanexogenoustaxrate. Thiscanbeseengraphically
in the ﬁgures below which result from numerical optimization of the model in MatLab37:
The graphs above are, just as the ﬁgures in the chapter, drawn for decreasing R. Note
that the Hessian at the displayed numerical solutions is negative deﬁnite, that is a maximum is
reached. We see that, as R decreases, the government’s defense effort D decreases, whereas
the people’s stealing effort E increases. This is the same qualitative result as in the model of
the chapter, where I assume - for analytical tractability - that τ is ﬁxed. Here the optimal tax
rate τ increases, as R decreases. That is, as the resource rents become smaller the government
concentrates its effort (in the form of public good provision and tax rate) on the production
sector.
37Note that I have rescaled E∗ in Figure 4.6 for expositional purposes.80 4.10. APPENDIX 3: ADDITIONAL PROOFS















Figure 4.6: D∗ and E∗ in a model with an endogenous tax rate















Figure 4.7: τ∗ in a model with an endogenous tax rate
4.10.2 Outcome of a Cournot game
The reaction functions in this setup would be of the following form:








I know (taking assumptions as in the chapter) that ∂E






















which is greater than 0 under the assumptions in the model. In equilibrium both of the above
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Figure 4.8: Equilibrium in a Cournot game & changes with an increase in R
The equilibrium is given by (E∗,D∗). Next I address how the equilibrium values of E and
D change, if R increases.
I know (from the Appendix 2: A General Model) that ∂2E
∂D∂R < 0. That is the slope of E(D) in
the graph above becomes more negative if R increases.
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If the production function were linear in D (as in the speciﬁcation of the chapter), ∂2D
∂E∂R < 0
would hold (since then ∂2F
∂D2 = 0). That is the slope of D(E) becomes less positive, if R
increases. The changes are displayed in the ﬁgure above.
One sees unambiguously, E∗ falls (from E∗ to E∗′) if R increases - a result qualitatively
similar to the one in the chapter. Different to the chapter though, the ruler’s defense effort D∗
could increase or decrease as a result of an increase in R.
4.10.3 Amodelwithconﬂictoverproductioninsteadofoverarentalﬂow
Here I consider how the model outcomes would differ if there were no contested rental ﬂow
but instead the government would devote resources to collect taxes:
Assume the government’s choice variables are φ and D, and the population chooses W
and E. Also assume the tax rate is a function of both contesting efforts, i.e. τ(D,E). Now
rather than ﬁghting over an exogenous rent ﬂow R, the ruler and the people “ﬁght” over
the distribution of an endogenous prize, the manufacturing output. The model outcome is
different to the one in the chapter because the prize is endogenous (rather than exogenous as
in the chapter). Let me formalize this:
The people’s problem is given by
max
E
(1 − τ(E,D))F(D,E) (AAA-17)





      
MB
= −(1 − τ)
∂F
∂E       
MC
(AAA-18)
Note that the term (− ∂τ
∂E) corresponds to ∂G
∂E in the model of the chapter.


























∂E2F − 2 ∂τ
∂E
∂F
∂E + (1 − τ)∂2F
∂E2
(AAA-19)
A and B denote the change in the MC of E, whereas X and Y denote the change in the MB
of E. First I inspect the change in the MC of E. The term B captures an effect also present in
the model of the chapter: if D increases, φ decreases and thus the opportunity cost of ﬁghting
decreases. This works to decrease the MC of E. In this setup there is an additional effect
not present in the chapter though, that is effect A. If D increases, τ increases and thus theCHAPTER 4. CONFLICT AND PRODUCTION: AN APPLICATION TO NATURAL
RESOURCES 83
opportunity cost of ﬁghting decreases further (since less of what is produced can be kept by
the people). This effect works to decrease the MC of E even further.
Also when looking at the change of the MB of E there is an additional effect here, not
present in the chapter. First, effect X is the one also present in the chapter. If D increases,
this reduces the impact of E on τ (assuming ∂2τ
∂E∂D > 0 just like I assumed ∂2G
∂E∂D < 0 in
the chapter). This works to decrease the MB of ﬁghting. Effect Y is new. If D increases, φ
decreases and thus the prize fought over decreases. This works to decrease the MB of ﬁghting
as well.
As I have just shown the incentives in such a model are different than in the model consid-
ered in the chapter. Therefore also model outcomes would differ.CHAPTER5
Resources, Conﬂict and Development Choice: Public Good
Provision in Resource Rich Economies
5.1 Introduction
The “curse of natural resources” is a puzzle since intuition suggests more resources should
help a country grow rather than be an obstacle to economic development. Recent research
has shown that not only does resource wealth impede growth (e.g. Sachs and Warner [1997])
and democracy (Ross [2001a]), it also makes civil conﬂicts more likely (Collier and Hoefﬂer
[1998], Collier and Hoefﬂer [2004]) by raising the prize of appropriative actions. If true, the
threat of conﬂict may affect the policy choices made by leaders in resource rich countries.
Callaghy [1984], Robinson [2001], Deacon [2002] and Acemoglu et al. [2004] all argue that
deliberate under-development and repression may become optimal policies for leaders who
wish to prevent the population from threatening their power and in particular their hold on the
country’s riches. They contend that for a dictator like Mobutu, under-investment in essential
infrastructure was a deliberate strategy to under-develop Zaire to maintain his position and
thwart potential opposition. The threat of social conﬂict might, on the other hand, induce a
self-interested ruler to seek to “buy” social peace by implementing productivity enhancing
policies (provision of health, education, infrastructure). Thus a large endowment of natural
resources (and thus a high risk of conﬂict) might lead a priori to more or less public good
provision.
In this chapter, we investigate what determines the decision of a self-interested ruling
elite (represented by an autocrat) in a resource rich country to invest in productivity enhancing
8586 5.1. INTRODUCTION
publicgoods 1 anddiversify theeconomygiventhelooming threatofconﬂict. Inparticular, we
examine the conditions under which an autocrat ﬁnds it optimal to buy the peace by creating
the incentives for the people to allocate their effort to productive activities (which both can
beneﬁt from) rather than to ﬁght over the control of the resources. We develop a Stackelberg
game to analyse the ruler’s decision to provide a public good in the context of conﬂict over
natural resources.
Within the model the ruler has two ways of keeping the population from contesting the
resources. One is to try to lure the people into production by increasing productivity (by
means of public good provision), the other is to simply militarily oppress them. The people,
by contrast, choose the allocation of their time between working in the non-resource sector and
ﬁghting to appropriate resources. We show that the ruler’s policy choice depends critically on
1) the extent of the resource wealth; 2) the magnitude of investment costs; 3) the investment
worthiness of the non-resource sector; and 4) the ruler’s and the people’s relative effectiveness
in ﬁghting over the resource. In particular, the dictator is likely to invest in a public good
when the non-resource sector is productive enough. In addition, a ruler relatively efﬁcient in
grabbing the resources is less likely to invest in public goods to buy the peace. If, on the other
hand, the ruler is relatively inefﬁcient in ﬁghting (compared to the people) he is more likely to
investindevelopmentanddiversifytheeconomy. Thus, themaincontributionofthischapteris
to provide a conditional theory of the resource curse (Dunning [2005]) which accounts for the
diverging economic experience among resource rich countries on the one hand and between
resource rich and resource poor countries on the other.
We test our predictions using data on physical infrastructure (power generating capac-
ity, communication and transport network) and social infrastructure (education and health) as
proxies for investment in public goods. Empirical evidence corroborates our theory.
Early explanations of the resource curse focused on purely economic mechanisms. The
so-called dutch disease hypothesis points to reasons why a resource windfall may impede
economicgrowth. Thebasicargumentisthattherapidgrowthoftheresourceandnon-tradable
sectors will crowd out the traded and manufacturing sector causing low growth. The implicit
assumption being that only the manufacturing sector (as opposed to the resource sector) can
induce a learning-by-doing process and productivity necessary to sustain economic growth
(Sachs and Warner [1997], Sachs and Warner [2001]). There is little empirical evidence to
support this hypothesis. Recently a more political perspective has gained momentum. Political
scientists highlight that the resource curse is a result of “bad policy”. Resources may induce
1The idea that it makes rational sense for an autocratic ruler to invest in public goods as they increase produc-
tion which in turn accrues (at least in part) to the ruler is discussed for example in Mcguire and Olson [2001].CHAPTER 5. RESOURCES, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT CHOICE: PUBLIC
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leaders to choose for non-developmental policies. Models formalizing these ideas are still
scarce. Among them, Tornell and Lane [1999], Robinson [2001], Dunning [2005], Caselli
and Coleman [2006], Hodler [2006] and Caselli [2006] are especially of interest.
Our work relates particularly to the last three cited. Robinson [2001] investigates what
drives non-democratic countries to choose predatory policies while developmental policies (in
the form of investment in public goods) are obviously more efﬁcient. He shows that the threat
of political replacement consecutive to developmental policies may deter public investment.
Since natural resource wealth, easily appropriable by the elite, increases the value of being in
power, an abundance of it creates an even stronger disincentive to invest.
Caselli [2006] argues that an abundance of natural resources, by increasing the value of
being in power, leads to more power struggles and thus increases the probability of losing
political power. Therefore the effective rate of return of investing in productivity enhancing
public goods is lower if more natural resources are present, and thus the incentive to invest in
public goods is reduced.
In both of the above papers natural resources are postulated to have a negative effect on
public good provision. That is differing development experiences among resource rich coun-
tries cannot be explained. This is a main shortcoming of much of the resource curse literature
up until now (Rosser [2006]). If one thinks of countries such as Botswana and Malaysia it is
clear that resources need not be a curse. Within our model we ﬁnd that resources may be a
curse or a blessing depending on external factors. This is a main difference to Robinson and
Caselli as discussed above.
Dunning (2005) on the other hand does offer a conditional theory of the resource curse,
that is, within his model, he is able to explain resource failures as well as successes. Also in
his model, like in Robinson’s, the probability of governmental replacement is increasing in
the provision of a public good. He focuses on different factors inﬂuencing the policy choice
of a ruler and in particular his desire to invest in public goods, such as the volatility of natural
resource prices or the prior development of the non-resource private sector.
All of the above theories assume that an increase in the provision of a public good in
some way or another decreases the probability of the current government to stay in power.
The idea, that an investment in development has a positive (increase in production) as well as
a negative (increase in probability of losing power) effect for the ruling elite, has also been
discussed by other authors such as for example Bourguignon and Verdier [2000]. We believe
that investment in public goods not only has the extreme effect of - in the long run - increasing
the probability of a change in the power structure, but also a rather direct effect. Investment
in public goods makes - for the same reasons that in the long run it increases the probability88 5.1. INTRODUCTION
of political replacement - it in the shorter run harder to repress people and in particular to
keep them from contesting resource rents. Whereas in Robinson, Dunning and Caselli it
was assumed that the entire resource rent accrues to the one in political power, we relax this
assumption. This seems to be of special relevance when one thinks of the experience of many
resource rich countries, where there is often conﬂict over the distribution of resource rents
(think of, for example, Nigeria where there is constant tapping of crude oil by rebels).
Contrary to the above-mentioned works we thus model the contest over resource rents.
As such, the probability of winning in our model is endogenous on the strategic interaction
between the agents. A feature not present in the discussed models.
In addition, the chapter follows the tradition of conﬂict models in economics. The idea
that the people might rebel and ﬁght against the ruling elite in a country is one also followed
by for example Grossman [1994] or Azam [1995]. Some works in the ﬁeld assume that the
government may choose between either repressing the people or buying the peace (Azam
[1995], Wick [2008]). Different to most of the conﬂict literature though we model conﬂict
over an exogenous prize (resource rents) and not endogenous production output.
The present chapter combines the two literatures discussed above by providing a model of
development choice combined with a model of conﬂict. As outlined, we argue that especially
inthecaseofautocraticresourcerichcountriesthesetwophenomenamightbepartiallyrelated
to each other. Therefore we present a model of strategic interaction, where potential conﬂict
drives the optimal policy choice by a ruler.
Our work also relates to the empirical literature on resources and conﬂict. Seminal con-
tributions by Collier and Hoefﬂer [1998] and Collier and Hoefﬂer [2004] present empirical
evidence that resource wealth triggers conﬂicts and civil war. That is, there is ample support
for our assumption that agents in resource rich countries have a strong incentive to engage
in appropriative instead of productive activity. Collier and Hoefﬂer’s studies suggest that the
outbreak of a conﬂict is more likely when earnings foregone in rebellion are low. Our model
is in line with such ﬁndings.
The chapter is organized as follows: In section 5.2 we lay out the fundamentals of the
model and explain in detail our assumptions. We then turn to a concrete speciﬁcation of the
model. In Section 5.3 we discuss the ruler’s decision to invest and ﬁnd the determinants of his
policy choice. With this knowledge we can compare the policy choice of a ruler in a resource
rich as opposed to the one in a resource poor country, as well as of rulers in two resource rich
countries, which differ along certain critical dimensions. Based on this we derive in Section
5.4 several testable predictions of the theoretical model. Also in this section an empirical
analysis is performed providing ample support for the model’s outcomes. Finally Section 5.5CHAPTER 5. RESOURCES, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT CHOICE: PUBLIC
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concludes.
5.2 The model
Consider a resource rich country populated by two groups, the ruling elite represented by a
self-interested and authoritarian 2 ruler and the population. The economy consists of two
sectors, a resource sector which generates a resource rent Z and a non-resource sector (manu-
facturing). Both the manufacturing and the resource sector are potential sources of income for
both groups. Following Caselli [2006], the manufacturing sector output is divided between
the two groups according to some exogenous parameter τ (which may be interpreted as a tax
rate). On the other hand, the resource stock and therefore the associated earnings Z are con-
sidered by the ruling elite as its own property. The division of the resource rent may create a
conﬂict between the ruling elite and the population and depends on their respective efforts to
appropriate it.
Both groups, the ruler and the population, have two possible actions at their disposal. The
population allocates its time endowment (T) between working in the manufacturing sector
(W) and ﬁghting (E) the ruler in an attempt to capture part of the resource earnings. By
contrast, the ruler can initiate a developmental policy by investing in a productivity enhancing
public good φ. He can also use force and repress (R) the population to deter it from contesting
the resource rent.
5.2.1 Fundamentals of the model
The manufacturing sector produces according to the production function (1 + A)f(φ,W),
where A is productivity, φ = {0,1} is the binary investment decision (1 represents invest-
ment, and 0 means no investment) 3.




∂W2 ≤ 0 and
∂f
∂E(φ = 1) −
∂f
∂E(φ = 0) < 0
We assume that production increases with investment and working effort and exhibits non-
increasing returns to labour. Moreover, a marginal rise in the ﬁghting effort causes production
2Following Robinson [2001], our model only applies to authoritarian regimes, where a ruling group takes
decisions purely motivated by self-interest. This captures the situation in many (developing) resource rich coun-
tries.
3See for example Dunning [2005] who also models investment as public goods as a binary choice variable.90 5.2. THE MODEL
to decrease at an increasing rate when investment is undertaken. In other words, the marginal
cost in terms of lost production increases with φ.
ThepopulationallocatesitstimeT betweenworkingW andﬁghtingE sothatT ≥ W+E.
Its effort in contesting the ruler’s control over the resource rent has an adverse effect on the
level of output produced in the manufacturing sector. 4 However, it gives the population
the opportunity to appropriate or grab a share of the resource rent according to a so-called
grabbing function G(E,R). Consequently, a share of the resource (1 − G(·)) accrues to the
government.
Assumptions GF (Grabbing Function): ∂G
∂E > 0, ∂G
∂R < 0, ∂2G
∂E2 < 0, ∂2G
∂R2 > 0, and ∂2G
∂R∂E < 0
We assume that the share of resources grabbed by the population increases with their ﬁghting
effort E and decreases with the ruler’s repression R. The grabbing function is also assumed
to have decreasing returns in E and is convex in R. In other words, both the marginal beneﬁt
to the people from ﬁghting
∂G
∂E











decrease respectively in E and R. In addition, a marginal increase in E causes grabbing to
increase at a decreasing rate as R increases, that is the marginal beneﬁt to the population from
grabbing decreases with R.
The ruler chooses two actions. First, he can invest in a productivity enhancing public
good. This investment (e.g. road network, a hospital or a school) comes at investment cost I.
Its payoff is determined by the level of productivity A. The higher productivity A, the higher
the payoff of investing in a public good. In this chapter, we investigate when (i.e. at which
levels of productivity A) a self-interested ruling elite chooses to invest in a public good.
Second, the ruler chooses repression effort R to prevent the people from grabbing re-
sources. The ruler incurs some costs for repressing the population c(R,φ).
Assumptions CF (Cost Function): c(φ = 1) − c(φ = 0) > 0, ∂c
∂R > 0, ∂2c
∂R2 = 0, and
∂c
∂R(φ = 1) − ∂c
∂R(φ = 0) > 0
The total cost of repression is assumed to increase with the amount of repression R and with
public good provision. In addition, the marginal cost of repressing increases with φ. Because
investment in public goods results in better educated and healthier people having access to bet-
4As we will argue later, because the endowment constraint of the people is binding, an increase in ﬁghting
effort results necessarily in a decrease in working effort (∂W
∂E ≥ −1), leading to a lower level of output in the
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ter infrastructure and communication means, keeping a repressive dictatorship then becomes
more costly to the ruler. This follows Robinson’s (2001) argument that many authoritarian
rulers are unwilling to construct or maintain socially productive infrastructure because pro-
viding such public goods may “reduce the cost of contesting elite control”. As an example
we may reasonably assume that it is harder to repress well educated people because they have
more interest in public affairs and demand more accountability from the government. 5 A
similar assumption can also be found in Bourguignon and Verdier [2000] and Dunning [2005].
To sum up, the interaction between the two agents takes place according to the following tim-
ing:
1. For a given A, the ruler decides whether to invest: φ = {0, 1}
Then the subgame Γ starts:
2. Stage 1 of the subgame Γ: Population reacts choosing a ﬁghting effort E (where the
working effort W is determined simultaneously 6)
3. Stage 2 of the subgame Γ: Ruler chooses a repression level R in response to E
4. Conﬂictissettledwitheachcontendergrabbingashareoftheavailablenaturalresources
according to his equilibrium strategy. Manufacturing output is produced and allocated
to the two groups according to the exogenous parameter τ.
First, therulerchooseswhetherornottoinvestinapublicgood. Conditional ontheinvestment
decision observed by the population, a contest over the resources takes place in subgame Γ
where the players decide sequentially their appropriative efforts. This subgame features a
Stackelberg contest where the population has the ﬁrst move. The ruler reacts by an appropriate
repression level. With this, we take the view that the lack of the ruler’s provision of necessary
public goods will fuel greed or grievance among the population and lead to rebelion. There
have been many such situations in the recent history, for example the Biafra war in Nigeria or
Congo-Zaire. We have nonetheless tried a different timing where the ruler is the ﬁrst mover in
the subgame. We found that the results are qualitatively very similar: the timing has no impact
on the comparative statics although it affects the equilibrium levels of ﬁghting and repression.
5Formallycorrectwouldbethefollowingspeciﬁcation. Weassumethattheﬂowvariableφincreasesthestock
of human capital in the economy, that is H = h(φ), with h(φ = 1)−h(φ = 0) > 0. As just discussed, we further
assume that people with higher human capital are harder to repress, that is repression costs are higher. Formally
this means repression costs c = c(H) with ∂c
∂H > 0. One can now readily verify that c(φ = 1) − c(φ = 0) > 0.
As a shortcut we include φ directly into the repression cost function.
6As we will argue later the endowment constraint of the people is always fulﬁlled with equality, i.e. the
people never “waste” any effort, and thus W = T − E.92 5.2. THE MODEL
By backwards induction, we ﬁrst solve for the equilibrium outcome in the subgame Γ and
later analyze the investment decision of the ruler.
5.2.2 Speciﬁcation of the model
In this section we derive the results of the model using a speciﬁc functional form. We specify
the total production of the economy, given inputs (A,φ,W) as
(1 + A)f(φ,W) = (1 + A)(1 + φ)(1 + W). (1)
Note that this speciﬁcation does not necessarily imply increasing returns to scale, as it might
seem at ﬁrst sight. It is easily veriﬁed that for φ = 0 the production function exhibits de-
creasing returns to scale. If φ = 1 on the other hand we ﬁnd that the production function
exhibits decreasing returns if and only if W < 1
λ, where λ is the scaling factor of inputs. 7
The repression costs are speciﬁed as
c(φ,R) = c(1 + φ)R (2)
Resource earnings are split between the two parties according to the so-called “grabbing func-







where G denotes the part of the resource grabbed by the rebels and 0 < α < 1 and 0 < γ < 1.
TheseconditionsensurethatGiswellbehaved. Thetwoparametersα andγ playacrucialrole
in determining the outcome of the model. They capture the elasticity of the grabbing function
with respect to the respective ﬁghting inputs, E and R. As such, if α < γ a one percent
increase in the ﬁghting input of the government has more effect on the grabbing outcome
than a similar increase in the rebel’s ﬁghting. Thus (α − γ) reﬂects the relative effectiveness
of the opponents in the contest. If γ > α, the ruler is more effective in keeping control of
the resources whereas if α > γ, the population is more effective in grabbing resources. Said
differently, if γ > α the same effort level of both groups is translated in more effective ﬁghting
power of the government as compared to the people’s. Note that in what follows we focus on
interior solutions 8 We are now ready to solve the subgame Γ by backward induction.
In the second stage of the subgame, the ruler’s problem is:
7Traditionally returns to scale are increasing iff f(λφ,λW) > λf(φ,W).
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max
R






Z − c(1 + φ)R − I (4)








In the ﬁrst stage of the subgame Γ, the people maximize their own payoff taking into
account the ruler’s reaction:
max
E







s.t. E + W ≤ T (7)
Note that the endowment constraint is always binding. If that was not the case then at the
optimum, we could slightly increase E and R, satisfy the constraint while increasing the
population’s payoff. This is a contradiction of the optimum.
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1) The population’s ﬁghting effort decreases with investment and higher productivity, but in-
creases with resource wealth.
2)Theruler’srepressionleveldecreaseswithinvestmentandhigherproductivity, butincreases
with resource wealth.
3) Grabbing decreases with higher productivity. It is ambiguous with respect to investment94 5.2. THE MODEL
and resource wealth, and depends on the opponents effectiveness in the contest.
Proof: derive the partial derivatives.￿
This proposition suggests three important results. First, investment in public good reduces
both the population’s ﬁghting effort E and and the ruler’s repression R. Indeed, the people
ﬁght less as a result of an investment in φ since the increase in marginal cost of ﬁghting in
terms of lost production is greater than the increase in marginal beneﬁt of ﬁghting. In other
words, by investing in φ, the ruler raises the population’s opportunity cost of ﬁghting so that
ﬁghting becomes less proﬁtable than engaging in the productive activity. Moreover, because
investment increases the marginal costs of R by assumption CF, and decreases the marginal
beneﬁt of repression by assumption GF, the provision of a public good leads to a lower level
of R for each level of E.
Second, moreﬁghtingleadstomorerepressionbecauseanincreaseinE raisesthemarginal
beneﬁt of repressing (i.e. R has more effect on the grabbing outcome if E is high by Assump-
tionGF)withoutaffectingthemarginalcostsofrepressing. Aconsequenceofthesetworesults
is that since E and R change in the same direction, which implies that the effect of φ and Z
on the grabbing function is a priori ambiguous. In particular, the effect depends on the sign
of α − γ. Grabbing decreases in φ when γ < α and decreases in φ when α < γ. Indeed, the
provision of a public good causes E and R to decrease proportionately 9 so that the ratio E∗
R∗
is independent of φ. When α > γ the decrease in the ﬁghting effort E has a larger impact on
grabbing than the decrease in repression R so that the ruler can control more resources and
G(.) decreases. This is because the loss of an effective unit of E is more detrimental to the
population when α > γ than the loss of a (less effective) unit of R is to the ruler. When α < γ,
the opposite is true.
Third, an increase in resource wealth raises the stakes of controlling the resources and
therefore intensiﬁes conﬂicts (more ﬁghting and more repression). Both opponents increase
their effort in contesting the resource. Thus, the effect on grabbing is ambiguous and depends
on the effectiveness in ﬁghting: the most effective party will have the advantage.
In contrast, by increasing the people’s opportunity cost of ﬁghting, a more productive non
resource sector (i.e. a higher value of A) is conducive to a less conﬂictual environment. The
population reduces its ﬁghting effort E. This in turn leads to a lower level of repression R. It
also results in a decrease in grabbing G(.), because a higher A decreases E more than R.
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5.3 Ruler’s decision to invest
We now consider the investment decision of a ruler given the subgame perfect equilibrium
discussed above. In the previous section we laid out the players’ responses to a public good
investment. Under certain conditions, the provision of a public good might bring about an
undesirable outcome from the point of view of the ruler (through the effect of public good pro-
vision on the conﬂict outcome), since - as we just saw- the sign of the the change in grabbing
as a result of public good provision is ambiguous. If those conditions occur, they discourage
public good investment. Given the equilibrium strategy in subgame Γ, the ruler’s investment
decision depends solely on the productivity level A. The objective of the present section is to
ﬁnd the productivity levels A for which the ruler ﬁnds it in his best interest to invest.
The ruler solves the following problem:
max
φ
(ΠG(A,φ = 1) − I,ΠG(A,φ = 0)) (11)
He compares the payoff of undertaking a costly investment (at investment cost I), with the
payoff when no investment is undertaken. As discussed in the introduction, we wish to under-
stand when a self-interested ruler in a resource rich country ﬁnds it optimal to invest; and how
the investment behaviour differs in a resource poor country (n) as opposed to a resource rich
one (r). A resource poor country is characterized by the absence of a resource, i.e. Z = 0.
In such an economy the people have no other choice but to work in the manufacturing sector.
Note that what we call a “resource-poor economy” throughout the text can also be thought of
as a “no conﬂict economy”. That is our model readily applies more generally to countries in
which any kind of windfall gain (another classic example, next to natural resource rents, is
foreign aid) is present and contestable. Within this more general framework what we call here
a “resource rich country” is a country in which windfall gains are available and contestable,
whereas they are not present in a “resource poor country”. The outcome of the subgame Γ in
such a country is E∗ = 0 (and thus W ∗ = T) and R∗ = 0. The outcome in a resource rich
country is as discussed in the preceding sections with Z > 0.





G(A,φ = 1) − Π
j
G(A,φ = 0) ≥ I (12)
with j ∈ {r,n}.96 5.3. RULER’S DECISION TO INVEST
Before solving this problem, we ﬁrst carry out a formal analysis and discussion of the rel-
ative value of investing in a resource poor (∆Πn









      
τ(1 + A)[E
∗(φ = 0) − 2E
∗(φ = 1)]
− [G(φ = 1) − G(φ = 0)]
      
(ii)
Z − c[2R
∗(φ = 1) − R
∗(φ = 0)]
      
(iii)
(14)
In a resource poor country, the relative value of investing in a public good ∆Πn
G, reﬂects solely
the increase in output resulting from the developmental policy. In a resource rich country
however, the relative value of investing ∆Πr
G is equal to ∆Πn
G plus additional effects captured
by three additional components: (i) represents the impact of the people’s ﬁghting effort on the
manufacturing output when a public good is provided; (ii) is the difference in grabbing due to
investment; and (iii) reﬂects the difference in repression costs triggered by investment. This







































These effects reﬂect the impact of public good provision on the contest in resource rich coun-
tries. Altogether, they represent the difference between ∆Πr
G and ∆Πn
G. The direction and
magnitude of these three effects depend on the sign of α−γ. We summarize them as follows:
(i) The production effect: Investing in public goods has the effect of reducing the population’s
ﬁghting effort as argued in section 5.2.2, i.e. E∗(φ = 0) − E∗(φ = 1) > 0. The magni-
tude of the reduction in E∗ depends on the sign of α − γ. The effect on E is large if α > γ
so that E∗(φ = 0)−2E∗(φ = 1) > 0 and small if γ > α so that E∗(φ = 0)−2E∗(φ = 1) < 0.
(ii) The grabbing effect: An investment in public goods leads to a decrease in the people’s
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of grabbing in the economy. Public good investment results in less grabbing whenever α > γ,
and in more grabbing otherwise.
(iii) The repression cost effect: The unit cost of repression, as well as the amount of repres-
sion changes with an investment in public goods. Public good provision raises the unit costs
of repression (because the population becomes harder to repress) and reduces the repression
effort. As a result, total repression costs are lower (higher) if α > γ (if α < γ).
Hence, the additional effects are positive if α > γ i.e. if P1 > 0, P2 < 0 and P3 < 0.
In this case, there is a substantial fall in the ﬁghting effort, as well as a decrease in both grab-
bing and total repression costs. It follows that for a given A, ∆Πr
G > ∆Πn
G. Ceteris paribus,
there are higher incentives to invest in a resource rich country than in a resource poor one.
On the other hand, the additional effects are negative if α < γ , i.e. if P1 < 0, P2 > 0 and
P3 > 0. This is because the positive effect of raising manufacturing output (investment leads
to a relatively small decrease in E∗ or equivalently a relatively small increase in W ∗) is offset
by the increase in both grabbing and total repression costs. This implies that ∆Πr
G < ∆Πn
G
for a given productivity level A.
To summarize, public good investment causes both the people and the ruler to decrease sub-
stantially their appropriation effort when α > γ. This has three positive effects on the ruler’s
payoff: First, the output from manufacturing increases, for the people provide signiﬁcantly
more working effort. Second, the people grab less of the resource, and therefore more of the
resource is left for the ruler. As explained in the discussion following proposition 1, a pro-
portionate decrease in E∗ and R∗ has a detrimental effect on the resource appropriation of the
more effective contender (in this case the people). Third, total repression costs decline since
the increase in unit costs of repression is offset by the dramatic fall in the ruler’s repression
level.
On the other hand, when α < γ, slightly less effort is devoted to resource appropriation
(E∗ and R∗ decrease slightly) as a consequence of public good investment. This has the posi-
tive effect of raising the manufacturing output. However this positive effect is outweighed by
two negative effects. First, the population grabs more of the resources because the decrease
in E∗ and R∗ has a detrimental effect on the resource appropriation of the more effective
contender (the ruler in this case). This ﬁnding was discussed in section 5.2. Second, public
good provision results in higher total costs of repression because the increased unit cost of
repression offsets the decrease in R∗. Thus the sum of the additional effects of public good98 5.3. RULER’S DECISION TO INVEST
investment is negative if α < γ.
Lemma 1
1. ∆Πn
G is linear in A
2. If α > γ then ∆Πr




γ + 1 − α






γ+1 − 1 ∆Πr
G is also strictly convex
everywhere.
3. If α < γ then ∆Πr
G is strictly increasing and strictly concave in A
Proof: See Appendix 1 ￿
When α > γ, an increase in A is associated with two opposite effects: an increase in the
output level through ∆Πn
G, and a decrease in the positive additional effects. For low levels
of productivity, the latter effect dominates so that ∆Πr
G decreases in A. However, the former
effect dominates for high levels of productivity resulting in the increase of ∆Πr
G.
When α < γ, an increase in A has two reinforcing positive effects on ∆Πr
G: ﬁrst, the
direct positive effect of increasing output (through ∆Πn
G), and second the shrinking additional
(negative) effects. Both work to increase ∆Πr
G.
We can now shed light on our main question as to when an authoritarian ruler ﬁnds it op-
timal to invest in public goods rather than carry out predatory policies.
Proposition 2
1. For any α and γ, if ∆Π
j
G(A = 0) < I, then there exists a unique A∗
j such that investment
is optimal for any A ≥ A∗
j. A∗










> I, then investment is optimal for any A.
Proof: See Appendix 2 ￿
The intuition is that so long as the investment cost I is very low, investment is optimal in-
dependently of the value A. However, whenever investment is costly enough (a reasonable
assumption), the investment decision depends on the productivity of the non-resource sector.
Only sufﬁciently high productivity levels give the ruler the incentive to invest in the economy.
In other words, there is a productivity threshold A∗
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The level of the threshold is informative of the likelihood of the ruler to undertake an invest-
ment in public goods. The higher the productivity threshold, the less likely investment will
be; inversely a lower threshold makes investment more likely.




j) = I. Therefore A∗
n and A∗
r
are deﬁned as follows :
τ(1 + A
∗
n)(1 + T) − I = 0 (16)
τ(1 + A
∗






γ+1−α − I = 0 (17)
Clearly the investment decision in a resource poor country is independent of resource
wealth. This outcome results directly from our assumption that resource poor countries pos-
sess no resource, i.e. Z = 0. Resource wealth however affects the threshold A∗
r and the
direction of their relationship is determined by the sign of α − γ.
Proposition 3:
In a resource rich country the ruler’s investment decision is characterized by:










Proof: See Appendix 3 ￿
In words, this proposition says that increased resource wealth provides a disincentive to invest
in productive public goods if the ruler is relatively more effective in contesting the resource. In
addition, increased resource wealth provides an incentive to invest in productive public goods
if the people are relatively more effective in grabbing the resource. A corollary of this propo-
sition is stated as follows.
Corollary:
1. If α > γ then A∗
r < A∗
n , that is in a resource rich country a lower productivity is
required to invest in productive public goods than in a resource poor one.
2. If α < γ then A∗
r > A∗
n , that is in a resource rich country a higher productivity is
required to invest in productive public goods than in a resource poor one.100 5.3. RULER’S DECISION TO INVEST
3. A∗
r |α>γ < A∗
r |α<γ, that is in a resource rich country the provision of public goods
requires a lower productivity when α > γ than when α < γ.
Proof: See Appendix 4 ￿
Our model explains why the investment decision may differ between resource rich and re-
source poor countries. In a resource poor country, investment in public goods has the sole
effect of raising the manufacturing sector output. In a resource rich country however, invest-
ment brings about the additional effects discussed above. These effects capture the predictable
change in the ruler’s payoff in a resource rich country as opposed to a resource poor country
and depend on the sign of α −γ. When α > γ, the additional effects are positive giving more
incentive to the ruler of a resource rich country to invest than to a ruler in a resource poor
country. Therefore a lower productivity A is required for the former to invest. When α < γ
the additional effects are negative, making investment less appealing to the ruler of a resource
rich country compared to a ruler in a resource poor country. Therefore a larger productivity
realization A is required for the former to have enough incentive to invest.
The model also explains the differing the investment behaviour of rulers in resource rich
countries according to the respective effectiveness of the population and the ruler in contest-
ing the resource rent. A ruler who can secure the control over resources easily will tend to
invest less in public goods than a ruler whose population is effective in contesting the resource
rent. By investing in a productive public good, the ruler provides an incentive to work in the
manufacturing sector rather than ﬁght over the resource riches. Providing such incentive is
obviously more pressing to the ruler who faces a population effective in ﬁghting and appro-
priating the resources.
Finally we can ask ourselves how an increase in the tax rate τ impacts on the critical
productivity level A∗
r. We show that also the answer to this question depends on the relative
effectiveness of the two parties in contesting the resource. As established formally in Ap-




< 0. In this case, if the tax rate increases, the critical A at
which investment is undertaken falls. In other words, if the tax rate rises in a country where
the population is quite effective in ﬁghting, the ruler has to invest early enough (i.e. at a lower
level of productivity A) to avoid rebelion. On the other hand if α < γ and Z > Z (where Z is




> 0. That is, ceteris paribus, a rise in the tax rate in
a country where the ruler is relatively more effective in ﬁghting makes investment less likely.CHAPTER 5. RESOURCES, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT CHOICE: PUBLIC
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5.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we test some of the predictions of the model to ascertain what drives the elite in
a resource rich country to provide public goods. Following the literature on the determinants
of provision of public goods, we deﬁne public goods as “goods or services enjoyed by all or a
large share of a jurisdiction” . 10 Most of this literature is concerned with either the deter-
minants of public good provision in democracies11 or the difference in public good provision
between dictatorships and democracies. An important ﬁnding of this literature is that democ-
racies tend to provide higher levels of public goods than authoritarian regimes. One possible
explanation is the difference in “inclusiveness” (i.e. the size of the group whose interests are
represented by a government) of the respective regimes (Deacon [2002], Mcguire and Olson
[2001], Bueno de Mesquita et al. [2003]). Another explanation might be the difference in the
contestability of political power when political leaders provide public goods in exchange for
political support (Lake and Baum [2001], Wintrobe [1990]).
A thorough empirical and theoretical investigation of the determinants of public good pro-
vision in dictatorships is however still missing. In the present chapter, we look at the speciﬁc
question of public good provision in autocratic resource rich countries. We ﬁnd that the
ruler’s relative effectiveness in keeping control of the resource plays a crucial role in explain-
ing the various economic outcomes within resource rich countries and between resource rich
and resource poor countries. Our primary objective in this section is to test the validity of this
ﬁnding.
5.4.1 Testable predictions
The ﬁrst prediction is derived from proposition 3. Proposition 3 essentially postulates that the
effect of the resource rent on the investment decision depends on the effectiveness of the two
respective parties in contesting resources. In particular, ceteris paribus, (i) increased resource
rent provides an incentive to invest in productive public goods if the people are relatively
more effective in securing the control over the resources; (ii) increased resource rent provides
less incentive to invest in productive public goods if the ruler is relatively more effective in
securing the control over the resources. We test this prediction by estimating the following
10See for example Lake and Baum [2001], Deacon [2002], and Deacon and Saha [2006] for a review of the
literature.
11For example Persson and Tabellini [1999], Persson and Tabellini [2000], Persson and Tabellini [2004] in-
vestigate the effect of majoritarian versus proportional voting rules (see also Milesi-Ferretti et al. [2002]) and
presidential versus parliamentary systems on spending on public goods.102 5.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
equation within the sub-sample of resource rich countries:
PGit = β0 + β1Controlit + β2Resourcesit + β3Resourcesit ∗ Controlit
+β4Productivityit−1 + β5X1it + εit (18)
where PGit denotes country i’s level of the public good at time t; Resourcesit is the amount
of resource rent; Controlit = 1 indicates that the ruler is more effective than the people in
appropriating resources (that is in terms of the theoretical model the case where α < γ);
Productivityit−1 denotes lagged productivity, X1it denotes all the other control variables and
εit are the error terms (which are assumed to be i.i.d). The two coefﬁcients β2 and β3 are
of interest: β2 represents the marginal effect of resources on the public good provision when
Controlit = 0; while β3 indicates how the effect of the resource rent differs between an
effective ruler (Controlit = 1) and an ineffective one (Controlit = 0). Finally, the sum
β2 + β3 reﬂects the effect of the resource rent when Controlit = 1. The model predicts
that β2 > 0 and (β2 + β3) < 0, implying that while an ineffective ruler has an incentive to
provide more public goods as resource rent increases, public goods supply decreases with the
resource rent in the presence of an effective ruler. This happens if the negative interaction
effect outweighs the positive main effect, i.e. if β2 > 0, β3 < 0 and |β3| > β2.
The second prediction derives from point (3) of the corollary. It implies that, ceteris
paribus, investment is (i) more likely when α > γ; and (ii) less likely when α < γ. This
prediction is tested within the sub-sample of resource rich countries as follows:
PGit = β0 + β1Controlit + β2Productivityit−1 + β3X2it + εit (19)
where X2it denotes all the other control variables. We expect to ﬁnd β1 < 0.
Thirdly, Points (1) and (2) of the corollary predict that the effect of resource richness
(whether a country is resource poor or resource rich) on public goods supply depends on the
effectiveness in controlling the resources. We postulate that, ceteris paribus, (i) there is more
public good investment in a resource rich country than in a resource poor country if α > γ ;
and (ii) there is less public good investment in a resource rich country than in a resource poor
country if α < γ. This prediction is tested using the following speciﬁcation:
PGit = β0+β1Controlit+β2Richi+β3Richi∗Controlit+β4Productivityit−1+β5X3it+εit
(20)
where X3it denotes all the other control variables. Note that here Richi = 1 if the country is
resource rich and Richi = 0 otherwise. Both constitutive terms of the interaction are binary.
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ruler provides more public goods than a resource poor one when he is ineffective in controlling
the resources; 2) a resource rich ruler provides less public goods than a resource poor ruler
when he is effective in controlling the resources.
5.4.2 Data
Our data set runs from 1975 to 2000 and contains 67 countries that have been led by an
authoritarian regime at some point since 1975. 12 We use the dummy variable constructed by
Cheibub and Gandhi [2004] on the type of political regime to indicate whether a country is
run democratically or by a dictator. Descriptive statistics of the data are provided in Appendix
6.
Dependent variables
As dependent variables we study seven different measures of public good provision. In partic-
ular, we use physical infrastructure (power generating capacity, communication and transport
network) and social infrastructure (education and health). These variables are used as a proxy
for investment in public goods. We believe that the provision of these public goods by the state
is indicative of the state’s commitment to development policies. Although the model treats the
decision of providing a public good as discrete, the empirical analysis will be concerned with
public goods as continuous variables. Empirically, it is more meaningful to think of the supply
of public goods in terms of levels and not as a binary decision. For instance, whether a country
extends its road network by 1 km or 100 km is the same binary decision while it is certainly
different if we consider the potential contribution of 1km and 100 km to development.
The data on the stock of physical infrastructure includes 1) electricity generating capacity
measured as the number of kWh available per capita in log; and 3) the available phone lines
per capita and 3) the transportation network , i.e. road and railway network in km per square
km expressed in log. The electricity and phone line series comes from Canning [1998] (1975
- 1995) and have a yearly frequency. The transportation network data on the other hand, is a
5-year averaged data (1975-2000) from Calderon and Serven [2004].
Our sources of data on education are 1) Ed Stats 13 for gross enrollment 14 in secondary
12We do not include Western countries so that countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain are not in our sample
despite being lead by dictators until the seventies. The former Soviet bloc is also excluded from the sample.
13This is a comprehensive database of education statistics created by the World Bank from the collection of
data mainly from UNESCO and the OECD (World Bank [2006a]).
14Gross enrollment ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of all persons enrolled at a given level of schooling to the
population of the age group that national regulation or custom dictates should be enrolled at that level. For
example, the total registered students in primary school are typically compared with the population aged 6-1l104 5.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
schools, (5-year data covering the period 1975-2000); and 2) World Development Indicator for
illiteracy for the years 1975-2000. The public health data measures the percentage of children
aged 12-23 months who have been immunized against Measles and DPT. The immunization
series come from the World Development Indicators (1980-2000)(World Bank [2006c]).
Independent Variables
In the theoretical model, we have established that the ruler’s relative effectiveness in appro-
priating the resource determines crucially his provision of public goods. We hypothesize that
such effectiveness is derived from the form of the political power. In particular, we assume
that the elite is effective in appropriating and keeping the resources for its own beneﬁt when-
ever the power is controlled by the most autocratic regimes. In the empirical set-up, these will
be the strong dictatorship regimes where the ruler has no ﬁnite term constraint. We ﬁnd this
intuitive, since if one assumes that all dictators would strive for an inﬁnite term in power, the
fact that some dictatorships are (only) ﬁnite term, implies that they have not held sufﬁcient
power to reach their objective (an inﬁnite term, strong dictatorship) and are therefore weaker.
Inlinewiththis reasoningweﬁndinourdatasetthatthosecountrieswheretheruler enjoys
an inﬁnite term would qualify to Fearon and Laitin’s deﬁnition of full (or harsh) autocracies,
with an average polity score of -6.18 (Fearon and Laitin [2003]). An example of such an au-
tocracy is given by Nigeria, which is led by inﬁnite term dictators. The counterpart, the weaker
dictatorships, such as Malaysia, have ﬁnite term rulers. We assume that in these cases the pop-
ulation is relatively more effective in appropriating resources. Our assumptions are supported
by empirical studies that compare strong versus weak dictatorships and ﬁnd that the latter have
a higher level of internal violent conﬂict. In fact the literature shows an inverted U relationship
between the frequency of conﬂicts and the level of democracy (de Nardo [1985], Francisco
[1995], Muller and Weede [1990],Ellingsen and Gleditsch [1997], Hegre et al. [2001]). For
our present purposes - a comparison between weak and strong dictatorships- only the decreas-
ing part of the slope is relevant. Therefore, we start from the empirical ﬁnding that the risk
of internal violence is highest in weak autocracies and lower in countries where harsh au-
tocrats rule (see also Fearon and Laitin [2003] for a similar point). All autocratic regimes
result in grievances of the population, but the difference between harsh autocracies where the
dictator has the means to establish a “peace of a zoo” and weak autocracies, is that in the
latter (semi-repressive) regime rebel movements have more possibilities to evolve (Muller and
Weede [1990], Hegre et al. [2001]).
Therefore we believe it is a realistic assumption that in the case of resource rich countries,
years. However, the gross ratios will overstate the accumulation of human capital when students repeat grades.CHAPTER 5. RESOURCES, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT CHOICE: PUBLIC
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governments in harsh autocracies are more effective in keeping control of the resources than
their counterparts in weak autocracies. If they had the necessary authority to (among other
things) preserve control over resources, they would not be weak autocracies to begin with.
Assuming therefore that weak democracies are characterized at the same time by lower
effectiveness in controlling resources (as in our theoretical model) and higher accountability
or ﬁnite term in ofﬁce (as in the empirical analysis), we expect the latter to be a relevant proxy
for testing our theoretical predictions.
We construct a dummy variable Controlit (with value 1 when the ruler has no ﬁnite term)
from Beck et al. [2004].
Yearly series (1975-2000) on resource rents are provided by K. Hamilton and G. Ruta from
the World Bank (Hamilton and Ruta [2007]). Resource rent is measured as the product of the
quantity of resources extracted by the difference between the resource price and the average
extraction cost. Resource abundance is measured as the GDP share of point resource rent .
The measure of the rent includes ten different minerals, coal, oil and natural gas. 15 We also
consider the area of cropland per capita as a second measure of resource wealth. Due to lack of
data, the monetary value of cropland cannot be accounted for. Consistent with the theoretical
model, these two measures of resource endowment only include contestable resources.
We deﬁne a country as resource rich if it is either rich in point resources (minerals, coal,
oil and gas) or cropland or both. 16 A country is said to be rich in point resources if its mean
rent over time exceeds a given threshold. Given the median rent for point resources is 2.7%
of the GDP, we use two thresholds to characterize pointiness: 5% of the GDP and 8% of the
GDP (a similar cutoff has been used by Besley and Kudamatsu [2002] but applied to export
over GDP). On the other hand, a country is rich in cropland resources if the country average of
cropland and arable area over time is higher than 0.3 hectare per capita 17 and does not exceed
the pointiness threshold. A country is resource poor if it is neither rich in point resources nor
in cropland. Each country’s classiﬁcation (i.e. whether it is rich in point resources, cropland
or resource poor) is therefore time-invariant and unlike most studies is based on the average
rent or land endowment instead of an initial date resource wealth (generally 1970).
In the empirical analysis we systematically control for productivity. It is proxied by the
real GDP per worker. To avoid reverse causality between productivity and the dependent
variables, lagged productivity (one year lag) rather than current productivity is used. 18 The
15The list of the minerals is: bauxite, copper, gold, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, zinc.
16Point resources are geographically clustered resources unlike diffuse resources, which are spread out in
space. Usually point resources are those that are assumed to be contestable, whereas cultural land (a typical
example of a diffuse resource) cannot be contested.
17This cutoff ruler is also used by Auty [2001b].
18This strategy is discussed in, for example, Deacon [2002].106 5.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
bulk of the control variables is presented in the appendix.
5.4.3 Estimation Results
In this section, we estimate the various equations presented above and test our theoretical pre-
dictions. Given our static model, testing the predictions of the model requires us to look pri-
marily into cross-country variations. Our estimation relies therefore on pooled OLS because
the ﬁxed effects estimator rules out cross-country variation, using only the within-variation
(see Barro [1997] and Wacziarg [2002]). However, the major drawback of using OLS is that
our estimates could be biased due to omitted factors. To circumvent this problem, we control
for institutional features (using Hall and Jones measure of social infrastructure), legal ori-
gins (French and British), openness (fraction of years with open trade from Sachs and Warner
[1997]), and geographic variables such as population, urbanization, and size of the country
(following Lake and Baum [2001], and Canning [1998]). We also introduce regional dum-
mies for Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America, and time
dummies to control for aggregate effects that impact on all countries in a given year.
Table 5.1 presents the estimation results for prediction 1. We investigate whether the effect
of the level of resources (point resources rents and land endowment) on the provision of public
goods depends on the relative effectiveness to control resources. Empirical evidence is in line
with our prediction.
The effect of point resource rents when the regime is relatively ineffective in ﬁghting to
keep control of the resources (Controli = 0) is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for power
generation, transport network and secondary school enrollment. This suggests that a ruler
ineffective in keeping the resources will provide more public goods as the rent increases. In
addition, the ruler’s behaviour differs signiﬁcantly when he is effective in controlling the re-
sources. The negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect of the interaction term indicates that
an effective ruler will provide less of the public goods. Furthermore, the differing behaviour is
such that the negative interaction effect outweighs the positive main effect, resulting in a neg-
ative correlation between resource rent and public good levels. Thus, the total effect (i.e. the
effect of point resources when an effective ruler is in power) is negative and signiﬁcant except
for transport network where the effect remains insigniﬁcant (despite the expected negative
sign). Overall, our ﬁndings corroborate prediction 1.
We ﬁnd very similar results with illiteracy. The sign of the effect of point resources on
illiteracymustobviouslybeoppositetotheonefoundabove. Prediction1issoundlysupported
by the evidence.
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(columns (6) and (7)). As a matter of fact the main effect is statistically insigniﬁcant sug-
gesting little relationship between public good levels and point resources when the ruler is
ineffective in ﬁghting. This may be due the fact that unlike the other public goods, immu-
nization campaigns are often funded by external agencies (Lake and Baum [2001]). However,
the negative and signiﬁcant interaction effect indicates that when a ruler is effective in ﬁght-
ing, immunization rates fall. In both columns (6) and (7), the total effect is negative but only
signiﬁcant with immunization against measles.
However, the results obtained with cropland endowment are not as good. We ﬁnd some
evidence for our prediction in the sense that the coefﬁcient on land endowment is of the “cor-
rect” sign for power generation, phone lines, transport network and illiteracy. In these cases
we also ﬁnd that an effective ruler provides signiﬁcantly less public goods. Finally the total
effect is only of the predicted sign in the case of power generating capacity. It seems that
our model predicts essentially situations in which point resources are contested as opposed to
contest in cropland endowment.
In Table 5.2, we test the prediction that a ruler relatively effective in ﬁghting over resources
provides comparatively lower levels of public goods. The interest lies in the coefﬁcient of the
variable Control in the sub-sample of resource rich countries. Table 5.2 shows that there
is empirical evidence consistent with Prediction 2. We ﬁnd that the level of public goods
is constantly lower in resource rich countries where the ruler is relatively more effective in
controlling the resource endowment, i.e. when α < γ according to our model. The coefﬁcient
of the dummy variable Control is negative and statistically signiﬁcant for the range of public
goods considered, i.e. electricity, transport network, secondary school enrollment, illiteracy,
immunization rates of measles and DPT. The effect on social infrastructure is particularly
large: a country ruled by a leader effective in ﬁghting exhibits on average 4.6 percentage
points less enrollment and 6.8 percentage points higher illiteracy. Besides, its immunization
rates are 5 to 6.5 percentage points lower. Thus our model does particularly well in explaining
differences in the levels of public good provision among resource rich countries.
In Table 5.3, we wish to answer the following question: does the effect of resource rich-
ness (whether the country is classiﬁed resource rich or resource poor) on public good supply
depends on the relative effectiveness in ﬁghting to control resources? We ﬁnd some evidence
that ineffective rulers provide more public goods when they are resource rich. This is true typ-
ically for power generation, school enrollment and immunization against measles where the
coefﬁcient of Rich is statistically signiﬁcant. Note that for illiteracy and immunization against
DPT, the coefﬁcient is of the predicted sign but insigniﬁcant. However, there is little evidence
to support the prediction that resource rich rulers who are effective in ﬁghting provide less108 5.5. CONCLUSIONS
public goods than resource poor ones. The prediction is only corroborated for power genera-
tion. Although, transportation network, enrollment and illiteracy have the expected sign, they
are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Overall, the empirical evidence is consistent with the main results of the model, namely
that the effect of resources on the provision of public goods hinges generally on the ruler’s
relative effectiveness in ﬁghting. Our results are obviously robust to a wide range of public
goods considered, whether they are physical or social infrastructure. They are also insensitive
to the choice of the cutoff points deﬁning resource wealth. Results using a cutoff level of 8%
of GDP in deﬁning a country as resource rich are available upon request from the authors.
There is no qualitative difference compared to the results presented here. Also, prediction 1 is
fairly robust to the inclusion of ﬁxed effects, i.e. when doing a panel instead of a pooled OLS
analysis. A panel analysis is only sensible in case of prediction 1, since in prediction 2 and 3
we are interested in the coefﬁcient of mostly time invariant explanatory variables.
Theresultsarealsorobusttotheuseofanalternativeproxyfortheeffectivenessinﬁghting.
One possible proxy is whether a country is ruled by a monarch or a military ofﬁcer. The idea
is that such countries tend to have military capacity that may deter effectively any dissent.
Besides, our ﬁndings using this alternative proxy are consistent with the disastrous record of
military dictatorships in providing public goods provided by Lake and Baum [2001].
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we follow an idea that has gained much support in recent years, namely the
role of political choices in producing resource curse outcomes. As the term “policy choice”
suggests such outcomes are by no means deterministic, and thus our model is one of the few
to provide a conditional theory of the resource curse.
Inparticular, wefollowthethoughtthateasilyappropriableresourcerentsmaylead(among
other things) to distortions in public policy (Bulte et al. [2005]). Recognizing the inherent
threat of conﬂict in resource rich countries, we present a model in which the outcome, the pol-
icy choice, is driven by purely economic incentives. Our model points to reasons why some
resource abundant countries perform poorly whereas others prove highly successful. That is
we show why policy and thus development experiences differ among resource rich countries.
In particular, we show that the degree of resource wealth, the investment worthiness of the
economy and in particular the ruler’s and the people’s relative effectiveness in contesting the
resource are crucial to determine whether developmental or predatory and repressive policies
are carried out.CHAPTER 5. RESOURCES, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT CHOICE: PUBLIC
GOOD PROVISION IN RESOURCE RICH ECONOMIES 109
Testing our model empirically we ﬁnd that it does particularly well in offering a condi-
tional resource curse theory. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with the idea that the effect of re-
source wealth crucially depends on the ruler’s relative strength (which is proxied by whether
or not the ruler faces a ﬁnite term in ofﬁce). As an example consider the differing experiences
of the two countries Nigeria and Malaysia. In Nigeria, the presence of inﬁnite time dicta-
tors had particularly dramatic effects on the provision of social infrastructure. From 1990 to
2000, children immunization to DPT and measles have fallen respectively from 54% to 26%
and from 54% to 35%. In addition, secondary school enrollment has not improved over that
decade remaining at a low 25%. By contrast Malaysia, which was led by ﬁnite term authoritar-
ian rulers, has consistently invested both in physical and social infrastructure. Over the 1990s,
measles immunization has progressed by 18 percentage points (from 70% to 88%), while sec-
ondary school enrollment increased from 56% to 69%. Power generation has also witnessed
an outstanding rise between 1990 and 1995 (282 to 520 kWh per capita). Also within a coun-
try a similar pattern can be observed. Consider the example of Congo. There the arrival in
power of Sassou-Nguesso (a ﬁnite term dictator) after previous inﬁnite term military dictators
(e.g. Mariem Ngouabi and Yhomby-Opango) correspond to a period of large investment in
power generating capacity (from 20 kWh/cap in 1978 to 65 kWh/cap in 1980), telephone lines
and school enrollment (from 48% in 1975 to 74% in 1980).
The resource curse literature has often hinted to that institutions are the key factors in ex-
plaining disappointing development experiences of resource rich countries (see for example
Isham et al. [2005]). Note that in our estimations institutional quality is controlled for, and
still we ﬁnd the degree of resource wealth and the relative effectiveness of the two parties in
contesting the resource to be signiﬁcant. That is, whereas institutional quality undoubtedly
plays a crucial role in explaining public good provision (the coefﬁcient is usually highly sig-
niﬁcant), there is evidence that this is not the whole story. By pointing to other determining


















Dependent Variable: Provision of Public Good
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Power Generation 
Capacity per Cap









Lag Productivity 0.082 0.535*** 0.530*** 3.688* -5.255*** -4.327** -4.477*
[0.058] [0.048] [0.043] [2.196] [0.990] [1.980] [2.311]
Control -0.859*** -0.227*** -0.172** 11.445*** 3.481* 0.831 -0.995
[0.118] [0.076] [0.076] [2.988] [1.783] [3.402] [3.465]
Point 0.015*** -0.001 0.016*** 0.427** -0.530*** -0.03 0.037
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.167] [0.064] [0.106] [0.120]
Point*Control -0.026*** -0.012*** -0.027*** -0.748*** 0.805*** -0.346*** -0.437***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.187] [0.074] [0.126] [0.131]
Land Endowment 0.424*** 0.230*** 0.427*** -6.517*** -5.274*** -1.129 -1.337
[0.072] [0.041] [0.035] [1.775] [0.929] [1.531] [1.584]
Land Endowment*Control -0.718*** -0.066 -0.361*** 7.676*** 5.762*** 3.015 -0.564
[0.101] [0.065] [0.053] [2.579] [1.253] [2.316] [2.331]
Open Economy -0.944*** -0.316* -0.162 -4.85 6.067** -17.913*** -24.434***
[0.176] [0.167] [0.106] [4.792] [2.913] [4.337] [4.357]
Area 0.04 -0.142*** -0.988*** -2.201** 4.078*** -1.908** -0.258
[0.036] [0.024] [0.025] [1.049] [0.504] [0.899] [0.945]
Population -0.193*** 0.032 0.914*** 2.227** -2.247*** -3.447*** -3.160***
[0.043] [0.029] [0.023] [1.108] [0.537] [1.062] [1.133]
Governance 3.676*** 1.055*** -0.783*** 6.104 -2.196 59.595*** 63.002***
[0.409] [0.270] [0.298] [12.289] [5.848] [10.992] [12.046]
British Colony 0.217** 0.435*** 0.479*** 4.000 5.519*** 1.920 -1.653
[0.094] [0.062] [0.049] [2.547] [1.687] [2.129] [2.189]
French Colony -1.194*** -0.378*** 0.344*** -6.188** 23.603*** -19.100*** -17.989***
[0.114] [0.075] [0.061] [2.802] [2.210] [2.795] [3.023]
Urban Population 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.014*** 0.672*** -0.433*** 0.634*** 0.507***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.100] [0.061] [0.116] [0.126]
Constant 4.772*** -1.794** -10.239*** -39.79 52.366*** 158.113*** 131.822***
[0.982] [0.761] [0.553] [29.358] [12.305] [24.161] [26.450]
Point + Point*Control -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.011 -0.321*** 0.275 -0.376 -0.4***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.042] [0.09] [1] [1.828] [0.079]
Land End + Land End *Control -0.295*** 0.164*** 0.065*** 1.16 0.489*** 1.886*** -1.901
[0.071] [0.05] [0.002] [2.037] [0.036] [0.082] [1.964]
Observations 627 610 585 212 689 524 509
Adjusted R-squared 0.828 0.882 0.901 0.718 0.794 0.742 0.674
Robust standard errors. Control for Openess, Colonizer, Region and Year dummies *** indicates 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10%.
Resource Richness defined with point resources of 5% GDP





























































































Dependent Variable: Provision of Public Good
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Power Generation 
Capacity per Cap









Lag Productivity 0.103 0.532*** 0.479*** 0.92 -3.778*** -4.542** -4.909**
[0.063] [0.048] [0.048] [2.197] [1.070] [1.837] [2.206]
Control -0.483*** -0.275*** -0.137*** -4.566** 6.811*** -6.549*** -5.084***
[0.065] [0.048] [0.044] [1.799] [1.007] [1.748] [1.840]
Open Economy -0.545*** -0.161 0.255** -7.209 -2.571 -21.591*** -29.263***
[0.177] [0.160] [0.120] [4.654] [3.112] [4.095] [4.262]
Area 0.066** -0.195*** -1.003*** -2.078** 3.795*** -2.981*** -1.141
[0.032] [0.021] [0.024] [1.007] [0.476] [0.871] [0.909]
Population -0.231*** 0.120*** 0.960*** 2.722** -3.304*** -2.246** -2.921***
[0.039] [0.034] [0.022] [1.209] [0.504] [0.996] [1.017]
Governance 3.523*** 0.886*** -0.999*** -10.801 16.824*** 53.181*** 61.052***
[0.353] [0.294] [0.267] [13.035] [5.712] [10.432] [11.614]
British Colony 0.256*** 0.481*** 0.434*** 8.146*** 2.482 4.327** 1.087
[0.098] [0.080] [0.067] [3.014] [1.697] [2.094] [2.131]
French Colony -1.053*** -0.052 0.618*** -1.012 18.490*** -14.135*** -14.421***
[0.106] [0.083] [0.067] [2.967] [1.816] [2.552] [2.583]
Urban Population 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.717*** -0.548*** 0.547*** 0.415***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.118] [0.053] [0.101] [0.110]
Constant 4.057*** -2.874*** -11.442*** 9.046 65.304*** 121.001*** 100.780***
[0.937] [0.798] [0.552] [32.048] [12.340] [21.941] [24.771]
Observations 664 654 619 225 741 559 544
Adjusted R-squared 0.825 0.878 0.849 0.68 0.767 0.732 0.66
Robust standard errors. Control for Openess, Colonizer, Region and Year dummies *** indicates 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10%.
Resource Richness defined with point resources of 5% GDP


















Dependent Variable: Provision of Public Good
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Power Generation 
Capacity per Cap









Lag Productivity 0.289*** 0.436*** 0.440*** 2.088 -3.183*** -1.436 -4.210***
[0.059] [0.044] [0.040] [2.361] [0.920] [1.259] [1.512]
Control 0.234** -0.083 -0.236** -0.627 6.828*** -13.700*** -11.049***
[0.094] [0.058] [0.093] [3.291] [2.190] [2.479] [2.362]
Rich 0.229*** 0.063 -0.026 4.498* -0.334 1.817 6.364***
[0.076] [0.055] [0.062] [2.485] [1.899] [2.106] [2.121]
Rich*Control -0.695*** -0.186*** -0.004 -5.19 1.944 2.708 2.702
[0.109] [0.072] [0.097] [3.642] [2.317] [2.807] [2.708]
Open Economy -0.328** 0.194* 0.861*** -0.78 -18.435*** -7.673** -18.945***
[0.130] [0.112] [0.102] [3.870] [2.768] [3.463] [3.384]
Area 0.160*** -0.061*** -0.771*** -0.19 -0.023 -0.896 -1.234**
[0.022] [0.016] [0.016] [0.798] [0.404] [0.596] [0.572]
Population -0.158*** 0.061* 0.900*** 1.667 -2.428*** -3.468*** -3.296***
[0.038] [0.034] [0.024] [1.205] [0.557] [0.877] [0.892]
Governance 2.063*** 2.540*** -0.426 -3.213 -0.66 63.686*** 71.225***
[0.316] [0.195] [0.263] [8.776] [5.204] [7.529] [7.703]
British Colony 0.036 0.314*** 0.548*** 1.347 1.525 -3.109* -5.253***
[0.073] [0.051] [0.060] [2.453] [1.256] [1.660] [1.566]
French Colony -0.891*** -0.068 0.698*** -5.282** 14.808*** -20.300*** -22.179***
[0.092] [0.064] [0.065] [2.040] [1.295] [1.886] [1.933]
Urban Population 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.010*** 0.594*** -0.313*** 0.089 0.227***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.097] [0.040] [0.059] [0.061]
Constant 0.562 -3.970*** -13.556*** -11.035 113.881*** 131.706*** 88.921***
[0.946] [0.751] [0.543] [29.802] [12.253] [18.564] [20.847]
Rich + Rich*Control -0.466*** -0.122** -0.031 -0.692 1.61 4.525** 9.066***
[0.101] [0.06] [0.067] [2.963] [1.692] [2.167] [2.04]
Observations 924 906 799 309 1005 752 728
Adjusted R-squared 0.8 0.894 0.893 0.669 0.682 0.709 0.686
Robust standard errors. Control for Openess, Colonizer, Region and Year dummies *** indicates 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10%.
Resource Richness defined with point resources of 5% GDP
Table 5.3: Resource rich and resource poor impact on public good provision: Prediction 3CHAPTER 5. RESOURCES, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT CHOICE: PUBLIC
GOOD PROVISION IN RESOURCE RICH ECONOMIES 113
5.6 Appendix
5.6.1 Appendix 1: Lemma 1 (Properties of function ∆Π
j
G(A))
Resource Poor Country, j = n: We know that ∆Πn
G(A) = τ(1+A)(1+T), which is strictly
increasing and linear in A.
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G(A) = 0 (A-4)
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∂A2 > 0foranyA. So∆Πr
G(A)isstrictlyconvexanddecreasesintheinterval
[0,A], reaches the minimum at A and increases in the interval [A,+∞). Note that as ∆Πr
G(A)
is decreasing in the interval [0,A], min[∆Πr
G(A)] = ∆Πr
G(A = A) < ∆Πr
G(A = 0).
Also, ∆Πr
G(A) is above ∆Πn
G(A) for any A, and converges asymptotically to ∆Πn
G(A) (see
Figure 5.1).
Case 2: γ > α








∂A2 < 0 for any A, i.e. ∆Πr
G is strictly increasing and strictly concave in A. In ad-
dition, ∆Πr
G(A) is below ∆Πn
G(A) for any A, and converges asymptotically to ∆Πn
G(A) (see
Figure 5.2).
5.6.2 Appendix 2: Proof proposition 2
According to (12), investment is optimal if and only if ∆Π
j
G(A) ≥ I.





G(A) = +∞, andI isﬁnite, thecontinuityof∆Πn
G(A)guaranteesthat∆Πn
G(A)
must cross I at least once if min[∆Πn
G(A)] = ∆Πn
G(A = 0) < I (Existence).
If ∆Πn
G(A = 0) < I , then uniqueness is guaranteed since ∆Πn
G(A) is strictly increasing in
A whereas I is constant in A. Hence there exists a unique productivity level A∗
n such that
investment is optimal whenever A > A∗
n.
On the other hand if min[∆Πr
G(A)] = ∆Πr
G(A = 0) > I, then ∆Πr
G(A) > I for any A, that
is whatever the value of A, the ruler will always ﬁnd it optimal to invest.
Resource Rich Country j = r:





G(A) = +∞, and I is ﬁnite, the continuity of ∆Πr
G(A) guarantees that
∆Πr
G(A) must cross I at least once if min[∆Πr
G(A)] = ∆Πr
G(A = A) < I (Existence).
If min[∆Πr
G(A)] < ∆Πr
G(A = 0) < I, then uniqueness is guaranteed since ∆Πr
G(A) is
strictly increasing in the interval (A,+∞) as I is constant in A. Hence there exists a unique
productivity level A∗
r such that investment is optimal whenever A > A∗
r.
If min[∆Πr
G(A)] < I < ∆Πr
G(A = 0), then ∆Πr
G(A) crosses I twice in A∗
rlow and in A∗
rhigh.
Hence investment is optimal for any A < A∗
rlow and for any A > A∗
rhigh. Note that it is ob-
vious that A∗
rlow < A and A∗
rhigh > A. This case is presented for completeness of the proof.
However, we will assume that I is large enough so that there exists at most only one threshold.
On the other hand if ∆Πr
G(A = 0) > min[∆Πr
G(A)] > I, then ∆Πr
G(A) > I for any A, that
is whatever the value of A, the ruler will always ﬁnd it optimal to invest.





G(A) = +∞, and I is ﬁnite, the continuity of ∆Πr
G(A) guarantees that
∆Πr
G(A) must cross I at least once if min[∆Πr
G(A)] = ∆Πr
G(A = 0) < I (Existence).
If ∆Πr
G(A = 0) < I , then uniqueness is guaranteed since ∆Πr
G(A) is strictly increasing in
A whereas I is constant in A. Hence there exists a unique productivity level A∗
r such that




G(A = 0) > I, then ∆Πr
G(A) > I for any A, that is whatever the
value of A, the ruler will always ﬁnd it optimal to invest.￿
5.6.3 Appendix 3: Characterization of A∗
Applying the implicit function theorem using equation (17) yields:CHAPTER 5. RESOURCES, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT CHOICE: PUBLIC
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∂A and the sign of the numerator depends on the sign of
α − γ.
Case 1: α > γ








< 0 since A∗
r > A
• If min[∆Πr
G(A)] < I < ∆Πr






> 0 since A∗




< 0 since A∗
rhigh > A.
The latter case is presented for completeness of the proof. However, we will assume that I is
large enough so that there exists at most one threshold.
Case 2: γ > α
We established in Appendix 1 that in this case,
∂∆Πr
G
∂A > 0 for any A so that by continuity
the denominator is positive at A = A∗
r. Moreover, since the numerator is negative we have
∂A∗
r
∂Z > 0. An increase in resource abundance increases the threshold, reducing the incentive to
invest.￿
5.6.4 Appendix 4: Proof Corollary
Case 1: α > γ
We have established that in this case P1 > 0, P2 < 0 and P3 < 0. i.e. there are additional neg-
ative effects of an investment in a resource rich country, and therefore the value of investing is
lower than in a resource poor country: ∆Πr
G(A) > ∆Πn
G(A) for all A.
It follows that for any A, ∆Πr
G(A) − I > ∆Πn




n) − I > ∆Πn
G(A∗
n) − I, i.e. ∆Πr
G(A∗
n) − I > 0. For A = A∗
n, i.e. the produc-
tivity level at which the ruler in a non-resource country starts to invest, the ruler in a resource
rich country, is strictly better off investing which implies that investment is optimal for a lower
productivity level. As a result A∗
r < A∗
n, implying that investment is more likely in a resource116 5.6. APPENDIX
rich country than in a resource poor one (investment takes place for a larger range of A val-
ues).
This case is depicted in Figure 5.1 (the dotted lines represent the resource rich, whereas the
solid lines represent the resource poor country).
Case 2: γ > α
We have established that in this case P1 < 0, P2 > 0 and P3 > 0, i.e. there are additional neg-
ative effects of an investment in a resource rich country, and therefore the value of investing is
lower than in a resource poor country: ∆Πr
G(A) < ∆Πn
G(A) for all A.
ThereforeforanyA, ∆Πr
G(A)−I < ∆Πn






n) − I, i.e. ∆Πr
G(A∗
n) − I < 0. For A = A∗
n, i.e. the productivity level at which the
ruler in a resource poor country decides to start investing, it is not optimal for the ruler in a
resource rich country to undertake investment. As a result A∗
n < A∗
r, implying that investment
is less likely in a resource rich country than in a resource poor one.
This case is depicted in Figure 5.2 (the dotted lines represent the resource rich, whereas the
solid lines represent the resource poor country).























Figure 5.1: The case of α > γ
We have now established that :
• A∗
r < A∗
n if α > γ
• A∗
n < A∗
r if α < γCHAPTER 5. RESOURCES, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT CHOICE: PUBLIC
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Figure 5.2: The case of α < γ
Moreover, A∗
n is independent of Z by assumption. From proposition 3 we have shown that
A∗
r(α > γ) decreases in Z and A∗
r(γ > α) increases in Z. It follows that for any Z, we have:
A∗
r(α > γ) < A∗
n < A∗
r(γ > α).￿118 5.6. APPENDIX




The equation deﬁning A∗
r is given by
H = τ(1 + A
∗






γ+1−α − I = 0 (A-6)








. Remember from Appendix 3 ∂H
∂A∗
r > 0.
To determine the sign of the numerator:
∂H
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If α > γ, then
∂
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(τP1 − P2 − P3) > 0 and so
∂H
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< 0. If γ > α,
then ∂
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5.6.6 Appendix 6: Data
Sample (1975 - 2000)
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Power Generation (kWh per capita in log) 1363 4.60 1.53
Phone Lines (per 1000 people in log) 1326 2.46 1.56
Literacy Rate in % 1542 59.79 23.00
Immunization DPT in % 1284 62.72 26.37
Immunization MSL in % 1257 63.38 25.10
Polity Score 1704 -2.75 6.16
Resource Rent in % GDP 1565 11.04 16.11
Sub-Sample: Rulers with Finite Term
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Power Generation (kWh per capita in log) 843 4.65 1.35
Phone Lines (per 1000 people in log) 829 2.59 1.49
Literacy Rate in % 985 64.57 22.25
Immunization DPT in % 885 65.68 23.42
Immunization MSL in % 869 66.53 22.55
Polity Score 1105 -0.88 6.31
Resource Rent in % GDP 1041 7.56 10.53
Sub-Sample: Rulers without Finite Term
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Power Generation (kWh per capita in log) 520 4.51 1.78
Phone Lines (per 1000 people in log) 497 2.26 1.65
Literacy Rate in % 557 51.34 21.85
Immunization DPT in % 399 56.15 30.98
Immunization MSL in % 388 56.32 28.82
Polity Score 599 -6.19 4.02
Resource Rent in % GDP 524 17.96 21.99
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics
The deﬁnitions and sources of the used control variables are the following:
• The variable “Open economy” captures the fraction of years of open trade since 1950.
An economy is classiﬁed as “open” (as deﬁned by Sachs and Warner [1997]) if (1)
average tariffs ≤ 40%, (2) non-tariff barriers cover less than 40% of total trade, (3)
black market premiums are less than 20%, (4) the country is not a socialist country, and
(5) the government does not monopolize any major exports.
• The variable “Area” captures the log of the total land area computed with the unit of
square kilometers. It is taken from the World Bank [2006c].
• The variable “Population” measures the log of the total population as provided in World
Bank [2006c].120 5.6. APPENDIX
• The variable “Governance” is an Index of Government anti-diversion policies. The
index includes the risk of expropriation, contract enforcement, government corruption,
law & order and bureaucratic quality. This variable is taken from Hall and Jones [1999].
• The variable “British Colony” is a dummy variable, capturing whether a country is a
former British colony. It is taken from Fearon and Laitin [2003].
• The variable “French Colony” is a dummy variable, capturing whether a country is a
former French colony. It is taken from Fearon and Laitin [2003].
• The variable “Urban Population” measures the percentage of urban population in the
total population as reported by World Bank [2006c].CHAPTER6
The Missing Input: Accounting with and for Natural Capital
6.1 Introduction
The so-called natural resource curse has been shown most famously by Sachs and Warner
[1997]. Ever since then the paradox that on average resource wealth hurts countries and in
particular results in poor economic performance has received a lot of attention. First perceived
as a puzzle, it has today become common knowledge not only among academic scholars, but
also of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank that have
started to adjust their policies accordingly.
So far the literature on the phenomenon experiences several serious shortcomings though.
For one the measures of resource wealth employed are far from perfect. They suffer from
endogeneity problems that bias regression results and lead subsequent interpretations in the
wrong direction. Also, most measures arguably assess resource dependence rather than re-
source abundance. In the present chapter we address these issues and look at both, the effect
ofresourcedependence(properlyinstrumented)aswellasofresourceabundance(usingnewly
available data that offers us a more satisfactory proxy). In this novel setting, we are able to
change the perspective on the resource curse.
There is a large body of literature that ﬁnds resources to be a curse rather than a blessing
for many countries. According to this literature, countries rich in natural resources tend to
fare worse in many respects compared to their resource poor counterparts. They often have
low or even negative growth rates (i.e. also low income levels) and all kinds of important
developmental indicators, such as life expectancy, child mortality or access to water seem to
be negatively affected by the presence of resources (see for example Karl [1997], Sachs and
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Warner [1997], Auty [2001b] , Bulte et al. [2005]).
All of the above-mentioned works use a similar measure of resource wealth, usually pri-
mary good exports as a fraction of total exports or GDP. This variable - being a measure of
resource dependence rather than abundance - suffers from endogeneity problems. For exam-
ple in an income regression it is unclear whether resource dependence induces low income,
or whether a country is resource dependent because it has low income and the manufacturing
sector is underdeveloped. In the present chapter we remedy this problem by properly instru-
menting for resource dependence.
Most recently Collier and Goderis (2007) introduced a new dimension into the resource
curse literature, explicitly distinguishing between short run and long run effects of commodity
price booms, and ﬁnding a positive short term, but a negative long term effect of resources.
They, like us, acknowledge potential endogeneity problems with the resource measure. Within
their panel cointegration methodology, they claim however that endogeneity is not substantial,
while our chapter takes the view that potential endogeneity might be a core issue and proposes
to address it explicitly by an IV approach.
While speaking about a resource“curse” people loosely think about the effect of resources
on a country’s development and performance. We argue that one has to be careful to distin-
guish the terms resource abundance and resource dependence. If one is interested in the effect
of resources on a country’s development, that is if one wants to ﬁnd out whether there is a
“curse of natural resources”, one should look at the effect of resource abundance. The relevant
measure for resource abundance is a measure of resource stocks. Most of the resource curse
literature has - by employing the above-mentioned measure - looked at the effects of resource
dependence. In the present chapter we look at the effect of resource stocks, thus properly
accounting for resource wealth of a country.
We complement prior work that has acknowledged the difference and tried to distinguish
between the effects of resource abundance and resource dependence (Ding and Field [2004],
Brunnschweiler and Bulte [2008a]). Ding and Field include a resource abundance as well as
a resource dependence variable in their growth regressions. In addition they also instrument
for the resource dependence measure. As an instrument they choose rule of law, a variable we
cannot ﬁnd convincing in because it is not clear that this variable fulﬁlls the requirement of
exogeneity.
Brunnschweiler and Bulte also look at the effect of abundance as well as dependence
on economic growth. They concentrate on the effect of mineral (subsoil) resources whereas
we consider a wider range of resources and allow for the fact that different kinds may have
different effects. Also, due to limited data availability, Brunnschweiler and Bulte have usedCHAPTER 6. THE MISSING INPUT: ACCOUNTING WITH AND FOR NATURAL
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samples of very few observations for their regressions. In the present chapter we improve
upon this point.
In addition to employing more recent and improved data than the above cited works, we
are among the ﬁrst ones to consider the effect of natural resource abundance on per capita
income levels (arguably a superior measure of welfare as compared to economic growth).
To our knowledge this issue has only been looked at by Brunnschweiler and Bulte [2008b].
They ﬁnd, albeit in a different context, results comparable to ours. Furthermore we take the
analysis to a different level and investigate the relationship between resource abundance and
the accumulation of important input factors such as human and physical capital as well as
productivity.
Moreover, the present chapter contributes to the literature on Development Accounting.
This technique is concerned with investigating the roots of income differences across coun-
tries. Output is split up into its components, recognizing that it essentially stems from different
inputs such as human capital and physical capital. The part of output that cannot be explained
by these input factors is assumed to be due to productivity, the famous A in a production func-
tion. As a consequence cross-country differences in output can be traced back to differences
in the amount of inputs. Very often it turns out that the difference in inputs cannot explain
the large differences in output. Thus, the residual A is assigned an important role in explain-
ing cross-country income differences. The - in this way backed out - productivity levels vary
greatly across countries. Traditionally the inputs considered are physical and human capital
(labor). One important input factor - natural resources (especially important in poorer coun-
tries) - has not been taken into account so far (Caselli and Feyrer [2007]). The simple reason
for this shortcoming is that, until very recently, the data was not available. We make use of the
newly offered data and investigate how estimated productivity levels change.
6.2 Method and Data
6.2.1 Method
We employ the traditional method of Development Accounting.1, complemented with the ad-
ditional input factor natural resources. Natural resource input is disaggregated into input from










1For a thorough discussion of this method, see Caselli [2005]124 6.2. METHOD AND DATA
where Yi denotes output of the economy, Ki is the physical capital stock and Hi the human
capital stock. The exponents, which may vary across countries, sum to one, so there are
constant returns to scale. Natural resource input is split up into two components. We distin-
guish between input from subsoil and non-subsoil resources. Whereas we consider the stock
of non-subsoil resource capital (Z(ns)) to be productive (forests, agricultural land, etc.), we
argue that in the case of subsoil resources it is the rent ﬂow which enters the production func-
tion (R(s)). A more detailed discussion follows in section 6.2.2. Accordingly in equation
(1) R(s)
γ(s)i
i denotes input from subsoil resources, whereas Z(ns)
γ(ns)i
i denotes input from
non-subsoil resources.



















where lower-case variables are per worker. We write the production function in terms of the
capital output ratio to account for the fact that this variable is invariant to productivity in the
steady state of a neoclassical growth model (Hall and Jones [1999]).

















i.e. A is the “residual”, the part of output unexplained by the given factors. Of course A as
deﬁned by equation (6.3) is affected by measurement units. In order to be informative, A is
traditionally regarded in relation to a chosen reference point, such as the corresponding level
of the US (see for example Hall and Jones [1999]). The relative contributions to output in
country 1 are then given by:
y1














































      
non-subsoil resources
(4)
Consequently, the data necessary to perform development accounting consists of: output
y, human capital h, produced capital k, natural capital z and r (all in per worker terms),
and the respective exponents α,β, γ(s) and γ(ns). Note that under the assumption of perfect
competition on factor markets these exponents are given by the income shares of the respective
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6.2.2 Data
This section describes our data sources as well as various transformations undertaken, as the
case may be. In this chapter we consider a cross section of up to 94 countries for the year
2000. In the following we describe which data we use and how we manipulate it, if at all.
• y is GDP per worker from Heston et al. [2006] (Penn World Table (PWT) 6.2, base year
2000) in international dollars.
• h is human capital per worker computed following Caselli [2005] using data on educa-




where s is average years of schooling in the population over 25 in the year 2000. This
production function for human capital assumes that all returns to accumulation of this
factor are internalized and implies that the percentage difference in human capital,
log(h) − log(h′) equals the percentage difference in wage, log(w) − log(w′), which
in turn equals φ(s) − φ(s′). φ(s) is piecewise linear with slope 0.134 for s ≤4 (the
return to an additional year of schooling in sub-saharan Africa), 0.101 for 4< s ≤8 (the
average return in the world) and 0.068 for s >8 (the average return in the OECD). This
captures decreasing returns to education.
• k is the physical capital stock per worker computed from PWT 6.2 data using the per-
petual inventory method. The aggregate physical capital stock is
Kt = It + (1 − δ)Kt−1. (6)
Here It is real aggregate investment in PPP.2 K0 is chosen to be I0/(g + δ), where g is
the average geometric growth rate between the ﬁrst year with available data and 1975.
The depreciation rate δ is chosen to be 6% per year. The construction of the variable
follows exactly the methodology of Caselli [2005].
The World Bank [2006b] provides information on different types of natural capital. In partic-
ular there is separate information on subsoil resource capital, timber land, non-timber forest
resources, protected areas, cropland and pasture land. As we argue above, for inputs in pro-
duction we use the natural capital data provided in this World Bank data set for non-subsoil re-
sources (timber land, non-timber forest products, protected areas, cropland and pasture land).
2computed as RGDPL · POP · KI, where RDGPL is real GDP per capita using the Laspeyres method,
POP is the population and KI is the investment share in real GDP.126 6.2. METHOD AND DATA
We denote this measure by z(ns). In particular z(ns) includes and is computed by the World
Bank as follows:
• Timber wealth is calculated as the net present value (NPV) of rents from roundwood
production, with an assumed lifetime of 25 years. Unit rents are calculated as the prod-
uct of a composite weighted price and a rental rate. Unsustainable management of the
forest is captured by a shorter time horizon. Only forests within 50 kilometers of infras-
tructure are counted as being available for wood supply.
• Non-timber forest resources are beneﬁts stemming from various activities such as hunt-
ing, recreation as well as existence values. Returns per hectare per year vary from 190
US dollars in developed countries to 145 US dollars in developing countries. Further-
more it is assumed that one-tenth of the forest area in each country is accessible, i.e.
brings the above-mentioned beneﬁts. Non-timber forest resources are then valued as the
NPV of beneﬁts over 25 years.
• The value of cropland resources is estimated by assuming that the agricultural products
grown on the land are sold at world prices. The return to land is thus the difference
between the market value of output crops and crop speciﬁc production costs. Crops that
are being taken into account are maize, rice, wheat, banana, grapes, apples, oranges (the
last four as a proxy for fruits and vegetables), soybean and coffee (the latter two as a
proxy for oil crops and beverages respectively). Other crops are calculated as a residual.
A country’s overall land rent is then computed by a weighted average (weighted by the
sowing areas) of rents of all different crop categories. The annual return is projected for
25 years, i.e. starting from the year 2000 where values are known, until the year 2025,
assuming a constant growth rate which reﬂects sustainable management of land. The
NPV is calculated based on these assumptions.
• Pasture lands are valued at the opportunity cost of preserving land for grazing. The
returns to pasture land are assumed to be 45 percent of the output value, which is based
on the production of beef, lamb, milk, and wool valued at international prices. Again,
annual return is projected starting from the year 2000 until the year 2025, assuming a
constant growth rate reﬂecting sustainable grazing practices, and the NPV is calculated
accordingly.
• Protected areas provide a number of beneﬁts that range from existence values to recre-
ational values (tourist industry). They are valued at their opportunity cost, i.e. at theCHAPTER 6. THE MISSING INPUT: ACCOUNTING WITH AND FOR NATURAL
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minimum of the per hectare value for cropland and pasture land respectively. Again the
NPV over 25 years is computed.
• Finally the World Bank also provides estimates of the stocks of subsoil resources in a
country (which we denote by z(s)). Dollar values are assigned to the stocks of the main
energy resources (oil, gas and coal) as well as to the stocks of ten metals and minerals
(bauxite, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, nickel, phosphate rock, silver, tin and zinc). These
stocks are valued measuring the present discounted value of economic proﬁts (the total
rent at some time t) over the lifetime of the resource. Note that for this method future
rents of the resource have to be known. These are extrapolated from rents observed in
the year 2000, assuming that future rents grow at a constant rate g. A lifetime of 20
years is assumed for all resources and all countries.
In backing out productivity levels we do not use the measure of subsoil resource stocks
but rent ﬂows (r(s) as discussed above). Therefore we use in our calculation data on
subsoil resource rent, also provided by the World Bank.
Last, the income shares are calculated as follows: the labour share in GDP (β) is taken from
Bernanke and Gurkaynak [2001]. In order to maximize the number of observations we do not
exclude the countries where data for this variable is not available. Rather we use a geography-
based method to approximate the labour shares for the countries where the observations are
missing. We regress labor shares on regional dummies3 and use the corresponding predicted
values as labour shares for those countries where measured data is missing.
Assuming constant returns to scale in production, the total capital share in GDP is
(total capital share) = α + γ(s) + γ(ns) = 1 − β. (7)
We ﬁrst back out the income share of physical capital, α (for a discussion of this method see





where pkk and pyy is the nominal value of physical capital as well as output and i is the rental
rate for capital. We also know that the total capital share is given by (1 − β), where
1 − β =
i(pr(s)r(s) + pz(ns)z(ns) + pkk)
pyy
, (9)
where we have assumed that all types of capital have the same rental rate.
3The R2 from this regression is 0.4.128 6.3. MEASURES OF PRODUCTIVITY
Therefore we can rewrite the physical capital share as
α =
(1 − β)pyy




which can be simpliﬁed to
α =
pkk
pr(s)r(s) + pz(ns)z(ns) + pkk
(1 − β). (11)
pkk denotes the nominal value of physical capital which is given by the World Bank (physical
capital computed with the perpetual inventory method, in 2000 US dollars). pr(s)r(s) denotes
the nominal value of subsoil resources which is given by the resource rent data of the World
Bank as described before. Finally pz(ns)z(ns) denotes the nominal value of non-subsoil
resources. We normalize the price of non-subsoil resources to 1, and thus use the data from
the World Bank discussed previously.
At this stage we have all the data needed to back out the income share of physical capital, α.
Similarly the income shares of subsoil (γ(s)) and non-subsoil (γ(ns)) resources are computed.
In the regressions below several other variables are included. Institutional quality (IQual)
is measured by an index averaging different indices taken from Kaufmann et al. [1999], such
as government effectiveness, rule of law and graft. EuroLang, which is used as an exogenous
instrument in the analysis that is to follow, measures the population share speaking one of the
ﬁve primary European languages since birth. The measure of real openness (ropen), also used
as an instrument, is obtained by multiplying the openness variable of the PWT by the price
level of GDP. Land area (area) is measured in square kilometers. All of the above variables
(IQual, EuroLang, ropen and area) are taken from Alcal´ a and Ciccone [2004]. Furthermore
the population measure is taken from the Penn World Table 6.2.
6.3 Measures of productivity
In this section we compare our measures of productivity with the ones obtained by traditional
Development Accounting. That is we compute productivity A without taking natural capi-
tal into account (the traditional method) and compare these estimates with the measures we
believe to be more accurate (i.e. accounting for natural resources as an input factor in the
production process).
We ﬁnd that taking resources into account leads to systematic differences in the results. In
many cases the traditional method of computing A tends to underestimate productivity levels.
However we also note that in some, very poor, countries the traditional method estimates tooCHAPTER 6. THE MISSING INPUT: ACCOUNTING WITH AND FOR NATURAL
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high productivity levels, compared to our method, and argue that those countries have even
lower productivities than previously assumed. The intuition for this is the following. Poor
countries are often relatively more dependent on input from natural resources than rich ones.
Ignoring resources therefore leaves a relatively larger part of output unexplained. Thus A,
which measures the unexplained part in output as explained before, is relatively higher in poor
countries when resources as an input factor are not accounted for. Including natural resources
as an input factor results in a relatively smaller part of output unexplained and therefore in a
lower estimate of productivity A. In relatively rich countries on the other hand physical capital
is rather important, that is the physical capital income share is rather high using the traditional
method. When we account for natural capital in the new method, by deﬁnition the physical
capital share decreases. This means that much less variation in output (relative to the USA)
is explained by physical capital. Therefore, using the new method of Development Account-
ing, more of the relative output variation is left unexplained, which results in higher estimated
productivity levels. Of course, there is the counteracting effect (very important in relatively
poor countries as explained above) that the additional factor of natural capital is also able to
explain part of the output variation now. In countries where physical capital is very important
the former effect dominates the latter though, and thus we ﬁnd that in these countries the tra-
ditional method of Development Accounting underestimates productivity levels. Compared to
the traditional method of Developing Accounting we thus ﬁnd that cross country productivity
differences are even larger than assumed until now.
This can be seen graphically in Figure 6.1. We see the relationship between relative pro-
ductivity levels found using the traditional method (on the x-axis) and relative productivity
levels using our method (on the y-axis). Clearly if the productivity levels using both methods
were similar one would expect to ﬁnd most of the points on the 45 degree line. In fact, most of
the points are situated above that line indicating that productivity estimates using our method
are higher. But we also ﬁnd that for some very poor countries4 we ﬁnd even lower productivity
estimates than the traditional method.
A widely used measure of dispersion is the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile of the
distribution (see for example Caselli [2005]). This ratio takes on the value of 12.784 in the
case of accounting for natural resources (new method), and thus dispersion is much larger
than in the distribution of productivities when not accounting for natural capital. The ratio
using this (traditional) method of Development Accounting is 8.129. This again emphasizes
the point made above that productivity differences across countries seem to be larger than
4The correlation between output and productivity is very high therefore justifying this seemingly loose state-
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Figure 6.1: The traditional and the new method of computing productivity
presumed until now.
To see how much factor endowments can explain of income differences deﬁne the follow-








fac denotes the j-th percentile of the income distribution given by the factor-only
model.
success is the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile of income per worker if all countries
had the same productivity compared to the same ratio in the data. If factor endowment could
account for most of the cross country income differences, this measure should be close to one.
With the traditional method success is 0.32 while accounting for natural capital it is 0.24.
Hence, the income variation explained by factor endowments is signiﬁcantly lower with this
more correct method and an even larger proportion of income disparities must be attributed to
differences in productivity.
In Table 6.1 we show the results of the traditional method compared to our new results
for some especially interesting countries. In particular we show countries in which taking
resources into account makes a big difference. Whereas the traditional method underesti-
mates productivity levels in relatively rich countries such as Botswana, Chile, Norway and
Venezuela, it overestimates them in relatively poor countries such as Cameroon, Mali, NigerCHAPTER 6. THE MISSING INPUT: ACCOUNTING WITH AND FOR NATURAL
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New Method Traditional Method Comparing est. A
Country y cont. k cont. h cont. z cont. A cont. k cont. h cont. A A(new) A(trad.)
United States 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Botswana 0.25 0.95 0.48 14.43 0.04 1.25 0.57 0.35 0.66 0.35
Chile 0.42 0.91 0.60 10.07 0.08 1.20 0.73 0.47 0.77 0.47
Norway 0.95 1.35 0.96 1.18 0.65 1.45 0.97 0.68 0.75 0.68
Venezuela 0.27 0.97 0.51 11.52 0.06 1.36 0.58 0.34 0.60 0.34
Cameroon 0.09 0.79 0.42 14.31 0.02 0.52 0.45 0.38 0.19 0.38
Mali 0.03 0.80 0.34 11.52 0.01 0.66 0.33 0.15 0.07 0.15
Niger 0.03 0.81 0.34 12.69 0.01 0.70 0.33 0.11 0.05 0.11
Rwanda 0.03 0.78 0.38 10.86 0.01 0.40 0.39 0.18 0.06 0.18
Table 6.1: The traditional and the new method of development accounting
and Rwanda.
6.4 The resource curse revisited
6.4.1 A traditional resource curse regression
In this section we ﬁrst follow the line of the traditional resource curse literature. The most
closely related regression - given our data and method - is of the following form (Speciﬁcation
1):
log(yi) = a0 + a1γi + a2X1i + εi (13)
In(13)y denotesGDPpercapita, γ istheincomeshareofnaturalresources(γ = γ(s)+γ(ns))
and X1 denotes a matrix of control variables. ai are the coefﬁcients, where in this case we are
especially interested in the sign of a1. Note that in the traditional resource curse literature the
measures of resource wealth employed are usually resource exports
GDP or resource exports
total exports . Both
of these variables measure resource dependence rather than abundance, a problem we come
back to shortly. Theclosest related to this variable in oursetup is γ, the income share ofnatural
resources. Running the above speciﬁcation we ﬁnd the traditional resource curse result, that is
our measure for natural resource wealth is negatively related to income per capita. The result
can be seen in Table 6.2.132 6.4. THE RESOURCE CURSE REVISITED
More recently, it has become common to include institutional quality in resource curse re-
gressions. Since institutional quality is clearly endogenous in income regressions such as (13)
we employ a two stage least squares technique, in which institutional quality is instrumented
for. Therefore our next speciﬁcation (Speciﬁcation 2) is of the following form:
log(yi) = b0 + b1γi + b2IQuali + b3X2i + εi (14)
IQuali = β0 + β1conditioning variablesi + β2Y2i + ¯ εi (15)
We choose for EuroLang as the exogenous instrument for institutional quality (see for example
Alcal´ a and Ciccone [2004]). Y2 denotes control variables in the ﬁrst stage regression. We ﬁnd,
coherent with much of the traditional literature, that our measure for resource wealth has a
negative impact on institutional quality (see Table 6.3). In addition, even when controlling for
institutional quality, in our data natural resources preserve their negative impact on income
(see Table 6.2).
The above analysis suggests that resources have a negative effect on economic perfor-
mance of a country. This effect seems to work through a direct as well as an indirect channel.
The regression results suggest that resources impact negatively on institutional quality (in-
direct effect) and also have a direct (Dutch Disease type) negative effect on income. The
regression deﬁned in equation (14) is the most basic speciﬁcation certifying the destructive
effect of natural resources. Results similar to the one presented above were responsible for the
coining of the term resource “curse”. We argue here that several important problems plague
the traditional resource curse literature. In particular we detail three drawbacks of regressions
of the type presented above:
First, the resource wealth measure is a compound measure, made up of all types of natural
resources. It has been recognized recently that not all kinds of resources may have the same
effect on economies (Leite and Weidmann [2002], Isham et al. [2005], Bulte et al. [2005]).
Along this line, we argue that subsoil and non-subsoil resources should be accounted for
separately, and we take advantage of our data set accordingly.
Second, the resource wealth measure is endogenous. As already pointed out, the usual
resource wealth (export) measure reﬂects resource dependence, and as such suffers from en-
dogeneity problems. Speciﬁcally, resource dependence might lead to a low income per capita,
but the converse could also be true. Poor countries often depend to a large extent on their
resources, because for instance the manufacturing sector might be underdeveloped. Therefore
a correct analysis of the effect of resource dependence on income, has to properly address theCHAPTER 6. THE MISSING INPUT: ACCOUNTING WITH AND FOR NATURAL
CAPITAL 133
endogeneity problem.
Third, an important critique of the traditional resource measure is that it does not cap-
ture the effect of resource wealth but rather of resource dependence of a country. To answer
more precisely the question asked by the entire resource curse literature (i.e. the relationship
between the degree of resource abundance, that is wealth, and economic performance of a
country), we propose a different measure of resource wealth.
In the next sections we address each of the above points in turn, and thereby re-assess the
resource curse.
6.4.2 A disaggregated measure
The larger part of the discussion on the resource curse takes “resources” as an aggregate, com-
pound measure. Our recently available data allows us to improve upon this point. In particular
we can distinguish between the effects of subsoil as opposed to non-subsoil resources. We are
therefore able to align our analysis with recent results that establish that the effect of so-called
point resources is different to the one of diffuse ones. Point resources are geographically clus-
tered and thereby ﬁt our deﬁnition of subsoil resources, whereas non-subsoil resources in our
terming correspond to diffuse resources. We repeat the above analysis, but now accounting
for the two different kinds of resources separately.
log(yi) = d0 + d1γi(s) + d2γi(ns) + d3IQuali + d4X3i + εi (16)
IQuali = δ0 + δ1conditioning variablesi + δ2Y3i + ¯ εi (17)
The results conﬁrm that the effects of the two types of resources differ signiﬁcantly. Both
resources enter with a negative coefﬁcient in the ﬁrst stage regression for institutional quality,
but only non-subsoil resources exhibit a signiﬁcant effect (see Table 6.3). Similarly only
non-subsoil resources have a negative effect on income. Subsoil resources do not exhibit any
direct effect in our estimation (see Table 6.2). These results (that only non-subsoil resources
are negatively related to income - directly as well as indirectly) prove therefore the importance
of differentiating according to the type of resource in question.
6.4.3 Solving the endogeneity problem
In this section, we address the problem of endogeneity of the resource dependence measure.
As discussed earlier the traditional export measure suffers from serious endogeneity problems.134 6.4. THE RESOURCE CURSE REVISITED
So does our resource dependence measure employed in the preceding section.
The solution is to instrument for the endogenous variables in a two stage least squares
approach. Institutional quality (IQual) and the income share of subsoil as well as non-subsoil
resources (γ(s), γ(ns)) are instrumented as follows:
log(yi) = f0 + f1γi(s) + f2γi(ns) + f3IQuali + f4X4i + εi (18)
γi(s) = φ0s + φ1sconditioning variablesi + φ2sY4si + ˜ εi (19)
γi(ns) = φ0ns + φ1nsconditioning variablesi + φ2nsY4nsi + ˆ εi (20)
IQuali = φ0I + φ1Iconditioning variablesi + φ2IY4Ii + ¯ εi (21)
We use four exogenous instruments the fraction of European languages (EuroLang), real open-
ness (ropen), and the stocks of subsoil as well as non-subsoil resources (z(s) and z(ns)). Note
in particular that the resource stocks as provided by the World Bank (see Data section) are
exogenous for our purposes. We perform several tests to validate our use of instruments. First
of all the F-tests clearly indicate that the chosen instruments have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the endogenous variables. Also the Hansen J-statistic, the result of an overidentiﬁcation test,
shows that all instruments are exogenous. That is the null hypothesis that all instruments are
relevant, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, cannot be rejected. Furthermore the Kleibergen-
Papp underidentiﬁcation test gives evidence that the equation is identiﬁed, i.e. the excluded
instruments are indeed correlated with the endogenous regressors.
The results obtained once we control for endogeneity challenge the resource curse liter-
ature in important ways. In particular, both the income share of non-subsoil as well as of
subsoil resources, seem to have a positive rather than a negative effect on income per capita,
suggesting that resources contribute to welfare in a positive way. In the case of subsoilshare
this impact is signiﬁcant (see Table 6.2 and 6.3).
6.4.4 A fresh look at the resource curse
The income regression
Our remaining correction to previous literature refers to the fact that the traditional resource
curse literature has used (or triggered) a wrong terminology. The literature seemed to have
established as a sort of stylized fact that resources (i.e. resource wealth or abundance) impact
negatively on a country’s development. Our analysis so far aims to point out a far-reachingCHAPTER 6. THE MISSING INPUT: ACCOUNTING WITH AND FOR NATURAL
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mistake by most of the literature in mixing up the notions of resource abundance and depen-
dence. Data available until recently (mostly export data) has enabled scholars to only consider
the effects of dependence rather than abundance. To validate the general claim that resources
are bad for development, it is apparent that the objective should include not only at the effect
of resource dependence but also of resource abundance per se. In the next step we re-open
the question of the resource curse replacing resource dependence with resource wealth in our
speciﬁcation. Resource wealth is best measured by the resource stock of a country, now avail-
able from the World Bank, as described in the Data section. There are several possible reasons
why the stock of (in particular subsoil and timber) resources may inﬂuence the income of an
economy. Remember from section 6.2.2 that resource stocks, by construction, include the ex-
pected future rent ﬂows. For some resources (like for example pasture lands) the link is very
clear. For others the inﬂuence could occur via indirect channels. Indirectly a high resource
stock could have a detrimental effect on institutions. High levels of corruption could be the
consequence of a large amount of resources in the ground. Similarly such wealth, by increas-
ing the value of being in power, could lead to an increased chance of conﬂict as well as more
frequent changes in political power (with subsequent positive or negative effects on income).
More generally, I argue that the resources known to be in the ground are a potential future
wealth for the country, which is included in the expectations of the people. This treasure in
the ground may have many effects, as an example it may be used as collateral in order to
secure foreign credits. As we will see shortly this idea ﬁnds some support in the following
empirical analysis.
Next we want to scrutinize the resource curse by running the above regression speciﬁca-
tion, but now including resource wealth rather than dependence as a right hand side variable.
In particular Speciﬁcation 5 is given by
log(yi) = g0 + g1log(Zi(s)) + g2log(Zi(ns)) + g3IQuali + g4X5i + εi (22)
IQuali = ζ0 + ζ1conditioning variablesi + ζ2Y5i + ¯ εi (23)
In (22) Z(s) and Z(ns) respectively denote the stock of subsoil and non-subsoil resources
respectively. As in (14) institutional quality is endogenous. Thus, in a ﬁrst stage regression,
we may inspect the effect of resource stocks on institutional quality. We ﬁnd, contrary to
the traditional resource curse result discussed in Section 6.4.1, that resource stocks have a
positive effect on institutional quality, which in the case of non-subsoil resources is signiﬁcant
(see Table 6.3).136 6.4. THE RESOURCE CURSE REVISITED
In the main income regression we ﬁnd that resource stocks have a positive (and subsoil
a signiﬁcant) effect on income (see Table 6.2). Note that the effects are of a high economic
signiﬁcance. Since our relationship is estimated using a log linear model, we can interpret our
coefﬁcients as elasticities. That is, a one percent change in the independent variable subsoil
resource wealth increases income by 0.07 percent. Note that the size and disparity of the
independent variable subsoil wealth is very high (the sample mean is 5778.5 and the standard
deviation 14344.2). An increase in the subsoil wealth of a country by 100 percent - which
for example captures the difference between an averagely resource rich country such as Egypt
(the 90th richest country in the sample) and Argentina (the 96th riches country) - implies an
increase in income of 7 percent. These results are in clear contradiction with the resource
curse literature.
At this point our results lead us to conclude that resource stocks (i.e. abundance) might
actually be a blessing for a country. We ﬁnd a direct positive effect of subsoil resource abun-
dance on the income of a country. Furthermore non-subsoil resource abundance affects the
income of a country positively in an indirect way - through institutional quality.
Looking deeper
Having established that “the effect of resources” is in fact the effect of resource stocks on
economic performance, we next turn take a deeper look within the Development Accounting
framework laid out before. The method of Development Accounting allows us to understand
through which channels output is affected by resource wealth. That is, can now estimate the
effect of resources on the different inputs physical capital, human capital and productivity.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate a model similar to equation (22), using now productivity, physical
and human capital as dependent variables (Speciﬁcation 6, 7 and 8 respectively).
As reported in the last columns of Table 6.2 and 6.3, we ﬁnd that resources impact pos-
itively on all inputs, human capital, physical capital as well as productivity. The channels
through which they do are different though. In particular, we ﬁnd a direct positive inﬂuence
of subsoil resources on physical and human capital. Coming back to the question why sub-
soil resource stocks have a positive effect on income, this ﬁnding gives some support to the
idea laid out in the previous section. Resources in the ground may be used as a collateral to
acquire credits - money which is in turn invested productively in physical and human capital.
This hypothesis ﬁnds support in the fact that subsoil resource stocks affect income positively
through their effect on human and physical capital accumulation. We ﬁnd that, ceteris paribus,
an increase in subsoil wealth of 100 percent leads to an increase in human capital of 2 percent.
Moreover, the regression suggests that an increase in subsoil wealth of such magnitude im-CHAPTER 6. THE MISSING INPUT: ACCOUNTING WITH AND FOR NATURAL
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plies an increase in physical capital of 10 percent. Non-subsoil resources, on the other hand,
positively affect productivity and the stock of physical capital. In both cases this happens in-
directly through their positive effect on institutional quality. Again we are able to distinguish
between the effect of subsoil vs. non-subsoil resources. The former affect income positively
through their direct effect on physical and human capital accumulation, while the latter have
a positive (indirect) effect on income that works through physical capital and productivity.
6.5 Conclusions
Using the technique of Development Accounting and new data on natural resource inputs
we back out more accurate measures of total factor productivity. We ﬁnd that accounting
for natural resources as an input factor makes a systematic difference in the cross-country
distribution of productivity levels.
Furthermore Development Accounting provides us with a new measure of resource de-
pendence. We recognize that this, as well as other measures of dependence, suffers from
endogeneity problems and remedy this problem using an instrumental variables approach.
When properly instrumented, the negative effect of resource dependence - as suggested by
the resource curse literature - vanishes. Furthermore - to really examine the effect of re-
sources - we consider the effect of exogenous resource stocks on economic performance. Also
here evidence for a positive relationship is found. Similar insights with respect to economic
growth have been suggested in earlier works (Ding and Field [2004], Brunnschweiler and
Bulte [2008a]).
Our setup differs from the recent work by Brunnschweiler and Bulte in an important as-
sumption. They make the case that institutional quality might inﬂuence the degree of resource
dependence, hence a reverse causality compared to the traditional resource curse literature. A
complete analysis into the causality of these two variables would require the estimation of a
simultaneous equation model. We defer this to future research, and maintain in the present
chapter with the assumption of the traditional resource curse literature, that resources may
affect institutional quality. There are arguments that support this intuition. For example the
positive relationship we ﬁnd might be explained through a sort of endowment effect: resources
may provide a government with the ﬁnancial means to provide better-functioning institutions.
Development Accounting allows us to take a deeper look into the effects of resources.
We ﬁnd that resource abundance leads to higher levels of physical and human capital as well
as productivity. Thus our work particularly rejects Dutch Disease type arguments, which
contend that resources may hinder the accumulation of productive inputs (Sachs and Warner138 6.5. CONCLUSIONS
[1997], Gylfason et al. [1999], Gylfason and Zoega [2001], Papyrakis and Gerlagh [2004],
De Gregorio and Bravo-Ortega [2005]).
Our ﬁndings suggest that the term “curse of natural resources” (so widespread in the ﬁeld)
might be misleading. In fact, the econometric analysis of this chapter raises considerable






























































Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 Spec. 7 Spec. 8
log(y) log(y) log(y) log(y) log(y) log(A) log(h) log(k)
￿ -6.9 *** -4.13 **
[5.95] [2.34]
￿ (s) 2.27 26.04 *
[0.59] [1.95]
￿ (ns) -4.01 ** 3.17
[2.40] [1.04]
log(z(s)) 0.07 *** 0.04 0.02 *** 0.1 ***
[2.87] [0.79] [3.06] [3.49]
log(z(ns)) 0.06 -0.17 0.03 0.03
[0.50] [0.87] [0.75] [0.18]
IQual 3.27 * 3.07 * 6.36 *** 4.86 *** 6.11 ** 0.3 5.58 ***
[1.75] [1.69] [3.85] [5.93] [2.19] [0.70] [5.22]
log(pop) -0.2 *** -0.16 *** -0.14 *** -0.04 -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 * -0.18 ***
[3.42] [3.20] [3.02] [0.48] [1.28] [0.25] [1.89] [2.68]
log(area) 0.17 *** 0.13 ** 0.12 ** -0.01 0.02 0.06 0 0.12
[2.92] [2.56] [2.24] [0.12] [0.28] [0.48] [0.23] [1.62]
Constant 11.53 *** 8.05 *** 8.18 *** 4.52 ** 5.5 *** 4.54 ** 0.67 ** 5.28 ***
[19.68] [4.11] [4.47] [2.39] [6.26] [1.97] [2.23] [3.68]
Observations 94 92 91 76 81 68 71 78
Adjusted (Centered)  R-squared 0.78 0.85 0.86 0.71 0.83 0.5 0.74 0.86
Continent Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hansen J p-value 0.75
Underidentification Test (Kleibergen-Papp) 2.85 * 3.08 * 6.09 ** 10.52 *** 4.07 ** 6.52 *** 9.27 ***
Robust t statistics in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%


















Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 Spec. 7 Spec. 8
IQual IQual IQual
￿ (ns)











log(z(s)) 0.00 -0.01 ** 0.00 *** 0.00     0.00     0.01     0.01    
[0.89] [2.18] [4.73] [0.51] [0.9] [1.02] [1.02]
log(z(ns)) 0.02 0.05 ** 0.00 0.06 **  0.04     0.04     0.04    
[0.89] [2.5] [0.85] [2.24] [1.43] [1.47] [1.47]
log(pop) -0.02 -0.02 0.04 * -0.02 0.00 0.00     -0.02     0.00     0.00    
[1.29] [1.38] [1.77] [1.46] [0.98] [0.27] [0.84] [0.17] [0.17]
log(area) 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02     0.00     -0.01     -0.01    
[1.22] [1.5] [0.62] [0.82] [0.57] [1.37] [0.32] [0.6] [0.6]
EuroLang 0.08 *** 0.09 ** 0.09 * -0.04 ** 0.01 0.18 *** 0.11 *   0.14 **  0.14 ** 
[1.68] [1.74] [1.79] [1.99] [1.6] [3.64] [1.91] [2.57] [2.57]
log(ropen) 0.11 *** -0.06 *** 0.00
[3.52] [3.62] [0.05]
Constant 0.99 *** 0.94 0.57 ** -0.26 0.00 0.31     0.58 *   0.42     0.42    
[8.99] [8.16] [2.01] [1.34] [0.1] [1.11] [1.84] [1.39] [1.39]
Observations 92 91 76 76 76 81 68 71 78
Centered R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.72 0.51 0.69 0.73 0.71 0.70
F stat 2.84 * 3.01 * 4.82 *** 11.02 *** 7.16 *** 13.28 *** 3.66 * 6.62 ** 11.22 ***
Continent Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Robust t statistics in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6.3: First Stage Regression ResultsSamenvatting (Dutch Summary)
Volgens standaard economische theorien zou een grotere voorraad bezittingen - dat kun-
nen kapitaalgoederen, menselijk kapitaal of bodemschatten zijn - een land meer mogelijkhe-
den moeten geven voor economische ontwikkeling. Paradoxaal genoeg laat een groeiende
empirische literatuur zien dat natuurlijke rijkdommen eerder een belemmering vormen voor
economische groei dan een stimulering. De eerste studies op dit terrein van Sachs and Warner
[1997] laten zien dat een stijging van n standaarddeviatie in de voorraad bodemschatten een
daling van ongeveer n procent economische groei betekent, waarbij gecontroleerd wordt voor
een groot aantal variabelen. Dit is een verwarrend resultaat. Volgens dezelfde redenering
wordt ook gesuggereerd dat landen die rijk zijn aan natuurlijke rijkdommen meer geweld-
dadige conﬂicten kennen dan landen die weinig natuurlijke hulpbronnen hebben. In onder-
meer werk van Collier and Hoefﬂer [1998], Ross [2004b] en anderen wordt overtuigend bear-
gumenteerd dat bepaalde bodemschatten tot burgeroorlogen leiden en rebellen ondersteunen
in hun inspanningen om de regering te bestrijden. Om deze redenen wordt het hebben van een
overvloedaanbodemschatteneerderalseenvloekvooreconomischeontwikkelingbeschouwd
dan als een zegen.
Inhetalgemeenzijn(gewelddadige)conﬂictenalsonderzoeksthemameeropdevoorgrond
getreden, als een urgent probleem dat vraagt om een oplossing. Het was en zal waarschi-
jnlijk een onderwerp blijven op de onderzoeksagenda’s van veel verschillende disciplines,
zoals politicologie, sociologie, biologie, psychologie en antropologie. Als voorbeeld van een
dergelijk onderwerp kan men denken aan de dreiging van terroristische aanvallen dat een on-
derwerp van veel discussie is. De analyse van conﬂicten zou vaak verrijkt kunnen worden
met economische analyses. E´ en van de voordelen van economische analyse, het theoretisch
modelleren van een probleem, is tot zover verwaarloosd als methode.
De meest voor de hand liggende vragen op dit terrein zijn hoe de dreiging van een con-
ﬂict af te wenden is en hoe een land conﬂicten kan beheersen op het moment dat ze er zijn.
Om met antwoorden te komen, moeten we eerst de oorzaken begrijpen. Dat is het moment
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waar economische theorie nuttig kan zijn. Theoretische modellen bieden een systematisch
denkraam voor het bestuderen van het samenspel van oorzaken en gevolgen, prikkels en de
drijfveren achter bepaalde fenomenen.
Natuurlijk is er al veel onderzoek verricht naar conﬂicten met betrekking tot natuurlijke
rijkdommen om de empirische feiten vast te stellen en om de patronen te vinden in dergelijke
gebeurtenissen. Toch is het onderzoek naar de voornaamste oorzaken van dergelijke conﬂicten
nog speculatief. Het standpunt van dit proefschrift is dat het formaliseren van deze processen
belangrijk is om een beter begrip te krijgen. Het grootste deel van dit proefschrift is gewijd
aan het verkrijgen van inzicht met betrekking tot conﬂicten over bodemschatten in het formele,
rationeel keuzemodel met strategische interacties.
Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 modelleren conﬂictsituaties tussen twee groepen die de verdeling van de
opbrengsten van natuurlijke rijkdommen betwisten. Hoofdstuk 3 kijkt naar de geograﬁsche
spreiding van de bodemschat en naar het effect daarvan op de intensiteit van een conﬂict.
Hoofdstuk 4 beschouwt echter het effect van de grootte van de bodemschat op de intensiteit
van het conﬂict. Over beide problemen bestaat een grote hoeveelheid empirische literatuur,
maar deze twee hoofdstukken zijn de eerste in het geven van een theoretische onderbouwing
van de empirische bevindingen.
Eenoverheiddieinterneconﬂictenoverbodemschattenwilvermijden, heefttweemanieren
om dit te bereiken. De eerste mogelijkheid is militaire onderdrukking van de bevolking. Dit
kan eenvoudig worden bereikt door het opbouwen van een groot militair apparaat zodat de
bevolking niet in opstand durft te komen. Een tweede mogelijke strategie is het zogenaamde
’kopen van de vrede’. Dat gebeurt door de productiviteit van de bevolking in de andere sec-
toren dan de sector van de bodemschat te verhogen. De manier om dit te doen is het aanbieden
van goederen die de productiviteit verhogen, zoals goede gezondheidszorg, infrastructuur, on-
derwijs en dergelijke. Een overheid die dit doet, verhoogt de kosten van vechten voor de
bevolking. De bevolking wordt dan weerhouden van opstanden en geleid in de richting van
meer productieve activiteiten.
Twee hoofdstukken van deze thesis behandelen expliciet deze twee verschillende strate-
gien van een overheid. Het doel van hoofdstuk 4 is om de hevigheid van conﬂicten te begri-
jpen. De nadruk daar ligt op de onderdrukkende strategie van een heersende elite. Hoofdstuk
5 echter kijkt nadrukkelijk naar een overheid die kiest voor het aanbieden van publieke goed-
eren. Hier ligt de nadruk op een beleidsstrategie van het ’kopen van de vrede’.
Tot slot, hoofdstuk 6 heeft een unieke plaats binnen dit proefschrift. Vanuit een method-
ologisch perspectief is dit het enige hoofdstuk dat geen gebruik maakt van speltheorie. Dit
hoofdstuk is uitgevoerd als een oefening in empirie. Conceptueel is het gewijd aan een anderSamenvatting (Dutch Summary) 143
facet van de vloek: het verband tussen bodemschatten en slechte economische prestaties.Bibliography
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